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This dissertation is a cross-national, empirical study of human rights conditions in a
dynamic international political economy.  The scope of the examination covers 176
developed and developing countries from 1980 through 1993.  Through evaluating the
numerous theoretical aspects of human rights conceptualization, I draw upon Shue's
framework1 and consider whether there are indeed "basic rights" and which rights should
fit into this category.  Further, I address the debate between those who claim that these
rights are truly universal (applying to all nations and individuals) and those who argue that
the validity of a moral right is relative to indigenous cultures.  In a similar vein, I
empirically investigate whether various human rights are interdependent and indivisible, as
some scholars argue, or whether there are inherent trade-offs between various rights
provisions.  In going beyond the fixation on a single aspect of human rights, I broadly
investigate subsistence rights, security rights and political and economic freedom.  While
these have previously been addressed separately, there are virtually no studies that
consider them together and the subsequent linkages between them.
Ultimately, a pooled time-series cross-section model is developed that moves
beyond the traditional concentration on security rights (also know as integrity of the
person rights) and focuses on the more controversial subsistence rights (also known as
basic human needs).  By addressing both subsistence and security rights, I consider
whether certain aspects of the changing international political economy affect these two
groups of rights in different ways.  A further delineation is made between OECD and non-
                                      
1 Shue, Henry. 1980. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
OECD countries.  The primary international focus is on the effects of global integration
and the end of the Cold War.  Domestic explanations that are connected with
globalization include economic freedom, income inequality and democratization.  These
variables are subjected to bivariate and multivariate hypothesis testing including bivariate
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After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the segmenting of society into nation-
states began and the principle of national sovereignty started to take hold.  Along with
this idea of sovereignty came acceptance of the concept that internal affairs of states were
strictly a national rather than international matter.  The manner in which a government
treated its citizens or respected their human rights was likewise a domestic issue.  This
situation continued until the mid- 1940s with the end of the Second World War and the
creation of the United Nations.  It was then and only then that the notion of "human
rights" crept into the everyday vernacular of international politics (Weston 1992).  In the
wake of the atrocities of National Socialism in Germany, the concept of rights endowed
to individuals simply because they are human beings finally came into widespread favor.
Since World War II there has been a proliferation of international human rights
agreements, an unprecedented development in the history of international law.
Organizations like Amnesty International, Freedom House and the U.S. State Department
built upon these international instruments by issuing global reports on human rights
practices beginning in the 1970s.  More recently, these organizations and others have
issued human rights news virtually worldwide via the internet, so scholars and
practitioners alike now have the means toward a much better and more current
2
knowledge of countries’ human rights performance.1 As a result of these new
communications technologies and increasing globalization and interdependence,
governments are finding it increasingly difficult to violate their citizens' human rights
without attracting the attention and the ire of interested individuals, governments, and
international organizations around the world.
Notwithstanding the widespread acceptance of human rights issues as reflected in
U.N. and regional documents, observers may still ask why the study of human rights is
such an important endeavor to pursue.  I would argue that while social science research
might generally have considerable implications for society, few areas of inquiry are as
vital to the well-being of the individual citizens of the world.  It is hoped that
dissemination of these findings will help to increase our knowledge of human rights and
perhaps improve the current situation concerning these rights.  While some might dismiss
these goals as naive or idealistic, I believe that providing a better understanding of
international human rights and the violation of those rights is an important first step
towards eliminating the most severe types of abuse.
Heinish (1994) describes a number of problems that have plagued comparative
human rights research.  These include: 1) a normative controversy between disparate
conceptions of human rights which produce different preferences and potential rights
tradeoffs; 2) the issue of whether human rights are truly universal or relative and
culturally bound; 3) the question of narrowing a complex set of rights in an effort to
evaluate them empirically; and 4) the important but sometimes difficult task of
1 Examples of these include Freedom House (http://freedomhouse.org/), U.S. Department of State
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comparing countries with highly divergent resources and attributes.  This dissertation
addresses each of these shortcomings.
1.1 Organization of the Study
The study, which investigates the dynamic international political economy and
human rights, is divided into six chapters.  Chapter Two reviews the growing and diverse
literature in human rights.  This includes early investigations into U.S. foreign policy and
human rights as it pertains to foreign aid allocation.  Further, the separate work
concerning subsistence rights and security rights performance is compared and important
factors identified.  Potential controversies and contradictory findings are highlighted in
order to guide the scope and methodology of this study.
Chapter Three examines the content and nature of human rights.  First, I address
the theoretical question of whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so, which
rights fit into this category.  This chapter takes a broader view than much of the recent
literature that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g., integrity
of the person rights).  In examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the
origins of these rights in international law.  This ranges from the beginnings of the
United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the recent formation
of the International War Crimes Tribunal.  The issue here is whether there is indeed an
international human rights “regime” and to what extent this regime controls or alters
national sovereignty.  A second, parallel controversy that is also dealt with is the issue of
cultural relativism versus universality.  Are human rights truly universal in the sense that
they are the rights of every person simply because he or she is a human being? Or, as
many in the non-western world argue, is the validity of a moral right or rule relative to
(http://www.state.gov/global/human_rights/index.html) and Amnesty International
(http://www.amnesty.org/).
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the indigenous culture? While these normative questions are quite difficult to definitively
answer, it is imperative that we confront the various schools of thought and evaluate their
theoretical strengths and weaknesses.
Third, I empirically evaluate the assertion that rights are interdependent and
indivisible.  Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between the
provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989,
188) and as often argued by certain regimes.  Or, on the other hand, are two or more of
these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together, as suggested by
Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995).  Finally, I present exploratory results which
describe the empirical landscape of various rights.  Here, trend analyses are used to
determine if these rights and freedoms are improving in the world and whether the
national practices are converging or diverging.
Chapter Four provides the foundation of the multivariate research design, which
attempts to explain actual variation in human rights practices around the world.
Ultimately, the most theoretically interesting issue with which I am concerned is
determining what makes some regimes promote human rights while others do not. While
there is some convergence in human rights practices, there still remains a large disparity
between those nations that adequately provide basic human rights and those that do not.
This is an especially important objective since we can only provide intelligent
prescriptions to insure human rights conditions if we as scholars can adequately explain
human rights variations.  Further, if we can eventually identify situations that indicate a
government's propensity to violate human rights, we might assist in actually preventing
the spread of abuse.  To this end, I build upon the existing theoretical and empirical
research to develop multivariate models that attempt to explain variation in the broadly
conceived notion of basic human rights.
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In choosing the specific dependent variables in this chapter, I draw upon the
widely accepted framework of “basic rights” as offered by Shue (1980).  He argues that
there are at least three basic rights: security, subsistence, and liberty.  I have chosen to
highlight subsistence rights (also known as basic human needs) and security rights (also
known as integrity of the person or physical integrity rights).  This is an important
distinction in the literature since almost all studies focus only on a single aspect of human
rights.  However, I believe that by examining both areas in a comparative fashion, we
can gain even more knowledge of the dynamics of human rights practices.  The
important question here is whether certain factors affect various aspects of human rights
(i.e., subsistence and security rights) in different ways.
Again breaking from the traditional human rights literature, I employ an
international political economy model that centers on globalization and its effects on
basic human rights.  The general model includes both economic and political variables
that can be further categorized into international and domestic factors.  The primary
international focus is on the effects of global integration and the end of the Cold War.  It
is hypothesized that increased global integration will provide an environment in which
basic human rights are more likely guaranteed.  This hypothesis is surrounded by the
ongoing theoretical debate between realism/neorealism (Morgenthau 1948, 1967; Waltz
1979; Gilpin 1981, 1987; Prestowitz 1988; and Grieco 1990) and liberalism/globalism
(Keohane 1984, 1986; Axelrod 1984; Axelrod and Keohane 1986, Keohane and Nye
1989; Oye 1986; Lake 1988; Snidel 1985, 1991; Suzuki 1994).  As illustrated by Holsti
(1985), globalism predicts that growing interdependence of nations will result in a global
society or community.  In the last two decades, the increasing speed of technological
developments has transformed the way in which governments and individuals conduct
their affairs.  The ubiquity of the computer has revolutionized the financial and trade
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markets into a worldwide market place.  This has resulted in a dramatic rise in trade and
an even greater increase in international capital flow.  Further, in the aftermath of the
debt crises of the 1980s, IMF and World Bank influences over developing countries’
domestic economic policies (and indeed in the developed world’s need to remedy the
crisis) highlights this growing interdependence.  With new financial and (potentially)
political crises emerging in Asia and Russia, the degree to which many of the world’s
countries are intertwined is becoming quite apparent.
I further hypothesize that the incorporation of a nation into the international
community should have a positive effect upon a regime's treatment of its citizenry.  With
the advances in worldwide communication, this argument makes intuitive sense.  Further
integration into the world community would result in information concerning domestic
human rights abuses being dispersed more quickly to the outside world and therefore
bringing pressure on the offending government  (Webster 1994, 95).  Continuing this line
of reasoning, we could expect improvements in human rights practices as a result of
expanded integration.  As stipulated in the numerous international instruments discussed
in Chapter Three (e.g., International Bill of Human Rights), the world community has
agreed upon certain human rights standards.  If governments choose to go against these
accepted standards, they run the risk of bad publicity (which could indirectly injure them
economically by way of reductions in foreign investment) and perhaps economic
sanctions, which would be directly deleterious.  In an age of increasing capital mobility,
Keohane and Milner (1996, 19) argue that internationalization should even affect those
countries not integrated into the global system (i.e., those countries whose economies are
not open).  While there have only been two studies that even allude to the linkage
between globalization and variation in human rights practices (Gurr 1986, and Webster
1994), I move beyond these in both operational and methodological approaches.
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The realist/neorealist perspective might suggest that the power politics involved
in waging the Cold War would result in degraded human rights practices.  Regime
leaders on both sides of the superpower conflict might be more than willing to increase
repression on their own citizens in order to combat threats to the state.  Having said that,
I break with conventional wisdom and hypothesize that human rights are less likely to be
realized in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War as compared to the period of
superpower stalemate.  This would appear counter-intuitive to the realist perspective and
the tensions present during the Cold War.  However, if one observes developments since
the end of the Cold War, this scenario seems more plausible.  Since the fall of the Berlin
Wall in 1989 and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet Union, we have seen countries
struggling in their move to a market economy and democracy.  Market reforms in many
instances have resulted in at least a short-term decrease in the average person’s standard
of living.  Another problem that has arisen is the revival of nationalism among various
groups that previously was restrained by the respective superpowers.  As evidenced
throughout the former Soviet empire, national animosities that were suppressed during
the Cold War struggle have now bubbled over into severe conflicts.  Obvious examples
include the bloody confrontations in the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, and Georgia.
While tensions have at times eased, many of these regions still experience severe basic
human rights violations.  This line of reasoning is connected with the issues surrounding
ethnic conflict and civil war and their deleterious effects on basic human rights.
The primary domestic factors associated with globalization include economic
freedom, income inequality, and democracy.  The concentration on economic freedom
further distinguishes this work from others that traditionally center only on political
rights or civil liberties.  The argument here is that countries with higher levels of
economic freedom are more likely to insure basic human rights.  It has been shown that
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economic freedom is tied to higher levels of economic development (Gwartney, et al.
1996).  If increased levels of GNP are indeed correlated with better human rights
practices as the literature suggests, then economic freedom should (at least indirectly)
have an effect on basic human rights.2
Surrounding the issue of human rights and increasing levels of GNP are the
potential development trade-offs with basic needs and income equality.  It is argued here
that a greater inequality in wealth will likely result in a government being less likely to
guarantee basic human rights.  This development vs. equality competition can take a
"strong" and "weak" form.  The weak equality trade-off stipulates that the relationship
between the level of economic development and income inequality takes the form of an
inverted U-curve.3 The strong variation views inequality not so much an unintended
casualty of, but rather a contributor to, development.  Since only the relatively wealthy
will be able to save and invest, (and if investment is the mainstay of robust growth),
inequality is seen to benefit even the poor in the long run.  The research design includes
this factor to determine just what effect income inequality actually has on basic human
rights.
Following the recent literature that finds a relatively strong, positive relationship
between democratically controlled governments and the protection of human rights, I
also incorporate the variable of democracy in my general research design.4 There are a
number of reasons why democracy could have a substantial influence on basic human
2 In terms of subsistence rights, a number of authors (Moon and Dixon 1985, Spalding 1986, Rosh 1986,
and Park 1987) find that wealth is one of the most powerful explanations of well being.  Mitchell and
McCormick (1988), Henderson (1991) and Poe and Tate (1994) also find some support for this positive
connection between GNP and respect for security rights.
3 This U-curve hypothesis was first proposed by Kuznets (1955) and has since been widely debated
(Colombatto 1991; Newman and Thomson 1989; Newman and Thomson 1991; Ogwang 1995; Ram
1988; Rock 1993).
4 Scholars finding support for this notion are Henderson (1991, 1993), Poe and Tate (1994), Moon and
Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986), and Moon (1991).
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rights.  Since the democratic process is built on bargaining and compromise, it provides a
viable alternative for dealing with conflict.  Another basis for this hypothesis is that
democracies offer their citizens the ability to remove potentially abusive leaders before
violations become widespread.  Further, the civil liberties usually associated with
democracies (such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.) allow citizens and
opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular regime to not only the domestic
consumers but also the international community.  This could result in additional pressure
on the domestic government.
Although this dissertation analyzes international political economy variables
associated with increasing globalization, there are a number of other factors that have
garnered much interest in the development literature as well as human rights studies.  In
my desire for the most comprehensive model of international political economy and basic
human rights, I therefore control for a number of these variables including economic
development, economic growth, international war, civil war, population level and
population growth.
Building on the above research design, Chapter Five is centered on analysis and
interpretation of the quantitative results.  This begins by describing the sample and
reporting summary statistics and bivariate correlations between the various factors.  Next,
the overall country performance (i.e., ranking) of governments’ respect for basic human
rights is discussed and a number of geographical and political trends are identified.
Ultimately, the time-series cross-section multivariate models of subsistence and security
rights are evaluated.  For both dependent variables, I consider the various models for the
global sample as well as the separate developing and developed world samples.  Further,
the economic and political variables are also considered as separate models.  Extensive
diagnostics are performed on the models and the “most appropriate” versions are
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selected.  Finally, a comparison of the subsistence rights and security rights is conducted
in order to determine if certain aspects of the changing international political economy
affect these two groups of rights in different ways.  Chapter Six concludes with a
summary of the entire project, highlighting policy implications of the findings and
making suggestions for future directions in human rights research.
1.2 Significance of Study
This dissertation is significant for a number of reasons.  First, it fills a gap in the
existing human rights literature.  It is true that in the last two decades increasing numbers
of human rights investigations have been conducted.  However, almost all have examined
only one type of human rights.  Here I consider the interactions of subsistence rights,
security rights, economic and political rights.  Second, I concentrate on important aspects
of the changing international political economy.  Very little empirical research has been
performed which connects the timely issue of increasing globalization with human rights.
The third element that distinguishes this work is the broad ability to generalize from its
extensive coverage.  But with very few exceptions, most previous studies have been
somewhat limited in either their cross-national approach or the time period studied.5
Though data availability is always a concern, numerous studies only look at a limited
sample of the developed or developing world.  The comprehensive sample used for this
study considers 176 countries over 14 years.  It appears that this is one of the largest
time-series cross-sections for basic human rights data ever assembled.  Further, important
distinctions are drawn between the developing world and the industrialized countries
which have significant policy implications.  In short, this dissertation provides a
5 Indeed, many works evaluate only one time point (e.g., year) in their analysis.
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comprehensive survey of the dynamic international political economy and its impact on
worldwide basic human rights.
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CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
2.1 Introduction
A movement toward more rigorous, empirical research on human rights has
lagged only a few years behind the trend toward wider dissemination of information.
Since empirical research on human rights has been ongoing for over two decades, it is no
longer completely accurate to say that the empirical study of human rights is still in its
infancy.  Indeed, cumulation of findings has become evident on a variety of human rights
related topics.  For much of the 1980s, the central focus in human rights research was on
human rights abuse as an independent variable to explain U.S.  foreign policy (e.g.,
foreign aid expenditures).  Scholars contributing to this extensive literature include
Schoultz 1980; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985;
Carleton and Stohl 1987; Gibney and Stohl 1988; McCormick and Mitchell 1988;
McCormick and Mitchell 1989; Hofrenning 1991; Poe 1990, 1991, 1992; Forsythe 1993;
Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Poe, Pilatovsky, Miller, and Ogundele 1994; Blanton 1994;
Regan 1995; Poe and Meernik 1995; and Keith and Poe 1996.  In his work on democracy
and economic rights in the developing  world, McNitt (1988) argues that when human
rights are used as independent variables, there is “a strong tendency to reduce the
measurement of the abuse of human rights to a single indicator variable” (McNitt 1988,
90).  He further warns that while this approach is methodologically defensible, it runs the
risk of oversimplifying a complex conceptualization.
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2.2.  Security Rights
Since the mid 1980s, however, research has branched out into explaining cross-
national variations of legally recognized human entitlements, closely related to those that
have been called “basic rights” by Shue (1980).  One vein of research focuses
specifically on explaining cross-national variations in security rights; the rights to be free
from torture, execution, imprisonment, or the violation of what has come to be known as
integrity of the person, or physical integrity rights.  While somewhat rudimentary in their
approach, a number of early researchers laid a substantial foundation on which human
rights scholars could build.
In his work on state repression in 105 low-income countries from 1973-1980,
Wolpin (1986) considers a large number of variables including external military
relationships, internal military status, economic factors, cultural and religious
composition, and historical as well as geopolitical conditions.6 For his dependent
variable, Wolpin (1986) constructs a composite index of political rights based on Gastil
(1981) and Sivard (1981).  Ultimately, he finds that military rule, military aid and ethnic
fragmentation are negatively related to human rights while literacy and education are
positively related.  Though utilizing a relatively large sample with a plethora of
independent variables, the study is nevertheless limited as a simple cross-sectional,
bivariate investigation.  Further, the relationships that are proposed are not particularly
strong in their theoretical basis.
In a similar study of over one hundred countries during the 1970s and early
1980s, Park (1987) concludes that civil rights (Freedom House index) are positively
related to governmental expenditures on welfare, ethnic diversity, percent of population
that is Christian, and percent of population that is urban.  Negative correlations are found
6 Wolpin (1986) defines low-income countries as those with per capita incomes of less than $3,000.
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between political rights and governmental expenditures on education, military
expenditures, and percent of population that is Muslim.  As with Wolpin (1986), this
work is limited both from a methodological (bivariate, cross-sectional) and theoretical
standpoint.
Mitchell and McCormick (1988) utilize standards-based, five-point ordinal scales
to examine the political and economic factors involved in security rights in 123 countries
in 1985.  Drawing from Amnesty International reports, they differentiate between
murders/executions and imprisonment.  From an economic perspective, they consider
economic development, level of trade and level of foreign investment.  Politically, the
variables are British colonial history and nature of regime (authoritarian or totalitarian).
They find that wealthier nations are indeed less likely to engage in torture and false
imprisonment.  However, they caution us that poor countries do not necessarily violate
their citizens’ security rights.  In terms of governmental regime, they conclude that
totalitarian regimes are more likely to erroneously imprison while authoritarian
governments are more likely to rely on murder and execution.  While this study
incorporates a large sample size, it is still plagued by the cross-sectional and bivariate
approach taken by the previous authors.
In continuing the search for political and economic explanations of security rights
performance, Henderson (1991) increases the methodological sophistication of the field
by employing multivariate regression with a sample of 152 countries in 1985.  He finds
that level of democracy and economic growth have a positive relationship with integrity
of the person rights.  In addition, higher levels of inequality were associated with a
worsening condition in human rights.  Building on this earlier work, Henderson (1993)
concentrates on the effects of population level and growth rate on human rights (while
controlling for democracy, investment, and economic development.  Using a similar
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sample, he concludes that population growth rates (but not population level) are
negatively related to security rights realization.  Although this research moves beyond the
bivariate methods of previous work, it is a still a limited cross-section that does not
consider the issue of change over time.
Many of the shortcomings in the previous literature were remedied with the more
comprehensive work of Poe and Tate (1994).  Utilizing two separate measures for
integrity of the person rights (taken from both Amnesty International and U.S. State
Department annual reports) for 153 countries from 1980-1987, the authors test a number
of hypothetical linkages.  These possible connections involve democracy, civil and
international war, economic development and economic growth, population level and
population growth, regime type, and British colonial history.  Ultimately, they find that
democracy and participation in civil and international war has a substantively important
and statistically significant influence on security rights.  There is also secondary support
found for associating leftist regimes, population size, and economic development
(inverse relationship) with abuse.  These findings while supporting some previous
hypotheses (Stohl 1975, 1976; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991)
contradict others as well (Mitchell and McCormick 1988, Henderson 1993, Fein 1994).
Tate and Poe (1996) further their initial effort by isolating the democracy variable
and investigate not only the direct influence it has on repression but also the indirect
effects as well.  This is accomplished through the estimation of a path model using a
series of eight yearly ordinary least squares multiple regression on global cross-national
data, 1980-1987.  As hypothesized, democracy is still the strongest direct determinant of
integrity of the person violations.  In this model, population size and domestic as well as
international war exhibit only direct effects on repression.  Economic development is the
only variable that manifests both an indirect and a direct effect on abuse.  Population
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growth, military regimes, and leftist regimes manifest only indirect influence on state
terrorism.  Economic growth and British colonial history appear to have no effects on
either human rights violations or democracy.  These results are quite similar and seem to
conform (with different analytical design and statistical method) to the previous Poe and
Tate (1994).  It is important to note, however, that this study highlights the fact that
economic development demonstrates a combined direct and indirect effect that is almost
equivalent to the influence of democracy itself.
With the emphasis remaining on democracy, Fein (1995) reaches conclusions
different from many of her colleagues in the field of human rights.  In her study of 145
countries during 1987, she admirably questions the premise of a linear relationship
between democracy and security rights and argues in favor of a curvilinear correlation.
Although the study is limited in methodological rigor, it concludes that the chances for
human rights abuse is greatest not in authoritarian countries with little or no democratic
norms, but rather in those nations where democratization has been extended but not yet
fully institutionalized.  Fein calls this the "more murder in the middle" hypothesis.
Turning the independent and dependent variables around, Regan (1995) utilizes
U.S. foreign aid as an independent variable influencing the dependent variable of security
rights.  Employing a rather complex index of integrity of the person violations, he
analyzes 32 countries in Latin America and Asia, 1977-1988.7 While justifying some
exclusions in the stratified sample (out of a population of 54 nations receiving aid), he
does not provide such reasoning for others.  After controlling for a number of other
variables (population, democracy, economic development, number of military
personnel), he finds that foreign aid has little discernible effect on the human rights
7 Regan's (1995) additive index of repression is composed of five categories (disappearances, torture,
arbitrary arrests, political prisoners, and political killings) coded on a four point scale (0 though 3). The
maximum score for each country/year is 15. He argues that this expanded scale is more appropriate for
trying to identify the process behind changes in human rights.
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records of the recipients.  This is true for both the Carter and Reagan administrations,
which took vastly different approaches to foreign policy in general and human rights in
particular.  Further, Regan (1995) finds no support for the premise that democracy and
population level have influences on human rights records.  It is interesting to note that
these results directly contradict the findings of previous authors (Henderson 1991, Poe
and Tate 1994).  Several reasons could contribute to this including the utilization of an
altered dependent variable, small sample size, different methodology, and different time
period.
2.3 Subsistence Rights
A second strand of research in human rights seeks to explain why subsistence
rights, or basic human needs, are protected in some countries and not in others.  While
this literature is perhaps not as prevalent as that concerning security rights, it nevertheless
achieves a respectable level of theoretical and methodological rigor.  Indeed, even many
earlier studies in this subfield avoid the shortcomings of other human rights research.
Further, the focus of subsistence rights is more theoretically tied to the attributes of
international political economy and therefore more applicable to my emphasis here.  Two
of the pioneers in this area are William Dixon and Bruce Moon.  Dixon (1984) begins
this trend by looking at the effects of trade concentration and economic growth on
subsistence rights (i.e., basic human needs).  Here, attention is on the rate of
improvement in the provision of basic human needs (i.e., the Disparity Reduction Rate).
It is measured as the average annual change in Morris' (1979) Physical Quality of Life
Index.8 With a relatively large sample of 72 countries from 1960 to 1980, he finds weak
support for the proposition that trade concentration as a form of dependence is
8 See Chapter IV for a detailed description of the Physical Quality of Life Index.
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detrimental to national development.  When economic growth is added to the situation,
however, trade concentration loses any effect.
Moon and Dixon (1985) quickly turn to political aspects in their look at state
strength (government expenditures), democracy, and ideology in relation to basic human
needs.  The measurement used here for basic human needs is simply Morris' Physical
Quality of Life Index.  While controlling for divergent wealth in their large cross-section,
they find that democratic practices and leftist ideology are associated with higher levels
of basic needs provision while government expenditures (as a percentage of GNP) has a
negative effect.  This would be in keeping with the conservative notion that heavy
government spending is a hindrance to growth.  In a similar study, Spalding (1986)
examines a number of economic and political factors for 97 countries in 1970 and 1980.
She concludes that while wealth is one of the most powerful explanations, much of its
effect comes from governmental health expenditures and the size of the modern sector
labor force.  Surprisingly, degree of capitalism has virtually no explanatory power.  This
would support the hypothesis of the deleterious effects of rapid industrialization on living
standards.  Further, it is determined that democracy has a strong effect even when
controlling for level of aggregate wealth.
In looking at the influences of defense spending on physical quality of life, Moon
and Dixon (1985) confirm that military expenditures, manpower, and military rule have
some impact on the provision of basic human needs even when controlling for attributes
of the larger political economy (e.g., democracy, overall government expenditure, GNP).
In his examination of the military influence on basic human needs, Rosh (1986)
contradicts the previous authors and concludes that military burden and per capita GNP
have little if any effect on well being.  Further, he finds that democracy is the most
important factor after controlling for GNP.  These results are divergent from Moon and
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Dixon (1985) in part because Rosh (1986) concentrates only on the developing world and
also includes additional variables such as a country's degree of incorporation or
dependence on the world economy.
The most comprehensive study comes from Moon (1991) in which he considers
many of the above variables (democracy, military spending/manpower/regime, per capita
GNP) plus a number of additional influences (e.g., percent of labor involved in
agriculture, British influence, dependency, socialist influence, length of independence,
mineral exports, Buddhist and Islamic influence).9  While evaluating the overall political
economy of basic human needs, he finds many of his chosen factors to exhibit extreme
statistical significance.  He concludes that percentage of labor agriculture, military
spending, dependency, and Islamic influence has a strong negative effect on personal
well being.  Democracy, socialist influence, wealth, British influence, and Buddhist
influence had a positive impact on physical quality of life.
2.4 Tradeoffs Between Various Rights
Turning to the issue of potential trade-offs between various human rights,
theorists and policy-makers have given much thought to how security rights, subsistence
rights, and liberties relate to each other conceptually and normatively (e.g., Vance 1977,
Shue 1980, Donnelly 1989, Herzog 1997), as since World War II they have been
incorporated in the core U.N. treaties and covenants along with a wide array of other
legally recognized human entitlements.  From Shue's standpoint, each of these rights is a
basic right in the sense that enjoyment of them is paramount to the enjoyment of all other
rights (1980: 19).  Donnelly (1989) rejects Shue’s notion of basic rights, arguing instead
that these three kinds of rights as well as others are interrelated and indivisible.  Though
9 While Moon (1991) examines 120 countries at three different time points (1960, 1970, and 1980), the
core of his analysis focuses on the early 1970s.
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both of these scholars’ arguments are persuasive (and too detailed to repeat here), it is
unlikely that such philosophical questions will ever be answered with certainty.
What perhaps can be answered more definitively is the question of how these
rights concerning security, subsistence, and liberties (Shue 1980) are empirically related
to one another.  To my knowledge, this important aspect has not been adequately
addressed.  Though a number of studies investigate the determinants of why one or
another of these three rights are related, rarely have they been considered together in a
single, unified empirical analysis, and thus our knowledge of them is rather fragmented.10
Therefore, the objective in the initial portions of the study is to link these areas of human
rights research both theoretically and empirically.  This will be accomplished in Chapter
Three.
After dealing with the broader conceptual and empirical relationships among
these rights, I look more in depth at subsistence rights and focus on important factors in
the increasingly dynamic international political economy.  In the process, I attempt to
integrate the various subfields of literature into a comprehensive model, which will yield
utility in explaining variation in basic human rights performance throughout the world.




AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
3.1 Introduction
With so much attention being focused on human rights issues, human rights
scholars do not have the large burden of justifying the relevance of their research.
However, it would be inaccurate to state that there has been consensus on the nature and
extent of human rights.   Indeed, there has been a glaring lack of agreement as to what
human rights are and how the discipline should accurately measure rights related
concepts.11 One of the most widely accepted frameworks of "basic rights" is offered by
Shue (1980), who argues that there are at least three basic rights: security, subsistence,
and liberty.   Indeed, these are incorporated in the core U.N.  treaties and covenants that
provide a complex array of groups of rights - subsistence, personal, civil, political,
economic, social and cultural.   From Shue's perspective, a basic right is one that is
necessary for the enjoyment of all other rights.   This is not to say that these basic rights
are more important than others, but that they should be included in any human rights
policy.
Donnelly (1989), while acknowledging the substantial contribution by Shue
(1980), contends that there probably are not basic rights at all in the strict sense of the
definition.   In the case of subsistence, for instance, he argues that "one can subsist
without a right to subsistence" (1989, 38).   Here, I cannot favor one right over another
11 Numerous scholars (e.g., Machan 1975, Gewirth 1982, Nickel 1987, Forsythe 1989),  have addressed
the philosophical or moral bases of rights.  For a thorough investigation of the evolution of these rights,
see Shapiro (1986).
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without violating Shue's qualification that basic rights are not more important or
satisfying than any other rights.   Donnelly, therefore, posits that human rights must be
interdependent and indivisible.   "All human rights are “basic rights” in the fundamental
sense that systematic violations of any human right preclude realizing a life of full human
dignity...." (1980, 41).
In this chapter I empirically evaluate this assertion that rights are interdependent
and indivisible.   Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between
the provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989,
188) and as often argued by certain regimes.   Or, on the other hand, are two or more of
these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together. This scenario is
suggested by Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995), and the theories tested by a
number of empirical analysts focusing on one, or another subset of rights.12
Before examining potential trade-offs, however, I should first address the
theoretical question of whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so, which
rights fit into this category.   This takes a broader view than much of the recent literature
that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g., integrity of the
person rights).   In examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the
origins of these rights in international law.   A parallel controversy that should also be
dealt with is the issue of cultural relativism versus universality.   Are human rights truly
universal in the sense that they are the rights of every person simply because they are a
12 See Davenport (1995) for a study that indicates economic development is tied to less government
actions to restrict political liberties.  The findings of Poe and Tate (1994) indicate that economic
development and political liberties are linked to fewer personal integrity rights abuses.  Though
subsistence rights are not economic development per se, the two are strongly related (See Moon and
Dixon 1985, 1992).  Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and Moon (1991) find that
political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs satisfaction, even when controlling for
wealth (i.e., GNP).  Howard (1983) disputes the notion that civil and political rights can or must be
suspended until after economic development has been achieved.  Kyi (1995, p.  280) argues that the three
kinds of rights addressed in this paper are essentially intertwined, and that arguments that there are trade-
offs between them are mere “pretexts for resisting calls for democracy and human rights.”
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human being? Or, as many in the non-Western world argue, is the validity of a moral
right or rule relative to the indigenous culture? While these normative questions are
difficult to answer definitively, it is imperative that I confront the various schools of
thought and evaluate the theoretical strengths and weaknesses.
3.2 Cultural Relativism versus Universalism
There is nothing … culture-bound in the great evils of human experience,
reaffirmed in every age and in every written history and in every tragedy and
fiction: murder and the destruction of life, imprisonment, enslavement, starvation,
poverty, physical pain and torture, homelessness, friendlessness.13
– Warren Christopher
...  the very conception of the organization of society differs from one culture to
another.   The West places more emphasis on rights while Islam values
obligations....The West emphasizes individual interests while Islam values
collective good.
– Abdul Aziz Said
Though a large body of literature and international law (which I discuss in the
next section) exists that supports the idea of universal human rights, there remains much
discussion and conflict concerning the global application of basic human rights.   Indeed,
over the last fifteen to twenty years, the concept of cultural relativism has risen to
challenge the Western notion of universality.   Cultural relativism stems from the
epistemological assertion that norms of rationality are built on the consensus of  the
members of the culture to which those norms belong (Dromm, 1998).14 Teson (1992, 43)
defines it as “the position according to which local cultural traditions (including
13 Christopher, Warren.  1993.  “Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands.” 4 U.S.
Department of State Dispatch 441, 442.
14 For a examination of the differences and intersections of cultural relativism and historical relativism,
see Mazrui (1998).
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religious, political, and legal practices) properly determine the existence and scope of
civil and political rights enjoyed by individuals in a given society.” What might be
considered a rights violation in one community could properly be considered legal in
another.   Contemporary examples of the tension between international norms and
domestic customs include criminal punishment that involve mutilation and beating,
female circumcision, and the subjugation of women.
Donnelly (1989) views this debate as a continuum ranging from radical cultural
relativism to radical universalism.   Radical cultural relativism claims that culture is the
only origin of the validity of a moral right or norm.   At the other end of the spectrum,
radical universalism argues that certain moral rights and norms are universally valid and
that culture is actually irrelevant.   In the middle of these two extremes lie varying
combinations of cultural relativism and universalism.   Strong cultural relativism
postulates that the primary source of a moral right or norm is culture.   Having said that,
universal human rights can serve as a control of the possible extremes of relativism.
Moving slightly in the direction of univeralism, weak cultural relativism maintains that
culture may be a significant source of the validity of a moral right or norm.   Here,
univeralism is assumed, but the extremes of this universalism are checked by the
relativity of communities and rights (109-110).
From a heuristic standpoint, Glen Johnson (1988) states that contemporary
deliberations concerning this debate take one of the following positions:
1. traditions other than Western liberalism lack concepts of human rights; the
Western liberal tradition is either the only or the most legitimate concept of
human rights;
2. non-Western ideas about human rights are not only comparable but compatible
with the ideals of Western liberalism;
3. non-Western traditions may differ even to the point of incompatibility but is
possible to reconcile various views;
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4. human rights concepts differ and cultural relativism means that no particular
view can be held more valid than others.(43)
Donnelly’s (1982, 1989) framework, although challenging to categorize, best represents
the first position.   While conceding various notions of group rights (e.g., economic and
social rights), he concentrates primarily on preserving the integrity of Western liberalism
(1982, 315).   He argues that his position is that of a very weak cultural relativist where
deviations from universal human rights standards occur primarily in the form in which
particular rights are implemented (1989, 110).
Taking an opposing stance is Manglapus (1978), who best fits the second position
from the categories above.   He claims that non-Western cultures exhibit much of the
same “respect for the dignity of the individual, absence of arbitrariness, [and] availability
of remedies against despotic rule (5).   Pollis and Schwab (1979) are representative of the
third approach that strives to reconcile the divergent view of Western and non-Western
societies.   They argue that the Western notion of rights emerged under a specific set of
circumstances during a certain period of time.   Therefore, they argue, it is ill-advised
(and indeed, doomed to fail) to apply these exact human rights constructs onto the
developing world.15 However, they finally conclude that a reconciled concept of human
rights centered on participation, restraints on the use of force and violence, and sanctions
on those who violate their values is achievable (15).   The fourth direction is reflected by
Bradley (1980) in arguing that we need to explore a variety of views and that perhaps no
particular position is more valid than the other.
15  This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the development debates that raged between the
developmentalists (e.g., Lipset, 1959;  Rostow, 1960; and Almond and Powell, 1966)  and the
dependencistas (e.g., Prebish, 1960; dos Santos, 1970; Frank, 1967; and Cordosa, 1972).
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In placing my research in this context, it can be argued that this study is
compatible with categories 1 and 2 and possibly 3.   As discussed in the following
section, numerous international agreements and well-established international law
provide a substantial basis to support a position of compromise and compatibility.16 The
most recent example of this was the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna, June
1993) where a Declaration and Programme of Action was adopted by the representatives
of 172 nations (Perry 1997, 481).   It states categorically and repeatedly that “the
universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question” and that “they are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and mutually reinforcing.”17 In a commentary
on the Vienna conference, Donnelly (1994) muses that
One of the more heartening results of the Vienna Conference was the repudiation
of … the relativist position.   Despite lingering fears of Western neocolonialism,
and a continuing preoccupation with the task of development in the former Soviet
bloc and the Third World, the resolutions adopted at Vienna generally reflect a
commitment to the true universality … of internationally recognized human rights
(113).
16 Howard (1984) presents an interesting compromise strategy akin to the weak cultural relativist
tradition.  Basing her position on moral and practical foundations, she argues against an outright ban of
such customs as child betrothal and widow inheritance, but pushes strongly for domestic legislation that
would allow women and the families of female children to “opt out” of traditional practices.  This would
allow a person to choose his/her culture or the terms on which he/she will participate in the traditional
culture (Donnelly, 1989).
17 It should be noted that substantial cultural cleavages were still present in Vienna.  Indeed, in order to
achieve unanimity, the Declaration omits any reference to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights per se.
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3.3 The Foundation of Human Rights in International Law
There are a number of significant reasons for looking in depth at the international
legal foundation of human rights.   First, international human rights instruments provide
a legal as well as philosophical basis for answering the question of "What are basic
human rights?" Indeed, the types of rights on which I concentrate are detailed in these
international agreements and protected by international law.   Second, international law
provides the foundation for implementing human rights norms that can lead to reducing
abuse around the world.   Though this might appear naive or idealistic, a number of legal
decisions have proven otherwise.   In the 1980 case of Filartiga v.  Peña., a U.S.  federal
court utilized existing human rights agreements to rule "that deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted norms of the international
law of human rights regardless of the nationality of the parties" (Claude 1992, 337).18
Further, the European Court of Human Rights Commission has shown similar
effectiveness in holding foreign governments responsible for human rights abuse
(Friedlander 1986).19  The most recent example is the International War Crimes Tribunal
founded by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.   While there
have been no convictions as of yet, 46 persons (including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko
Mladic) have been charged with various crimes against humanity during the conflict in
the former Yugoslavia.   It is likely that with the first defendant, Dusko Tadic, now
standing trial, more of the accused will be formally tried.20  If we are serious about
18 Filartiga v.  Peña-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir., 1980).  Similarly, Letelier v.  Republic of Chile held
that victims (or their relatives) could sue in federal court and collect damages from a foreign government
responsible for injury of death resulting from political violence in the home country (Friedlander 1986).
19 In Ireland v.  United Kingdom, Great Britain was held liable for subjecting Irish suspects to torture and
degrading treatment prior to 1973 (Friedlander 1986).
20 This information was provided by the War Crimes Tribunal Watch, produced by the London-based
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (http://www.peacenet.org/balkans/tribunal/html).
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justifying the substance of basic human rights and insuring that these rights will be
guaranteed, it is imperative that they be grounded in universal international law.   Just as
a local community looks to city ordinances and criminal laws to achieve a safe and
orderly society, the international community likewise depends on the legal foundation
undergirding the protection of human rights.
Before the advent of the Second World War, nations operated under traditional
international law.   This law governed the relations between states, which were the only
entities, which possessed rights under the system.   Individuals, though they may have
benefited from such law, were not included in the rights recognized by international law.
State governments were free to deal with their citizens beyond the reach of international
scrutiny and were off-limits to the world community.   Human rights, which cover
relationships between individuals or between individuals and the government, were
therefore, exclusively a domestic affair.   By the late 1940s, however, the theory and
implementation of international law had undergone a virtual revolution.   During this
period, individuals in addition to nations began to enjoy the protections of the new
international order.   The obvious catalyst for this change was the war itself and the
circumstances surrounding the conflict.   As Humphrey (1986, 60) states, "Whatever else
it might have been, the Second World War was a war for human rights;..." Because of the
atrocities evident during the war, world opinion supported a drastic revision of the nature
and scope of international law.   In creating the institutions of the postwar era, human
rights became a central concern in hopes that the savagery of fascism could never again
take hold.
In the fifty years following World War II, human rights law has boomed.   During
the initial aftermath, the newly founded United Nations began to navigate the difficult
road toward an international bill of human rights.   Indeed, many in the field would argue
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that the world community as a result now operates under an international human rights
"regime" that is relatively strong.   In their most basic sense, regimes can be viewed as
systems of norms and decision-making procedures that are accepted by nations as
binding.21 At the core of this regime are a number of major human rights agreements that
impose obligations on governments as to the treatment of individuals under their
respective jurisdictions.   In a definite break with previous practice, these obligations
limit the concept of national sovereignty in two crucial aspects.   In the first case, the
treatment of a state's subjects is now a legitimate concern of international law.
Secondly, there results an international standard (established by consent) that can be
utilized for evaluating the domestic laws and conduct of sovereign states within their own
borders.   These norms may therefore be regarded as ranking even higher than national
constitutions in the hierarchy of laws (Sieghart 1983, 14-15).
Each of the human, and arguably, core or basic human rights discussed above are
referred to and guaranteed under various provisions of the International Bill of Human
Rights (the foundation of modern human rights law).   In terms of the basic rights that I
consider, all are referred to and guaranteed under various provisions of the International
Bill of Human Rights.   This consists of the three basic documents: Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (adopted December 10, 1948), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened for signature December 19, 1966 and
entered into force January 3, 1976), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (opened for signature December 19, 1966 and entered into force March 23, 1976).
In addition, regional and secondary agreements such as the European Convention on
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950), European Social Charter (1961), the
21 Beyond the seminal work of Krasner (1983) in this area, Donnelly (1986, 1989), Keohane and Nye
(1977), and Young (1980, 1987) contribute to the literature on regimes.
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American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (adopted by Organization of
American states in 1948), the American Convention on Human Rights (1969), and the
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (1981) bolster these basic rights.22
Proponents of humans rights protection maintain that the International Bill of Rights was
necessary in part because of the absence of any definition or listing of human rights in
the original U.N.  Charter:
..., the United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of 
economic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational cooperation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion (Article 55).
Having said this, the Charter did provide for a Commission on Human Rights, which was
to draft a subsequent International Bill.   The Commission agreed that the Bill would be
divided into three parts: 1) a declaration that was to serve as a manifesto of sorts without
legal force, 2) a multilateral convention (later called the Covenant) which would be
binding on those nations that ratified it, and 3) measures of implementation.   For reasons
both ideological and logistical (i.e., because the two areas of rights required different
22  For simplicity, the following abbreviations will hereinafter be used: Universal Declaration of Human
Rights - UDHR, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights - ICES, and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - ICPR, European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms - EHR, European Social Charter - ESC, the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man - ADRD, the American Convention on Human Rights - AMR, and the African Charter
on Human and People’s Rights - AFR.
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methods of implementation), the Covenant was separated into two separate agreements as
listed above.
While the Universal Declaration was not meant to be legally binding according to
international law (simply by its adoption by the General Assembly), the Declaration has
been invoked on so many occasions (both outside as well as inside the U.N.) and utilized
so often to interpret the Charter (which is quite vague) that its norms are now part of the
customary law of states and therefore binding on these nations (UNESCO 1986, 61;
Humphrey 1979, 33).   In support of this argument, a few members of the Assembly
(such as South Africa and the Soviet Union) voiced concern that the Declaration would
impose new legal obligations.   Indeed, all of the communist countries that then were
members of the U.N., along with and South Africa and Saudi Arabia, subsequently
abstained from the final vote (Tolley 1987, 23-24).   Further, the International
Commission of the Jurists argue that if the Declaration constitutes an authoritative
interpretation of the Charter articles, it then has the legally binding effect of an
international treaty (International Commission of Jurists 1968, 94-95).
Looking specifically at personal integrity rights, the rights to life free of
imprisonment, torture or execution undertaken arbitrarily or for political purposes are
amply recognized.    For example, Article 3 of the UDHR states that "Everyone has the
right to life....", while Article 6 of the ICPR goes further to say that every human being
has the "inherent" right to life and that this right must be protected by law.   The UDHR
(Article 5), ICPR (Article 7) and other documents stipulate that no one shall be subjected
to torture or cruel or degrading punishment or treatment.   Finally, the right to personal
integrity is firmly established by the UDHR (Article 3) and ICPR (Article 9), as well as a
host of other documents that state that everyone has the right to “security of the person, "
32
and further defined by articles such as UDHR (Article 9) and ICPR (Article 9) which
prohibit arbitrary arrest or detention.
Turning to the issue of "liberties," I investigate both political and economic
freedoms.   These two concepts, while definitely distinct entities, are nevertheless both
related to the liberty dimension as presented by Shue (1980).23 One of the most prevalent
political rights covered by international law is the right to participate in government and
public affairs.   UDHR (Article 21) calls for the right to take part in the government of
one’s country directly or through chosen representatives.24 The concept of participation is
taken broadly here to include direct and indirect action.   ICPR (Article 25) refers to the
right to take part in “the conduct of public affairs.”  In terms of political liberties
manifested as democratic institutions and elections, UDHR (Article 21) and ICPR
(Article 25) call for “freely chosen” representatives.25 According to these agreements, the
resulting election is to express the will of the people.   Further, it is stipulated that secret
ballots must be incorporated into elections that are to be held periodically or at
“reasonable intervals.26” Finally, the right to vote is to be by universal and equal suffrage
as covered in UDHR (Article 21) and ICPR (Article 25).
Similar to political rights, economic freedom is also protected under the
International Bill of Human Rights and other agreements.   It is important to note that
international law deals with two distinct aspects of economic rights.   The first, which is
usually associated with a more conservative interpretation, covers production-related
23 It should be noted that Shue (1980) does not make the specific argument that economic rights are
necessarily required in order enjoy other rights.
24 ADRD (Article XX) and AFR (Article 13) also demand this right to participation.
25 This is also covered under EHR (Protocol 1, Article 3) and AFR (Article 13).
26 An interesting term to note is that of "genuine election" in UDHR (21) and ICPR (25).  Does this cover
an election in which only one candidate or list of candidates is offered and no opposition to the governing
party is present (or allowed)? While there was debate over this controversy during the drafting of UDHR
and ICPR, the vague term "genuine" remained (Henkin 1981, 240, 461)
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rights (i.e., protections of property and liberties involved in acquiring, holding, using,
and transferring it).   The second aspect deals with consumption-related rights (which,
consistent with Shue, are discussed in the next section on subsistence).   UDHR (Article
17) guarantees the right to own property "alone as well as in association with others."27
Having said that, it is important to note the absence of the right to own property in either
of the Covenants.   In terms of depriving one of this right to property, UDHR (Article
17) and other instruments allow for instances when the government can lawfully restrict
this right (e.g., “in the public interest”).   Only one of these requires the government to
compensate individuals for this deprivation.28 Some critics could argue that most of this
area of international law is vague enough to allow some forms of “takings.”
With regard to basic needs or subsistence rights, access to adequate food, clothing
and housing are all guaranteed in UDHR (Article 25).   While the Declaration stipulates
that everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being
of himself and his family (including but not limited to food, clothing, and housing), the
ECSC goes beyond UDHR in recognizing the right to "the continuous improvement of
living conditions" and not simply the right to a stable condition of well-being (Article 11,
Section 1).   International human rights laws also establish the right of everyone to have
access to adequate health and well-being, when Article 1 of the UDHR calls for medical
care and necessary social services while the ECSC (Article 12) recognizes the right to the
enjoyment of the highest "attainable" standard of both physical and mental health.   A
third aspect to the issue of basic human needs involve a government's guarantee of
education for its constituents.   The right to education in general is recognized in UDHR
27 While ADRD (XXIII) recognizes the right to private property, it restricts it to "the essential needs of
decent living." AMR (21), EHR (Protocol 1, Article 1) and AFT (14) speak of the "use and enjoyment of
property," the "peaceful enjoyment of his possessions," and "the right to property," respectively.
However, none of these specifically refers to ownership per se.
28 This exception is AMR (Article 21).
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(Article 26) and the ECSC (Article 13), and further specified in a number of other
treaties and conventions.   The UDHR (Article 26) and ECSC (Article 13) state that
primary education should be a right of all citizens, and that this level of education should
be compulsory.
3.4.  Linkages between Security Rights, Subsistence Rights and Liberties
To my knowledge, no efforts have been made to examine basic human needs,
personal integrity rights, and political and economic freedoms together, in a single study.
Still a number of linkages have been theorized and empirically supported by previous
studies.   Figure 1 graphically depicts the types of human rights, and the relationships I
plan to examine.    Though my formulation of basic rights is similar to that of Shue
(1980), I differ in that I separate liberties into two dimensions, political and economic.












a.  Linkage One: Subsistence Rights and Security Rights
Little research has been done on the direct relationship between basic human
needs fulfillment, and the realization of personal integrity rights.    Previous empirical
findings, though not directly addressing this issue, do give us some very good reasons to
expect that the two are strongly related.    Economic development, which is typically
measured with per capita GNP or GDP variables, is not usually considered synonymous
with the fulfillment of basic needs, in large part because the predominant measures fail to
take into account inequality.   However, a number of studies show that economic
development has a strong, positive impact on basic human needs fulfillment.    For
example, Park (1987) in his limited study concurred that economic development is the
strongest predictor of improved basic needs achievement.   While their emphasis is on
military expenditures, Rosh (1986) and Moon and Dixon (1985) also conclude that per
capita GNP is closely associated with basic needs fulfillment.29  Per capita GNP and
other economic development variables have been shown to be related to the realization of
personal integrity rights (e.g., Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and
Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1997).   Indeed, the rationales for including economic
development in models of personal integrity abuse could very well apply equally to the
fulfillment of basic needs.   As Henderson (1991) argued, “it is only logical to think that,
with a higher level of development” (or when basic needs are being met) “people will be
more satisfied and, hence, less repression will be needed by the elites (1991, 1226).
Therefore it makes sense to hypothesize, at least initially, that greater fulfillment of
peoples’ basic needs leads governments to be more respectful of personal integrity rights,
in large part because threats to the regime are less apt to occur.
29 While ultimately arriving at this conclusion, Rosh (1986) warns that the relationship is expected to be
greatly reduced if research is concentrated on developing countries rather than the entire world.
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Alternatively, however, we might expect that people at the lowest level of needs
fulfillment would not have either the wherewithal or the energy to pose threats to the
regime, no matter how displeased they are with the status quo.    So perhaps the
relationship discussed above only occurs after a certain threshold of needs fulfillment is
met.    Another possibility is that needs fulfillment interacts with domestic inequality, for
persons are more apt to feel deprived, and therefore be willing to oppose the government,
when their referent is others in the society that are much better off  (e.g., Gurr 1970,
Ellina and Moore 1992; Moore, Lindstrom and O’Regan 1996).  I have found no
empirical research that has posited a relationship in the other direction.
b.  Linkage Two: Liberties and Security Rights
I expect a strong linkage between political liberties and the respect of personal
integrity for a number of reasons.   Though the two concepts are different, they are not
entirely distinct conceptually, and I expect that empirically they are closely related.
Abuses of personal integrity represent the most serious of means regimes may use to take
away political liberties.    Further, such abuses have the effect of terrorizing those not
directly targeted by those acts, leading them to restrain their own political activities for
fear of reprisal.
Recent literature on the determinants of personal integrity abuse has assessed the
impact of a factor closely related to political liberty, institutional democracy, on those
rights.   Democracy was found to be one of the strongest predictors of personal integrity
abuse, as greater democracy leads to decreased abuses (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate
1994; Richards 1996; Poe, Tate and Keith 1997).  Those who have tested the effect of
democracy on repression of personal integrity have cited several logics in support of that
proposition.  Henderson (1991) argued that because the democratic process is built on
bargaining and compromise, it provides a substantive alternative for dealing with
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conflict, while warning that democracy must truly be legitimate in the sense that
functional institutions are in place that can insure participation of various interests.  Poe
and Tate (1994) pay close attention to the possible problem of tautology, choosing
definitions of democracy and measures to avoid circularity of argument.   They find
support for the argument that an effective democracy provides “citizens (at least those
with political resources) the tools to oust potentially abusive leaders from office before
they are able to become...” repressive of these rights (855).  Also relevant here are the
thoughts of Dixon (1994, 15-17) in his investigation of democracy and international
conflict.   If Dixon is correct, leaders and citizens in democracies will tend to subscribe
to the idea "bounded competition," that bargaining and compromise are the preferred
avenues toward dispute resolution, much favored to the use of violence.
More directly relevant to the variables I am investigating is the argument that
civil liberties usually associated with democracies (such as freedom of speech, press,
assembly, etc.) enable citizens and opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular
regime.  These freedoms could also result in publicity of potential abuses being exported
to the international community (e.g., UN, EU, OSCE, and non-governmental
organizations such as Amnesty International) that could lead to further pressure on a
domestic government.  Though the findings would seem at first to be uniform in their
support of the strong positive relationship between democracy, political and civil liberties
and the respect for personal integrity rights, there are those that take contrarian positions.
As described in the literature review, Fein (1995) questions the premise of a linear
relationship between democracy and human rights and argues in favor of a curvilinear
relationship.30
30 While I substantially cover the linkage between political freedom and security rights, I choose not to
expand on the potential linkages between economic freedom and security rights.  The simple reasoning
here is that there is little if any theoretical justification for assuming that economic rights are associated
with integrity of the person rights.
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c. Linkage Three: Subsistence Rights and Liberties
Turning to political liberties and their effect on basic human needs, a number of
scholars propose that democracies are better equipped to provide their citizens with these
rights.  Many of the arguments linking democracy with integrity of the person rights also
hold for basic human needs.  Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and
Moon (1991) find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs
satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e., GNP).  These conclusions are
bolstered by the fact that the authors utilize different measures of democracy.  Spalding
(1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991) and Moon
and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1990).31
The linkage between economic freedom and basic human needs is somewhat
more circuitous.  As alluded to in the above discussion concerning the relationship
between basic human needs and personal integrity, economic development has been
directly tied to improvements in physical quality of life.  Drawing from this literature, it
can be further argued that economic freedom should be expected to be positively related
to GNP.  Economic theory suggests that higher incomes and increasing living standards
are dependent on increases in the production of goods and services that are valued by
society.  Gwartney, et al.  (1996, 91-92) suggest that as a nation reaches high levels of
economic freedom, it will enjoy swift growth.32 This should be especially pertinent to
developing countries that can gain from incorporating successful business practices and
technical advancements from the developed world.  Because economic growth can be
seen in part as a process of discovery, nations with greater economic freedom should tend
31 Both Arat (1991) and Bollen (1991) have further expanded on their operationalization of democracy in
later works.
32 This is contingent on the fact that this economic freedom is indeed credible and potentially long-
lasting.
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to have higher rates of growth than those with low levels of freedom.  Therefore, higher
levels of economic freedom should result in higher levels of per capita GNP as compared
to lower levels of freedom.
Scully (1988) supports this position in his analysis of 115 market economies from
1960-1980.  He finds that politically open societies, which guarantee private property
rights and the market allocation of resources, grow at three times the rate and are two and
one-half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are not guaranteed.  In his
cross-national study from 1960-1990, Leblang (1996) provides empirical evidence that
nations who protect property rights grow faster than nations that do not.  Gwartney, et al.
(1996, 92-93) also show that on average, countries with more economic freedom have a
higher per capita GDP.  With the most recently available data (i.e., 1994), the average
per capita GDP for the A rated economies was $13, 659 compared to those having a C
grade with $7,888 and the F- grade with $1,650.  If the argument holds from the previous
section that increased levels of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then
economic freedom could (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human needs.
In connection with the limited literature on this linkage, there is the issue of an
inherent trade-off between political rights and subsistence rights.  This "liberty trade-off"
as defined by Donnelly (1989) argues that civil and political rights could hamper or
completely sabotage even well-organized development plans.  Here, officials freely
elected may be forced by their constituency to choose certain policies because of short-
term political considerations rather than sticking to more difficult, but economically
essential, practices.  Donnelly (1989, 166) stresses that this conventional wisdom is
misguided and the trade-offs can actually be harmful to both development and human
rights.  In her examination of Sub-Saharan Africa, Howard (1983) bolsters Donnelly's
assertion and finds that suspension of political rights until after economic development
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has taken hold will result in neither development nor human rights being attained.  This
is not to say that civil or political rights should take precedence over basic human needs,
but rather the two sets of rights are interrelated, not sequential.  She makes the important
distinction that civil and political rights should be seen as a means to an end as well as an
end in themselves.
Streeten (1980) takes a divergent position in arguing that basic human needs can
be met in ways that deny political rights, while political rights can be achieved in a
manner that denies basic human needs.33 According to Streeten (1980), this is so because
of the positive nature of subsistence rights compared to the negative nature of political
rights.34  The primary point here is that negative rights can be provided with no resources
(notwithstanding opportunity costs) while to realize positive rights (i.e., subsistence)
requires substantial resources.
d. Linkage Four: Political Rights and Economic Freedom
Since the end of the Cold War, conventional wisdom has argued that democratic
reforms should go hand in hand with movement toward a market economy with greater
economic freedom.  During the immediate aftermath of fall of the Berlin Wall, Western
policy makers urged countries to throw off the shackles of communism and embrace both
democracy and free markets.  Well before the events of 1989 however, scholars
hypothesized about the nature of democracy and economic freedom.  In his influential
work, Dahl (1985, 110) argued that, “If democracy is justified in governing the state,
then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprise; and to say that it is not
33 He uses the example of a society organized as either a benevolent zoo or a less benevolent, well-run
prison where physical needs are met at a high level but political and civil rights would be denied.  He
continues that political rights in the form of one man-one vote might conflict with the provision of these
basic human needs.
34 Streeten (1980) also includes civil and security rights as negative rights.
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justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing
the state.” Taking a Libertarian stance, Narveson (1992) warns that while democracy and
economic freedom indeed go together, democracy should not be forced on the corporate
structure in the form of "worker democracy."
Berger (1986) goes as far as arguing that a free economy is a necessary but not
sufficient condition for democracy.35 It appears that this hypothesis has been confirmed
many times while not being falsified this century.  Since there have been numerous
capitalist nations that have not been considered democratic, capitalism is obviously not a
sufficient condition for democracy.  However, there have been no regimes that exhibit
genuine democracy that do not also subscribe to free markets.  In Capitalism and
Freedom, Milton and Rose Friedman (1962) echo this sentiment by arguing that
economic freedom is a necessary condition for political freedom and that while there is
some limited role for government in a free society, the primary entity should be the
individual.
Further, Berger observes that there is a tendency for capitalistic states to gravitate
in the direction of institutions that are also democratic.  Examples of this include South
Korea, Portugal Spain, Chile and Greece.  There can be at least two reasons for this
occurrence.  First, capitalism is based on the rule of law and can only flourish in this
environment.  This capitalist allegiance to due process and law naturally leads to the
typical institutions associated with democracy (e.g., separated powers, rule of law,
limited government, protection of rights of individuals and minorities).  Secondly, the
newly created middle class of entrepreneurs begins to believe that they are not inferior to
35 In terms of economic development as a predictor of democracy, numerous scholars have debated the
issue over the years.  These include Shumpeter, 1950; Lipset, 1959; Cutright, 1963, Smith, 1969; Dahl,
1971; Muller, 1988; Mueller, 1992; Huntington, 1992; Diamond, 1992; Lipset 1993, Huber, et.  al, 1993;
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck, 1994; Muller, 1995; and Bollen and Jackman, 1995.
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the upper echelon of politicians and aristocrats.  As a result they soon demand a more
representative government  (Novak, 1996).
Having said this, the razor of capitalism cuts both ways.  As we have seen in the
struggle towards democracy and market reforms in Eastern Europe, citizens are not
satisfied with democracy if it results in simply a chance to cast one's vote.  Rather, people
demand that their economic well-being improve as well.  While many do not expect to
reach the lofty levels of the West overnight, it is assumed that there will be tangible and
relatively consistent improvement.  This has led to the question of whether to implement
democracy and market reforms sequentially or at the same time.  In addition, the issue of
the pace of reforms in both respects has been a serious area of disagreement among
citizens as well as policy makers.36
In an interesting work, Arat (1988) asks whether democracy can survive where
there is a gap between political and economic rights.  Here, the analysis draws the
distinction between democracies that have been long established and newly emerging
democratic regimes.  She argues that the gradual and sequential social and political
change associated with "old" democracies enabled governmental institutions to take root
without severe turmoil (i.e., the dissolution of the government).  Lacking the means to
exploit others as Western imperialism could, democratic leaders in the developing world
which are aiming for rapid economic growth (i.e., without equitable distribution) often
expose themselves to problems which could result in their replacement by authoritarian
figures.  While his concentration is not on the relationship between the two, Leblang
(1996) evaluates the effects of property rights and democracy on economic growth.  In
this cross-sectional panel study from 1960-1990, he finds that economies of nations that
36 Scholars addressing this include  Åslund (1992), Brada (1993), Merrell (1993) and Köves (1992).
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protect property rights grow more rapidly and that the nature of the political regime
indeed influences economic growth indirectly through its commitment to property rights.
3.5. Exploratory Analysis
In this preliminary section, I investigate the empirical behavior of the measures of
subsistence rights, security rights, and the rights to political and economic freedom.  My
goal at this stage is simply to describe the empirical landscape by examining univariate
and multivariate characteristics of the data.   While I delve into a complete
operationalization of these variables in the next chapter, the measures for these four
concepts can be depicted as follows.
Subsistence rights are measured as the “Physical Quality of Life Index” (PQLI) as
originally developed by Morris (1979).  This index, which represents the combination of
infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy, ranges from 0 to 100.  Security rights that
cover physical integrity violations such as execution, torture, forced disappearance, and
imprisonment (whether arbitrary, political, or religious) are measured with the Political
Terror Scale (Gibney and Dalton, 1996).  This scale ranges from 1-5 with 1 being the
most egregious violator of human rights.  Political Rights are evaluated by Jaggers and
Gurr’s Polity III democracy measure that concentrates on institutions and restraints on
authority.  It is depicted by an eleven-point scale where 10 represents the most
democratic regime.  Finally, I turn to the Fraser Institute for the measure of economic
freedom.  This component index ranges from 0 to 10 with 10 being the most
economically open.
Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics of the Physical Quality of Life Index
(Subsistence Rights), the Political Terror Scale index (Security Rights), Jaggers and
Gurr’s Democracy Score (Democracy), and the measure of economic freedom
constructed by the Fraser Institute (Economic Freedom).   Keep in mind that the PQLI,
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Political Terror Scale, and Democracy measure I use are measured annually over the
entire period 1980-1993.  The economic freedom index is only available for 1980, 1985,
1990, and 1993.  All measures are coded so that higher scores represent greater
realization of the particular class of human right being measured.
Table 3.1 Summary Statistics
Variable N Mean Median Mode St.  Dev Min Max
World 2548
Subsistence Rights 2217 67.66 73.2 ----- 20.56 14.00 99.00
Security Rights 2208 3.56 4.00 4.00 1.15 1.00 5.00
Democracy 1900 3.86 1.00 0.00 4.36 0.00 10.00
Economic Freedom 420 4.57 4.40 ----- 1.48 0.60 9.30
Non-OECD 2226
Subsistence Rights 1923 64.00 67.40 ----- 19.65 14.00 99.00
Security Rights 1912 3.38 3.00 3.00 1.12 1.00 5.00
Democracy 1603 2.76 0.00 0.00 3.83 0.00 10.00
Economic Freedom 340 4.36 4.20 ----- 1.46 .60 9.30
OECD 294
Subsistence Rights 294 91.61 91.80 ----- 1.31 86.60 94.70
Security Rights 294 4.72 5.00 5.00 .46 3.00 5.00
Democracy 294 9.87 10.00 10.00 .42 8.00 10.00
Economic Freedom 80 5.47 5.65 ----- 1.22 2.90 8.00
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The summary statistics listed in Table 3.1 are reported separately for the entire
world, the developing world and the developed world.37 Due to the ordinal nature of the
Security Rights and the Democracy Score, I have also included the median and mode for
these measures.   Comparing these segregated samples allows us to draw two
conclusions.  First, OECD countries perform better on all empirical measures: they have
better physical quality of life (subsistence rights), stronger protection of security rights,
more democratic institutions, and more secure economic rights than the non-OECD
countries.  Table 3.2 provides further comparison between the industrial and non-
industrial world by listing difference of means and variance tests.  The first two columns
of Table 3.2 contain t-statistics for difference of means tests.   The t-statistics allow us to
reject the null hypothesis that OECD and non-OECD countries have equal means for all
of these variables.  Second, the developed countries are more homogenous than the
developing countries.   The variances of all four variables are smaller in the OECD group
than in the non-OECD group.  The difference of variance test located in the last column
of Table 3.2 indicates that we should reject the null hypothesis of equal variances across
these groups.   Analyzing the univariate distributions of these variables did not reveal any
significant outliers.  Therefore, I do not suspect that any single nation or cluster of
nations drives these summary statistics.  From the above analyses, then, we can conclude
that there is a substantial gulf between developed and less developed countries.  Further,
we can see that human rights are not only better protected in the OECD countries, but
that they tend to be more stable.
37 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is often used as a barometer for
membership in the developed world.  Its precursor , the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, was launched after World War II to administer Marshall Plan aid to Europe and was
transformed into the present organization in 1961.  Currently, it is composed of 29 members (primarily
European and North American).  During the period of this study, its membership included 24 of the
wealthiest nations (http://www.oecd.org).
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Table 3.2.  OECD v. Non-OECD: Difference of Means and Variances Tests

























* T-test 1 assumes equal variances between OECD and non-OECD countries.
T-test 2 does not assume equal variances between OECD and non-OECD
countries.  In Columns one and two entries are absolute values of t-statistics with
probability values in parentheses.   In column three entries are F-statistics with
probability values in parentheses.
Moving to Table 3.3, I have presented bivariate correlations for the OECD and
non-OECD groups as well as the sample for the entire world.  One interesting finding
gleaned from these data is that the developed and non-developed countries appear to be
driving somewhat different sets of correlations.  Looking at the entire world, we can see
that those countries with more democratic institutions and economic freedom, also tend to
enjoy better physical quality of life and greater protection of security rights.  The
correlations for the world sample are all significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level.
These relationships are still statistically significant, albeit less pronounced, if the
developing world is considered separately.  Singling out the OECD countries, we find that
the correlation between physical quality of life and economic freedom and between
democracy and economic freedom remain relatively strong and statistically significant.
Also, security rights and democracy perform equally well. The relationship between
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subsistence rights and security rights and between subsistence rights and democracy, while
weaker, still maintain statistical significance.  The correlation between security rights and
economic freedom for the OECD are not statistically significant at the conventional 0.05
level.  One obvious reason for this result is the small amount of variation for these
measures throughout the OECD sample.
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Table 3.3 Bivariate Correlations
World

























































































*correlation different from zero at the 0.05 level
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Though instructive, descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations do not provide
an adequate illustration of the trends of subsistence rights, security rights, democratic
institutions and freedom in the economic realm.  Are these rights and freedoms
improving in the world?  Are national practices concerning these rights converging or
diverging?
I begin by plotting the average subsistence rights scores (PQLI) across time in
Figure 3.2.  Overall, the average Physical Quality of Life has improved over the period
1980-1993.  As illustrated in Figure 3.3, both OECD and non-OECD countries have
progressively exhibited better performance in providing for the basic needs of their
citizens.  Here, it is obvious that the non-OECD countries are driving these conclusions
for the world.  Also, the road to improved subsistence rights has not been a completely
smooth one.  The most notable retrenchments occurred in 1984 and 1989.  The latter is
most likely attributable to the sudden fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War and
the pull back of the superpowers (along with associated aid).
Figure 3.4 addresses the issue of convergence.  For this, I plot the coefficient of
variation [(standard deviation/mean)*100] against time.  In terms of the world sample,
the variation has decreased over time.  As with previous evidence of discrepancy, it is
clear that the OECD has remained very homogeneous while the developing world
(though improving) still exhibits wide variation.  A reexamination of Table 3.1 reveals
similar findings with the standard deviation of the non-OECD group at 19.65 during this
period while the OECD registered a low 1.31.
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Figure 3.2 Trends in Subsistence Rights (World)
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Figure 3.4 Coefficient of Variation in Subsistence Rights Scores
I continue on the same path in examining the security rights measure over time.
At first glance, Figure 3.5 appears to indicate major changes in the mean Amnesty
International score.  The reader should note, however, that the vertical scale has a
minimum of 3.5 and a maximum of 3.65, for a measure that ranges from one to five.
With that in mind, using this global security rights scale as a guide, human rights
performance demonstrated no obvious trend between 1980 and 1989, worsened
somewhat from 1989 to 1992, and improved once again in 1993.  The sharp rise in
violation of these rights beginning after 1989 corresponds with the destruction of the
Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War.  This corresponds to the experience with
subsistence rights.  In the security rights case, this situation was perhaps tied to the
eruption of many post cold-war ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe, which led regimes to
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increase security rights abuses in an effort to combat domestic challengers.  In the wake
of the Cold War, control of activities within the blocs was lessened, the perception of
international threats dissipated and ethnic movements developed.  These could be viewed
as threats to existing regimes, thereby increasing the probability that these governments
would resort to security rights abuse as a policy tool.
Figure 3.5 Trends in Security Rights (World)
Figure 3.5 also plots the yearly standard deviation of security rights scores, with
evidence of similar trends.  Variation in human rights practices increased (unevenly)
between 1980 and 1988, and increased more dramatically from 1989 to 1993.  Although
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there is more variation in world-wide security rights practices in 1992-1993 than in any
prior period.  Again, this is perhaps attributable to the end of the Cold War.  Figure 3.6
indicates that the conclusions regarding security rights practices are again driven by the
developing nations.  Respect for security rights has slightly improved over time, although
not steadily.  Looking at the coefficient of variation (Figure 3.7), we see that the non-
OECD is driving overall security rights performance in the world where there is strong
evidence of divergence.  The OECD consistently has much less variation.
Figure 3.6 Trends in Security Rights
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Figure 3.7 Coefficient of Variation in Security Rights Scores
Next, we turn our attention to the properties of the Polity III Democracy variable.
Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show trends in the establishment of democratic institutions
across the globe.  Figure 3.8 illustrates a rather steady global movement towards the
establishment of democratic institutions.  Figure 3.9 suggests that this trend is being
driven by changes in non-OECD group.  Indeed, the OECD appears static, at least until
1990. This is reinforced by examining the bottom panel of Table 3.1 which shows that
OECD countries have a mean democracy score of 9.87 and a median and mode of 10 for
this period.
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Figure 3.8 Trends in Democracy (World)
It is interesting to notice that this trend in the direction of greater democracy has
accelerated since 1989 - a period that also experienced an increase in security rights
violations, according to the analysis just conducted.  This finding suggests that although
democracy typically decreases abuse of security rights (as is indicated by the correlations
previously presented), democratization in the aggregate may not always perform in this
manner.  Indeed, during this period it may have coincided with persons being subjected
to more repression of these rights than before.  Perhaps newly born democracies choose
to use security rights abuse to maintain control, as suggested by Davenport’s (1997) work
on negative sanctions.  This is also in keeping with Fein’s (1995) thesis of “more murder
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exhibit greater degradation in human rights provisions.  The remaining non-democratic
regimes may also be alarmed by democracy movements operating from within and
outside of their borders and increase repression in an effort to stifle dissent.  This could
more than erase any gains due to countries moving toward democracy in the aggregate.
In terms of variation, Figure 3.10 also indicates that there is a degree of convergence in
the non-OECD.   The coefficient of variation in democracy scores has steadily declined
during this period, indicating, possibly, that there is a demonstration effect or that more
countries view democratic institutions as being more legitimate.
Figure 3.9 Trends in Democracy
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Figure 3.10 Coefficient of Variation in Democracy Scores
Finally, we are left with economic freedom, a variable for which trends are
difficult to interpret because of the limited available sample (i.e., measures are only
provided for the years 1980, 1985, 1990, and 1993).  Keeping that in mind, there is
evidence that economic freedom has indeed increased across the globe.   Figures 3.11
and 3.12 plot economic freedom (as measured by the Fraser Institute’s index) against
time.   These two figures suggest that there has been a steady movement towards more
protection of economic freedom in OECD and non-OECD countries alike.   As is now
expected, the OECD appears to be relatively homogenous in behavior while non-OECD
countries exhibit more heterogeneous actions.   However, it should be stated that
variation across both sets of countries has been declining at least since 1990 (Figure
3.13).
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Figure 3.11 Trends in Economic Freedom (World)
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Figure 3.13 Coefficient of Variation in Economic Freedom Scores
3.6 Conclusion
While not answering all of my questions regarding the relationship between these
four groups of  “basic” internationally recognized human rights, this chapter did succeed
in taking some important initial steps toward understanding the various linkages between
basic human needs, security rights, democracy, and economic freedom.  In what might be
considered good news for citizens, as well as policymakers and scholars who have argued
that these rights are generally complementary (e.g., Vance 1977, Howard 1983, Donnelly
1989, and Kyi 1995), bivariate correlation analyses provide no direct evidence of trade-
offs.  In these simple analyses, I found a tendency for these human rights to be achieved
together, both in analyses of the full sample and in a subset of countries consisting of
Y e a r
 C.V. of Econ Fre e  S c o re s --World  C.V. of Econ Fre e  S c o re s --non-O
 C.V. of Econ Fre e  S c o re s --OECD






non-OECD countries.   Though when only OECD member countries were included in the
analysis many of the relationships dissipated, this finding is probably due to the lack of
variance in OECD countries and their relative homogeneity.   Most of the significant
findings throughout the chapter were driven by the non-OECD portion of the sample.
Thus far it would appear that Kyi (1995) is essentially correct when he suggests that the
trade-offs argument concerning development and other freedoms is merely a pretext used
by regimes to counter the ever-increasing call for governments to live up to international
political and security rights standards.
The results of my analyses of trends in human rights achievement and the
variance in human rights performance also provide some very interesting findings.   Each
of the variables analyzed in this study showed a trend toward greater realization of rights
since the beginning of the data series that I was able to examine.  Thus, it would seem
that it is possible (in the aggregate) to have each of these human rights become
increasingly realized over time.
That said, there are also some findings that hint that the four categories of human
rights we investigate do not always move together.  In spite of increases in levels of
Physical Quality of Life, economic rights, and democracy after 1989 and the end of the
Cold War, the security rights measure shows that respect for personal integrity abuse
actually decrease after 1989, until an improvement in 1993.   This would suggest that, on
a systemic level, moves toward democracy might actually be accompanied at first by
greater repression.  This would again lend credence to Fein's (1995) argument of "more
murder in the middle."  In addition, the correlations between the categories of rights are
not so strong as to preclude the possibilities of trade-offs in certain cases.
Analysis of the variance in the scores yield further potentially important
information.  Though measures of the variation in economic rights and democracy
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indicate the world is converging concerning respect for security rights and to a lesser
extent with PQLI, there is evidence of a trend toward divergence.  At least in the latter




RESEARCH DESIGN: HYPOTHESES, MEASUREMENT, AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Hypotheses: International Variables
The previous sections address the important topics of human rights
conceptualization and international law, as well as the potential theoretical linkages
between the various rights.   This chapter deals with the theoretically important task of
developing multivariate models that can better determine what aspects of the rapidly
changing global system actually affect basic human rights.   In order to achieve this, a
number of hypotheses are proposed and grounded in existing theoretical literature.
Differentiating between domestic and international determinants, I first begin with
external influences.
a. Global Integration
Hypothesis: The greater (the lesser) the extent to which a country is integrated into the
international political economy, the more (the less) likely it will guarantee basic human
rights.
This hypothesis is surrounded by the long-standing theoretical debate between
realism/neorealism (Morgenthau 1948, 1967; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981, 1987; Prestowitz
1988; Grieco 1990) and liberalism/globalism (Keohane 1984, 1986; Axelrod 1984;
Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Keohane and Nye 1989; Oye 1986; Lake 1988; Snidel 1985,
1991; Suzuki 1994).   In short, realists view the world as a group of sovereign states with
national security at the heart of foreign policy.   Under this scenario, there is very little
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incentive for international cooperation.   Liberalism or globalism sees a system of
regimes where integration is fostered and cooperation is not only possible, but likely.38
As illustrated by Holsti (1985), globalism predicts that growing interdependence
of nations will result in a global society or community.  This involves trade, technology,
communication, and the "vast network of transnational relationships between private
citizens, associations and companies (52)." Indeed, in the last twenty years, the
increasing speed of technological developments has transformed the way in which
governments and individuals conduct their affairs.  The emergence of the computer has
revolutionized the financial and trade markets into a worldwide market place.  Since the
1970s, global trade has risen dramatically relative to previous levels, and relative to gross
domestic product.  As a result of this increase in trade and investment (along with
technological innovation and deregulation of capital markets by governments), gross
international capital flows rose to $600 billion annually.  Indeed, as large as the growth
in trade has been, the increased volume in international finance has even dwarfed
progress in trade (Keohane and Milner 1996).  Even in developing countries,
international flows doubled from $52 billion in 1975-77 to $110 billion in 1985-89
(Turner 1991, 23).  Further, in the aftermath of the debt crises of the 1980s, IMF and
World Bank influences over developing countries' domestic economic policies (and
indeed the developed world's need to remedy the crises) strengthens the argument that
interdependence is increasing.  Recent events surrounding the Asian financial crisis and
Russian currency dilemma (and their subsequent impact on the U.S.  and European
economies) dramatize this growing globalization.
To my knowledge, there are only two scholars who have linked the level of
incorporation into the global system with variations in human rights practices.  Gurr
38  See Keohane and Nye (1989) and Krasner (1983) for examinations of the nature of regimes in general.
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(1986) contends that since nations on the periphery of the system are not subject to
retribution, they can engage in state terrorism against their citizens.  Indeed, it appears
that the most egregious violators have been those countries with little (or no) connection
to the outside world (e.g., Cambodia under Pol Pot, Albania during the Cold War, North
Korea until very recently).  Because of this isolation, potential sanctions placed on them
would have little effect.  In employing an empirical test of Gurr's initial work, Webster
(1994) finds marginal support for the hypothesis that linkages with the international
system have a positive impact on states' respect for human rights.
Webster’s findings notwithstanding, I hypothesize that the incorporation of a
nation into the international community should have a positive effect upon a regime's
treatment of its citizenry.  With the advances in worldwide communication, this
argument makes intuitive sense.  Further integration into the world community would
result in information concerning domestic human rights abuses being dispersed more
quickly to the outside world and therefore bringing pressure on the offending
government  (Webster 1994, 95).  Continuing this line of reasoning, we could expect
improvements in human rights practices as a result of expanded integration.  As
stipulated in the numerous international instruments discussed previously (e.g.,
International Bill of Human Rights), the world community has agreed upon certain
human rights standards.  If governments choose to go against these accepted standards,
they run the risk of bad publicity (which could indirectly injure them economically by
way of reductions in foreign investment) and perhaps economic sanctions, which would
be directly deleterious.  In an age of increasing capital mobility, Keohane and Milner
(1996, 19) argue that internationalization should even affect those countries not
integrated into the global system (i.e., those countries whose economies are not open).
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b. Cold War
Hypothesis: governments during the Post-Cold War era are more likely to violate their
citizens' basic human rights.
On the surface, this position appears counter intuitive to the realist/neorealist
perspective and the power politics involved in waging the Cold War.   As the Second
World War was coming to an end, strategic positions were already being taken by the
Soviet Union and United States.  Although they were both victors in the conflict,
negotiations in splitting the spoils of the war soon exposed major rifts that would
manifest themselves in a “cold war” that would ebb and flow over the next forty years.
Acting in a realist fashion, both superpowers assembled satellite states, which would act
as a check on the other's power.  In order to maintain these client nations, the U.S.  and
U.S.S.R.  employed threats as well as incentives in an attempt to prevent states from
drifting into the opposing camp.  The “carrots” would include foreign policy tools such
as increased aid to the satellites. “Sticks,” on the other hand, would involve demands by
the superpower that the domestic government prevent any insurgents from wresting
power away from the client (Webster 1994).
It could be argued that, as a result, regime leaders on both sides were more than
willing to increase repression on their own citizenry in order to deter threats to the state.
The U.S.  threw support to such violators as Pinochet in Chile, Duvalier in Haiti,
Stroessner in Paraguay, Mobutu in Zaire, Marcos in the Philippines, and the Shah in Iran.
The Soviet Union, while famous for its repressive communist puppets in Central and
Eastern Europe, can also be credited for propping up other dictators such as Mengistu in
Ethiopia and Karmal and Najibullah in Afghanistan.  For their part, the superpowers
were comfortable in overlooking their clients' human rights violations while publicly
speaking out against the other's atrocities.  While criticizing civil and political rights
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violations in Soviet-bloc nations, the U.S.  allowed (and at times encouraged) similar
violations within their allies' borders (Donnelly 1992).  In short, both Washington and
Moscow conceded that coercion by the domestic government was necessary in order to
maintain their Cold War position.
The sudden end to the Cold War (which took most of the policy-making
establishment and academia off guard) has nullified the justification for supporting such
regimes.  From the Soviet standpoint (both economically and politically), they can no
longer maintain support for their former allies even if they wanted to.  Much of the
American aid given to repressive regimes was built on anti-Communist sentiment in the
legislature as well as the nation at large.  With the collapse of the "evil empire," the
rationale for support is no longer applicable.  As a result, one might expect that the
protection of international human rights would substantially improve.
Having said that, it is equally plausible (and as I argue in the above hypothesis,
more likely) that the end of the Cold War will have an adverse effect on human rights
violations, especially if one concentrates on subsistence rights.  From an economic
standpoint, the difficulty in which the former Soviet states in Central and Eastern Europe
have moved to a market economy could prove problematic in providing basic human
rights.  Market reforms in many of these countries have resulted in at least a short-term
decrease in the average person's standard of living.  With former Communists recently
making inroads into the political gains of reformers in Eastern Europe and Russia, it
appears that some citizens have been disappointed and expect more from the economic
and political changes brought about by the end of the Cold War.  This could eventually
result in political instability with increasing opposition to further movement towards a
market economy and democratic government.  Here, it is possible that needs fulfillment
interacts with domestic inequality, for persons are more apt to feel deprived, and
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therefore be willing to oppose the government, when their referent is others in the society
that are much better off  (e.g., Gurr 1970, Ellina and Moore 1992; Moore, Lindstrom and
O’Regan 1996).
Another problem surfacing with the close of the Cold War is the revival of
nationalism among various groups that had been restrained by the respective
superpowers.  As we have seen throughout the former Soviet empire, national
animosities suppressed during the post-war struggle have now bubbled over into severe
conflicts.  Obvious examples include the bloody confrontations in the former Yugoslavia,
Chechnya, and Georgia.39 While the tensions have at times eased, many of these areas
still experience severe basic human rights violations, both in subsistence and security
rights.  This line of reasoning is connected with the issues surrounding ethnic conflict
and civil war and their deleterious effects on basic human rights.
While there is an immense literature on realism and the Cold War in general, only
a couple of scholars have attempted to make the connection between this conflict and
human rights performance.40 Gurr (1986) hypothesized that nations acting as proxies in
major conflicts are more likely to utilize extreme violence on their own population.  In
order to combat internal threats to the state from the opposing ideological camp, the
primary powers were pleased to supply the recipient regimes with money and weapons.
Further, in cases where the intensity of the internal conflicts is high, Washington and
Moscow were willing to accept not only immense financial costs but also increased
repression in their client states.  Though he is the first to even allude to the theoretical
39 Other problem areas include Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Sudan, and Zaire.
40 The realist paradigm includes early philosophers such as Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli as well
as the more contemporary work of Morgenthau (1948), Waltz (1979), Gilpin (1981, 1987), Prestowitz
(1988) and Grieco (1990).  For a general examination of the consequences of the end  of the Cold War
see Hogan (1992) and Rabie (1992).
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relationship between the Cold War and human rights, Gurr (1986) does not move beyond
hypothesis generation.
Wolpin (1986) also subscribes to this argument in his examination of repression
in developing nations.  He contends that the presence of foreign military personnel from
both sides has a negative impact on the human rights policies of domestic governments.
Though he does find substantial relationships between the two, the work is hampered by
its failure to link the results with any overarching theory as Gurr (1986) does.  More
recently, Webster (1994) draws upon these two works and empirically tests the
hypothesis.  He finds that instead of exacerbating human rights violations, the Cold War
actually improved human rights conditions in many parts of the world.  While useful, this
research is rather limited in the data used and overall scope.  It is my intention to shed
some definitive light on these conflicting results by utilizing a more comprehensive
model with expanded data over a longer period of time.
4.2 Hypotheses: Domestic Variables
a. Economic Freedom
Hypothesis: The higher (lower) the level of economic freedom in a country, the more
(less) likely the government will guarantee basic human rights.
Most research involving freedom has traditionally centered on such things as
political rights and civil liberties.  With ever more countries turning to a market
economy, recent work has looked at the more narrow aspects of economic freedom and
its effects on society.  The philosophical underpinning of this effort is found in some of
the classics of political and economic philosophy.  Almost every advocate for economic
freedom emphasizes the need for well-defined property rights that are guaranteed by law.
John Locke, with his Second Treatise on Civil Government, can be credited with
providing the foundation for legitimacy of private property and the government's
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responsibility in protecting this right.  In Capitalism and Freedom, Milton and Rose
Friedman (1962) carry on in the tradition of Locke by proposing a forthright statement of
economic freedom.  Here, it is argued that economic freedom is a necessary condition for
political freedom and that while there is some limited role for government in a free
society, the primary entity should be the individual.  The Friedmans expand on this by
proposing an economic bill of rights to complement the original Bill of Rights of the
U.S.  Constitution.  This list has provided a starting point for attempts to design a
measure to rate economic freedom.
Before I address the issue of how to operationalize economic freedom, it is
important for us to make the linkage between economic choice and basic human needs.
Tying in with the literature on economic development, it can be argued that economic
freedom is indeed related to GNP.  Economic theory suggests that higher incomes and
increasing living standards are dependent on increases in the production of goods and
services valued by society.  Gwartney, et al.  (1996, 91-92) suggest that, as a nation
reaches high levels of economic freedom, it will enjoy swift growth.41 This should be
especially pertinent to developing countries that can gain from incorporating successful
business practices and technical advancements from the developed world.  Because
economic growth can be seen in part as a process of discovery, nations with greater
economic freedom should tend to have higher rates of growth than those with low levels
of freedom.  Therefore, higher levels of economic freedom should result in higher levels
of per capita GNP as compared to lower levels of freedom.
Scully (1988) supports this position in his analysis of 115 market economies from
1960-1980.  He finds that politically open societies that guarantee private property rights
41 This is contingent on the premise that this economic freedom is indeed credible and potentially long
lasting.
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and the market allocation of resources grow at three times the rate and are two and one-
half times as efficient as societies in which these freedoms are not guaranteed.
Gwartney, et al.  (1996, 92-93) empirically show that on average, countries with more
economic freedom have a higher per capita GDP.  With the most recently available data
(i.e., 1994), the average per capita GDP for the A rated economies was $13, 659
compared to those having a C grade with $7,888 and the F- grade with $1,650.42 If the
argument holds (from the previous section) that increased levels of GNP result in higher
physical quality of life, then economic freedom should (at least indirectly) have an effect
on basic human needs.43
b. Inequality
Hypothesis: The greater (the lesser) the inequality of wealth, the less (the more) likely the
government will guarantee basic human rights.
The issue of inequality has been a concern for politicians since ancient times.  A
number of modern scholars have drawn attention to its widespread and persistent
influence around the world, especially in developing countries (Ward 1978, Gurr 1985,
Midgely 1987, Sterling 1974, Russett 1972, Douglas 1972, Grenier 1984, Kohli 1986).
Not only is the problem of inequality an issue that governments must address, but in
many instances a situation that is exacerbated by the regime itself.  As many have noted,
the elites use the state apparatus to safeguard their own economic interest and indeed
protect the rich from the poor (Duff and McCamant 1976, North 1987, Claude 1987,
Flynn, 1978, Scott 1985).   For Gurr (1985, 1986), the central issue of inequality is that
42 The economic freedom ratings that range from zero to ten are also broken down into grades: countries
with ratings of 8.0 or more were assigned an A; 7.0 to 7.99 a B; 6.0 to 6.99 a C; 5.0 to 5.99 a D; 4.0 to
4.99 an F; and less than 4.0 an F- (Gwartney, et al.  1996, 53).  Details of the overall economic freedom
index can be found in Appendix B.
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the gulf between the “haves” and the “have-nots” will result in conflict and instability.
Since the elite are not willing to accept a more equitable distribution, resorting to
repression appears to be an efficient short term solution, especially in situations (as is
usually the case) where resources are very limited.  While the theoretical basis for this
scenario is quite logical, empirical evidence has been less than unanimous.  Although
Muller (1985) finds support for the inequality hypothesis (as a correlate with political
violence), Duff and McCamant (1985) find no relationship in Latin America between
inequality and repression.
Surrounding the issue of basic needs and increasing levels of GNP is the notion
that there is (or could be) a trade-off between development and provision of basic needs.
The argument for development maintains that resources, which would be devoted to
social programs to satisfy basic human needs, are instead channeled toward greater
investment.  This can be broken down into "strong" and "weak" needs trade-off.  Strong
needs trade-off would constrain consumption to obtain the highest percentage of total
income for investment.  Weak needs trade-off simply bars consideration of consumption-
based human rights from development policy.
A trade-off can also occur between development and equality.  As in the above
case, the development vs.  equality competition can take a "strong" and "weak" form.
The weak equality trade-off stipulates that the relationship between the level of economic
development and income inequality takes the form of an inverted U-curve.  This U-curve
hypothesis was first proposed by Kuznets (1955) and has since been widely debated
(Colombatto 1991; Newman and Thomson 1989; Newman and Thomson 1991; Ogwang
1995; Ram 1988; Rock 1993).  The strong variation views inequality not so much an
unintended casualty of, but rather a contributor to, development.  Since only the
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relatively wealthy will be able to save and invest, (and if investment is the mainstay of
robust growth), inequality is seen to benefit even the poor in the long run.
c. Democracy
Hypothesis: The more (less) democratic a government, the more (less) likely it will
guarantee basic human rights.
Recent literature on human rights finds a relatively strong relationship between
democratic forms of government and protection of human rights.  It appears that there
are a number of theoretical justifications for this conclusion.  Henderson (1991) was one
of the first to empirically test this hypothesis that the more democratic the government,
the less likely that it will oppress its citizens.  Because the democratic process is built on
bargaining and compromise, it provides a substantive alternative for dealing with
conflict.  We are also warned by Henderson that democracy must truly be legitimate in
the sense that functional institutions are in place that can insure participation of various
interests.  Poe and Tate (1994), in their pooled cross-sectional study of integrity of the
person rights, substantially extend the findings of Henderson (1991, 1993) with different
measures of democracy.  In his investigation of democracy and international conflict,
Dixon (1994, 15-17) continues the argument that "bounded competition" with its rules,
procedures and guidelines socialize democratic leaders that bargaining and compromise
are the only avenues to dispute resolution.
A second theoretical basis for expecting greater human rights guarantees with
greater democratization is that democracies offer their citizens the ability to remove
potentially abusive leaders before violations have become too severe.  This usually
includes not only the right to vote but also the capability to oust officials for
unconstitutional behavior.  This obviously assumes that a country will have constitutional
guarantees for human rights - which most do indeed have. Thirdly, the civil liberties
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usually associated with democracies (such as freedom of speech, press, assembly, etc.)
enables citizens and opposition groups to publicize abuse of the particular regime.  These
freedoms could also result in publicity of potential abuses being exported to the
international community (e.g., UN, EU, OSCE, and non-governmental organizations
such as Amnesty International) which could lead to further pressure on a domestic
government.
Turning more specifically to democracy and its effect on basic human needs, a
number of scholars have proposed that democracies are better equipped to provide their
citizens with these rights.  Moon and Dixon (1985), Rosh (1986), Spalding (1986) and
Moon (1991) find that political democracy is associated with higher levels of basic needs
satisfaction, even when controlling for wealth (i.e., GNP).  These conclusions are
bolstered by the fact that the authors utilize different measures of democracy.  Spalding
(1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991) and Moon
and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1991).44
Table 4.1 Summary of Hypotheses
Independent Variable
Hypothesized Relationship
with Basic Human Rights
Source of
Independent Variable
H1: Global Integration Positive International
H2: Cold War Positive International
H3: Economic Freedom Positive Domestic
H4: Income Inequality Negative Domestic
44 Both Arat (1991) and Bollen (1991) further expand on their operationalization of democracy in later
works.
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H5: Democracy Positive Domestic
4.3 Control Variables
While the focus of this dissertation analyzes international political economy
variables associated with increasing globalization, a number of other factors have
garnered much interest in the development literature as well as human rights studies.  In
my desire for the most comprehensive (as well as parsimonious) model of international
political economy and basic human rights, I therefore control for a number of these
variables.
The first set of control variables includes economic development and economic
growth.  The prevailing hypothesis is that the richer a country's population, the more
likely its government will guarantee subsistence as well as security rights.  In terms of
subsistence rights, a number of authors (Moon and Dixon 1985, Spalding 1986, Rosh
1986, and Park 1987) find that wealth is one of the most powerful explanations of well-
being.45 Having said that, Goldstein (1985) and Rosh (1986) question whether this linear
relationship holds universally, especially at the higher levels of GNP.  Mitchell and
McCormick (1988), Henderson (1991) and Poe and Tate (1994) also find some support
for this positive connection between GNP and the respect for security rights.  Again,
support for this argument is also not without its detractors (Duff and McCamant 1976).
Turning to the rate of economic growth, intuition tells us that a strong economic
growth rate will provide more goods for a society and therefore lessen the potential
friction between a government and its people.  However, Olson takes a different
approach by strongly arguing that "rapid economic growth is a major force leading
45 While ultimately arriving at this conclusion, Rosh (1986) warns that the relationship is expected to be
greatly reduced if research is concentrated on the third world rather than the entire world.
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towards revolution and instability" (1963, 530).  In what he calls a "revolution of rising
expectations," rapid growth will increase the problems of inequity and rising expectations
about what the government should do outstrip what the regime is actually capable (or
willing) to do (540-541).  Continuing this line of inquiry, Gurr (1968, 1986) argues that
this "relative deprivation" may occur because rapid growth almost never is rapid enough
to keep up with the ever-increasing expectations.  From an operationalization standpoint,
I follow a number of authors (McKinlay and Cohan 1975, 1976; Mitchell and
McCormick 1988; Poe and Tate 1994) in using gross national product per capita for level
of economic development and percentage growth in GNP per capita for economic
growth.46
The next pair of control variables addresses the government's involvement in
either international and/or civil war.  A number of studies argue that participation in
international conflict (Stohl 1975, 1976; Rasler 1986; Poe and Tate 1994) and civil
conflict (Nieburg 1969; Tilly 1978; and Skocpol 1979, Poe and Tate 1994) will have a
deleterious effect on human rights.  To operationalize both international war and civil
war, I utilize the scales proposed by Small and Singer (1982).  The first defines a country
as being involved in an interstate war if 1) there was a total of a thousand or more battle
deaths suffered by all of the participants in the conflict or 2) the particular country
suffered at least a hundred fatalities or had a thousand or more personnel taking part in
the hostilities (pp.  50, 55).  The second scale categorizing civil conflicts stipulates two
criteria.  The first criterion for an actual civil war would demand that the regime in
power be directly involved in the conflict.  Also, there must be a viable resistance where
46 While GNP is considered the traditional and most popular approach, there have been several
alternatives offered.  These include energy consumption (Henderson 1991) and a number of basic human
needs measures reviewed in the subsistence rights section above.  The primary difficulty in employing
measures such as energy consumption is that accurate data do not exist for many of the years and
countries that are included in this study.  The basic needs measures obviously would be problematic in
that one of my dependent variables (subsistence rights) utilizes components of these indices.
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either both sides must be "organized for violent conflict" or "the weaker side, although
initially unprepared [must be] able to inflict upon the stronger opponents at least five
percent of the number of fatalities it sustains" (215).  As a result, I do not categorize
massacres and/or genocides as civil wars.
The final variables, which I control for, look at population issues.  It has been
argued that the larger a nation's population and population growth rate, the greater its
government's tendency to violate basic human rights (Henderson 1993, Poe and Tate
1994).47  Henderson emphasizes the stresses put on all aspects of society as "individuals
and groups compete for every conceivable good." While the "extent of scarcity varies
from country to country, [but] in the more hard-pressed countries, burgeoning demands
will keep governments off-balance and will incline them to resort to repression.  This
high level of population can push countries into repression in a variety of ways.   From a
basic statistical standpoint, larger populations increase the possibility for repressive acts
to occur (Poe and Tate 1994, 857).  Secondly, unsustainable populations can result in
environmental devastation, which in turn injures the economy and lessens the regime's
ability to meet its citizens' demands (Henderson 1993, 324).  For my uses here, I
incorporate the natural logarithm of total national population.  The log is employed to
overcome the skewed distribution of total population that would otherwise hamper the
statistical assumptions.
 In terms of population growth, increasing populations tend to counter any
economic growth that may be present.  Second, increasing populations exacerbates the
already difficult problem of ethnic conflict, "as when an increase in the size of an ethnic
47 In the end, Henderson (1993) finds that population pressures, as evidenced by population growth rate,
are related to integrity of the person violations by governments.  On the other hand, population size itself
demonstrated little or no affect on government repression.  The results from Poe and Tate's  (1994) study,
however, indicate that population size has a positive impact on human rights abuse while population
growth has no statistical effect on repression.
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group leads to a demand for a larger share of society's political and economic rewards"
(Henderson 1993, 324).  Third, a rising growth rate tends to result in a relatively large
number of young persons (as compared to the overall population) whose needs and
demands are enormous (e.g., education, jobs).  Also, this demographic group is more
likely to be involved in challenging the government when it comes to meeting these
demands.  In measuring population growth, I utilize the average percent increase in
national population from year to year, throughout the thirteen-year period of the design.
Table 4.2 Summary of Control Variables
Independent Variable
Hypothesized Relationship
with Basic Human Rights
Source of
Independent Variable
H6: Economic Development Positive Domestic
H7: Economic Growth Negative Domestic
H8: International War Negative International
H9: Civil War Negative Domestic
H10: Population Level Negative Domestic
H11: Population Growth Negative Domestic
4.4 Operationalization: Dependent Variables
a. Subsistence Rights
For the sake of clarity, it is imperative for us to specifically define and
operationalize the phenomena that I attempt to explain.  In terms of basic human needs,
many would agree that these include unpolluted air and water; sufficient food, clothing
and shelter; and minimal public health care.  While the provision of these is somewhat
more controversial than security (i.e., integrity of the person) rights, they are nonetheless
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essential if one is to realize a relatively healthy and substantive life.  If a person is
lacking in these basic human needs, the result can be just as painful and deleterious as
when a person's physical security is violated.  The acceptance of these rights was
illustrated in U.S.  foreign policy through the unveiling of the "New Directions" or
"Basic Needs Mandate" by Congress in 1973.  This marked a major departure in foreign
aid from the development assistance policies of the 1960s to the proposed goal of
meeting the needs of the poorest people in the poorest countries.  This was to be
accomplished by concentrating assistance on food production, nutrition, health care and
education (Sartorius and Ruttan 1989).
In his extensive examination of basic human needs, Moon (1991, 7-9) argues that
the provision of these needs requires few compromises concerning alternative normative
goals.  This addresses the ongoing debate concerning the trade-off between growth and
equality.48  According to the U-curve hypothesis originally proposed by Kuznets (1955),
inequality associated with economic development will at first accelerate and then, after a
period of time, begin to decline.  This stems from the intersectoral shifts in the early
stages of development, which exacerbate inequality.  While the theory has won support
from numerous scholars (Ahluwalia 1974; Robinson 1976; Chenery and Syrquin, 1975,
Okun 1975; Ogwang 1995) others have found conflicting results (Adelman and Morris
1973; Chenery et al.  1974; Ram 1988).  Moon joins other scholars (Isenman 1980; Hicks
1980; Berry 1984) in concluding, "...just as growth does not eliminate poverty,
egalitarianism does not slow material progress" (1991, 8).  He further argues that
provision of basic needs may even be necessary for rapid economic development.
48 Donnelly (1989: 163-166) provides a succinct overview of the trade-offs between development and
basic needs, equality and liberty.
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Assuming that basic needs should be provided (or at least not withheld) by
sovereign governments, the question of measurement still needs to be solved.  For
decades, social scientists studying the problems of the developing world have used gross
national product (in addition to its components and growth) as a yardstick of progress.
Benefits of this measure include its widespread availability for comparison cross-
nationally and/or over time.  This utilization rested on the premise that economic growth
would filter down to the poor or if that did not occur, governments would take action to
alleviate the inequality.  History has taught us that growth indeed did not spread to those
most in need and governments did not always step in to assist.  In addition, numerous
other problems with GNP as a measure of overall well being have been exposed by
scholars (e.g., Hicks and Streeten 1979; Morris 1979; Moon 1991).  First, it is an index
of aggregate production rather than personal income or consumption Second, the issues
involving the evaluation of output from different countries in a common measure is very
troublesome.  Thirdly, the economic cost of a good is not a measure of its ability to
enhance welfare.  Finally, goods required to meet basic needs may simply not be
available at any price, irrespective of income or GNP (Moon 1991, 22).
As a result of the above shortcomings, there have been numerous attempts by
agencies such as the UN, AID, OECD and UNESCO to find superior measures.  The
primary focus in this effort has centered on social indicators of certain basic needs.
These basic needs and their common indicators are:
Health (life expectancy, health expenditures, doctors per thousand 
population, hospital beds per thousand population)
Education (literacy, primary school enrollment, education expenditures)
Nutrition (caloric supply per head, caloric supply as percent of requirements)
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Water supply (percent of population with potable water, infant mortality per 
thousand population)
Sanitation (percent of population with access to sanitation facilities, infant 
mortality per thousand population)
Housing (No acceptable indicator available)
This process can be further broken down into consideration of indicators that reflect
either inputs or results.  Indicators reflecting results or outcomes are on the whole
preferable since I am striving to evaluate the actual performance of governments in
providing basic human needs to its citizens.  For instance, health expenditures and
primary school enrollment tell us nothing about the distribution of these services or the
quality and therefore success of the effort.49 (Hicks and Streeten 1979, 571-578; Moon
1991, 24).
Additional efforts (many funded by the United Nations) have been made to
combine individual indicators into composite indices.  Examples include Drewnowski
and Scott's (1966) "Level of Living" index, McGranahan et al.'s "Development Index,"
and the work of the United Nations Economic and Social Council which combined seven
social and economic indicators.  For numerous reasons such as lack of data/comparability
and attempting to combine too many indicators, most of these indices have not been
implemented by many scholars.50
49 At least one attribute in favor of inputs would be in attempting to measure the intention and
commitment of a particular government to provide services.  Fraser (1994) utilizes both of these
approaches in comparing human rights practice versus promise.  For our purposes here, however, I will
concentrate on those indicators reflecting only outputs.
50 A notable exception is the Human Development Index, which is the most recent measurement offered
by the United Nations.  It combines indicators of national income, life expectancy and educational
attainment.  Although it is an improvement over some previous attempts, it however presents several
shortcomings.  These include only measuring human development since 1990 and mixing ends and
means (i.e., income is means of achieving human development while standards of health and educational
achievement are ends).
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The most widely utilized composite was developed by Morris (1979) under the
auspices of the Overseas Development Council.  This "Physical Quality of Life Index"
(PQLI) is a composite of three indicators: infant mortality per thousand live births, life
expectancy at age one, and basic literacy as the proportion of population fifteen years and
over who are literate.  Ultimately, the overall PQLI composite is the unweighted
arithmetic mean of these three indicators.  The measure for life expectancy at age one
(LE1) considers 38 years as the “worst” case scenario (since 1950) and 85 years as the
“best” performance.  The index for each country is designated by the formula
LE1 - 38 / 0.47
Since most sources usually report data only for life expectancy at birth, LE1 can be
calculated by the standard formula
LE1  =  LE0 – 1 + IMR(1-SURV) / 1 – IMR
Where LE0 is life expectancy at birth; LE1 is life expectancy at age one; IMF is infant
mortality rate per 1,000 births, SURV is the average survival period for the first year and
is assumed to be three and one half months (0.3 years).  The infant mortality rate (IMR)
index utilizes 250 per 1,000 live births as the “worst” performance and 0 per 1,000 live
births as the “best” possible performance.  Specific country measures are determined by
the formula51
51 For those already familiar with the PQLI, it must be noted here that the original formulas of Morris
(1979) have been slightly modified (updated) for methodological reasons.  These changes have been
applied to the entire data set (all countries and years).  The original index defined life expectancy at age
one as LE1 – 38 / .39 and infant mortality as 229-IMF/ 2.22 (Morris 1979, p.  45).   Because of rapid
increases of IMR and LE1 in a number of higher-ranking nations, it was soon possible to obtain a score in
excess of 100.  If IMR or LE1 rise above 100, their weights in the composite measure will be
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250 – IMR / 2.50
Infant mortality and life expectancy at age one arguably capture the combined
effects of public health, nutrition, family environment, and social relations.  On the
surface, it might appear that infant mortality and life expectancy measure the same things
(i.e., health).  In reality, they indicate different aspects of social performance.  In looking
at the historical pattern of the two, it becomes evident that the factors affecting changes
in life expectancy at age one are not the same as those affecting infant mortality.  An
example of this is shown by Western countries since 1950 where mortality rates of
persons over age one were typically falling while infant mortality rates refused to
decline.  Infant mortality rates eventually came down, but in a separate and later
occurrence.  The sources of survival improvements (whether nutrition, environment,
medicine, etc.) did not impact each age group in the same manner or at the same rate.
Even during the 1990s, countries that have similar life expectancies do not always have
the same infant mortality rates and vice versa (Morris 1979, 35).
Essentially, infant mortality reflects social conditions inside the home, especially
the well being of women.  Life expectancy at age one indicates conditions in the external
environment.  The indicator for literacy indicates the potential for development and
ability of the underclass to gain the advantages and responsibilities of this development.
As Morris (1979, 35) correctly argues, literacy is a superior measure than school
enrollment or numbers of classrooms or instructors.  These are only indicators of inputs
disproportionate in relation to literacy, which by definition cannot be over 100.  Therefore, the high end
of IMR scale has been altered from 7 per 1,000 to 0 per 1,000 live births.  The low end of the scale was
increased from 229 to 250 per 1,000 live births.  The high end of the LE1 has been increased from 77 to
85 years.  The bottom end of the scale remains at 38 years.  Finally, the formula used to convert life
expectancy at birth data to life expectancy at age one has been slightly altered to where SURV (the
average survival period during the first year) is 0.3 rather than 0.2 (Morris 1996, 7).
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and do not guarantee any improved results or at best indicate the educational benefits
going typically to elite groups.  Indeed, basic literacy component not only measures gains
to the very poor but can also record literacy gains obtained through informal as well as
formal processes.
In constructing his index, Morris (1979, 30-34) lays out six criteria that all
composite measures should meet.  These are: 1) it should not assume that there is only
one pattern of development; 2) it should avoid standards that reflect the values of specific
societies; 3) it should measure results, not inputs; 4) it should be able to reflect the
distribution of social results; 5) it should be simple to construct and easy to comprehend;
and 6) it should lend itself to international comparison.   The PQLI indeed meets all of
these criteria.
Some scholars have questioned the index approach in general and the PQLI in
particular (Bayless and Bayless 1982; Goldstein 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979; Larson
and Wilford 1979).  One argument is that a loss of information may result from an index
of indicators that measure similar aspects of basic human needs.  Provided the
components are indeed highly correlated, then nothing is gained from the index.
Conversely, if the components move in different directions, combining them could mask
the changes that might be detected by using the individual indicators.  Perhaps the most
troubling criticism is brought on by the apparent arbitrary nature in equally weighting
infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy.
While Morris (1979) originally laid out an extensive justification for his index,
Moon (1991) also succinctly addresses many of the criticisms of the PQLI.  First, using
the index instead of a series of collinear indicators greatly reduces the burden of analysis.
Comparison studies (Moon and Dixon 1985; Moon 1991) indicate that the
intercorrelations among the three ingredients and the overall PQLI are extremely high.
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In addition, it can be assumed that the separate items measure different aspects of a
single theoretical construct.  If this is the case, then a single index is more appropriate
than multiple measures.  This approach is especially applicable if the underlying
construct has related components.  Employing single indicators may result in a restricted
interpretation of the problem and a governmental response that does not detect that the
measure is a proxy for a concept, not the concept itself  (Streeten 1981, 22).  Therefore,
nations might implement policies that might lead to an improvement in a specific
indicator while not completely addressing the overall shortcoming in basic needs.   Also,
by using a combination of the three indicators, I can lessen any impact of the
idiosyncrasies of any single item.
Much of the harsh criticism of the PQLI has come from the basic weighting
scheme of placing equal emphasis on infant mortality, life expectancy and literacy
(Bayless and Bayless 1982; Goldstein 1992; Hicks and Streeten 1979; Larson and
Wolford 1979).  The primary objection is that there is no theoretical basis for assigning
equal weights to the components.  Morris (1979, 47-49) forcefully argues that since there
is no overriding theoretical justification for treating any one indicator as more important
than another, we must employ equal weights.  Moon (1991, 27) echoes this position and
stresses that reweighting the components in various plausible alternatives produces
measures with a Spearman rank order correlation consistently over .98.  This level of
intercorrelation is well above that usually considered sufficient to warrant a composite
index.  After evaluating all of the advantages and disadvantages of the numerous




The next aspect of human rights I examine is that which pertains to the "integrity
of the person" or “physical integrity” (Stohl and Carleton 1985; Cingranelli and
Pasquarello 1985; Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate
1994; Fein 1995; Poe, Tate, Keith and Lanier 1996; Cingranelli and Richards 1997).  As
the above authors have indicated, abuses that violate the integrity of the person are
execution, torture, forced disappearance, and imprisonment/detention of persons, either
arbitrarily or for their political and/or religious beliefs.  For Shue (1980), these constitute
violations of what he calls security rights, while Poe and Tate (1994) refer to them as
both integrity of the person violations and state terrorism interchangeably, since these
government actions are used to force compliance in others.  Although these deplorable
acts have obvious deleterious effects on the victims, governments can further use them to
control their citizens after the fact.  As Amnesty International illustrates in their report on
Torture in the Eighties, states utilize torture as a tool
"...to intimidate the victim and other potential dissidents from further political
activity....  Intimidation of rural populations by means of torture and killings has
been part of government strategies to bring the population or land areas under
government control" (1984, 5).
For my purposes here, the rights insuring protection against the above violations are
referred to as either integrity of the person rights or security rights.
Though I have presented what has become a rather conventional definition of
integrity of the person rights, measurement of their realization is a bit more difficult.
One of the best guides in this endeavor is Jabine and Claude's (1992) Human Rights and
Statistics: Getting the Record Straight.   While better measurement and statistical
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availability will continue to be called for, numerous scholars (e.g., Milner 1995, Poe and
Tate 1994; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984) argue that
empirical tests are appropriate and necessary with currently obtainable data.
In measuring these rights, researchers may choose between what have come to be
known as events-based approach and standards-based approaches (Stohl et al.  1986;
Lopez and Stohl 1992).  The events approach would involve coding cases of repressive
events from newspaper accounts.  Typically, the number of these events is summed for a
particular period (a month or year) and the number of events is considered a measure of
repression.  Some difficulties with this approach as a means to measure levels of human
rights violation have been identified (Stohl et al.   1986; Lopez and Stohl 1992; Poe and
Tate 1994).  First, typically a few major Western newspapers have been used to find
mention of events and consequently, a Western bias in reporting often arises.   There is
also apt to be a bias in favor of closed societies that would tend to have less of their
abuses reported internationally.  An example of the need for this would be the case of
North Korea.  With such a closed society, it would not be surprising that there are no (or
at least very few) reports of government repression in North Korea.  This would be of
particular concern in cross-national analyses like the ones I plan to conduct, and also for
personal integrity abuses in particular, which, it would seem, governments would want to
be kept under a veil, hidden from the world press.
I therefore opt, instead, to use the standards-based approach, which calls for
coders to read various reports on governments’ human rights practices, and to classify
countries according to a set of predetermined criteria.   Though not without its own
weaknesses, this approach does allow the researcher to exercise judgment in coding, thus
decreasing some of the problems associated with bias.   The standards-based measure I
employ is the five point Political Terror Scales, or PTS  (Gibney and Dalton 1996)
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scales, which were created from the annually published human rights reports of Amnesty
International.   As in previous studies by Poe and Tate (1994) missing cases are filled in
using similar codings gained from the U.S.  State Department Reports.  Though an
alternative measure, gathered mainly from the U.S.  State Department is also available, I
have not used it here because of my concerns regarding the well-known allegations that
the U.S.  State Department Reports exhibits biases (e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights 1993; Innes 1992; Poe and Tate 1994).  Innes (1992) argues convincingly that the
State Departments reports have improved over time.  Still, since I aim to later conduct
analyses of trends in realization, the accuracy of the early years of those reports are a
special concern, and thus I use Amnesty’s reports as the major data source.
The PTS has been widely used in the study of human rights and are the only
measures currently available for a worldwide sample, and all of the years I wish to
cover.52 Having said that, the PTS scale is no stranger to criticism.  McCormick and
Mitchell (1997) argue that the concept of human rights is not unidimensional as PTS
portrays, but rather is multidimensional (especially concerning the components of
imprisonment and the use of torture and killing).  In their attempt at improving upon the
PTS, Cingranelli and Richards (1999) persuasively argue in favor of a unidimensional
approach and dispute the claims made by McCormick and Mitchell (1997).  While
Cingranelli and Richards’ (1999) scale is enticing, it is only available for five of the
years in my study.  Therefore, at this time, I have chosen to utilize the Political Terror
Scale.  The scales cover the 1980-1993 time frame.  They are coded so that a “5”
represents a country where these rights are not abused, while the lowest score,  “1” is
52 Among the studies using these indices include Poe and Sirirangsi 1993, 1994; Gibney and Stohl 1988;
Carleton and Stohl 1987; Stohl and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton and Johnson 1984.
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assigned to countries that are the worst human rights disasters.53  The scale is presented
in its entirety in the Appendix A.
4.5 Operationalization: Independent Variables
a. Global Integration
While there are many definitions of globalization (Gurtov 1991, Hirst and
Thompson 1996, Mittelman 1996, Clark 1997), interdependence (Keohane and Nye
1989, Jones 1984), and internationalization (Keohane and Milner 1996) my
conceptualization is rather straightforward.  For our purposes here, I define globalization
as the degree to which nations are economically and politically incorporated into the
overall international system.  To date, the only empirical work considering
interdependence and human rights is Webster (1994).  While he makes a significant
contribution by initially testing the hypothesis, his single measurement scheme is not
sufficient.  Therefore, for the measurement of global integration, I utilize three separate
but associated components.  These are integration into the postwar Bretton Woods
system, trade openness, and financial openness.
For my measure of Bretton Woods regime integration, I look to Webster's (1994)
measurement of membership in the World Bank, the GATT and the IMF.  For each
membership category and year, a simple dichotomous rating is applied ("one" if it is a
member and "zero" if it is not).  The values for the three categories are then summed so
that the highest possible score for a nation is three and the lowest is zero.   The data
indicating membership come from various issues of The Political Handbook of the
World.
53 In order to be consistent with the scales of the other variables, the original five-point security rights
scale is recoded so that countries with more severe human rights violations exhibit a lower rating while
nations with fewer violations are assigned a higher rating.
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Following the work of Heston and Summers (1994), I choose to measure trade
openness as the sum of imports and exports divided by the gross domestic product.
Unfortunately, there has been little success in accurately estimating financial openness
for the vast majority of countries throughout the world.  Data on gross financial inflows
and outflows as a percentage of gross national product simply is not available at this
time.  Until very recently, studies of capital controls were limited to indirect measures
such as covered interest differentials (Kasman and Pigott 1988, Frankel and McArther
1987, Ito 1986, Dooley and Isard 1980, Giavazzi and Pagano 1985) or a dichotomous
indicator of whether or not nations imposed restrictions on capital flows (Alesina, Grilli,
and Milesi-Ferretti 1994).
In moving beyond the simple dichotomous discussion of whether countries
impose restrictions on capital, I have tracked the trends for each of the various capital
controls for both the OECD and non-OECD nations as reported by the IMF.  The first
type of controls involves restrictions on the current account.  These actions include 1)
restrictions on payments for current transactions, 2) import surcharges, 3) requirements
of advance import deposits, 4) surrender or repatriation of export proceeds.  Further,
controls can involve restrictions on the capital account.  This can involve 1) restriction on
payments for capital transactions, 2) limitations on non-resident accounts, 3) licensing of
inflows and outflows of various forms of capital (real estate, securities, banknotes, bank
loans, bank deposits), and 4) special reserve requirements on banks' foreign positions.
Finally, capital controls can manifest themselves in the form of exchange control
restrictions.  Here, one may find dual or multiple exchange rates existing for commercial
or financial transactions in addition to possible bilateral arrangements (IMF 1994,
Epstein and Schor 1992).  The results are illustrated in Table 2. 54
54 This sample includes 164 countries (21 OECD and 143 non-OECD).
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1980 45 23 87 55 90 24
1981 49 21 90 60 92 28
1982 43 19 90 67 93 28
1983 43 25 89 68 94 28
1984 42 20 89 68 90 26
1985 44 18 92 70 93 30
1986 42 22 93 67 93 31
1987 43 22 94 68 92 30
1988 43 17 91 66 92 28
1989 41 17 87 62 90 25
1990 42 19 92 66 90 24
1991 42 19 87 64 90 19
1992 23 12 62 50 60 22
1993 19 9 64 46 64 21
While this is an instructive first step, it does not provide us with an acceptable
operationalization for further empirical tests.  Therefore, I have chosen to combine these
measures of capital controls into one overall indication of international financial
openness.  This variable ranges from zero to six (according to how many individual
capital restrictions were imposed for a given country in a given year).  In order to
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simplify interpretation, I have recoded this measure where zero indicates the least open
economy and the value six indicates the most open international market.55
b. Cold War
One of the explanations for human rights variations is the presence or absence of
the Cold War.   For purposes of this analysis, a very simple measure is employed - a
dummy variable signifying the presence or absence of tensions between the U.S.  and the
U.S.S.R.  Although the reforms of Glasnost and Perestroika became evident soon after
Gorbachev’s rise to power in the mid 1980s, the actual release of Eastern Europe by the
Soviet Union did not actually occur until late 1989 with the culmination of the collapse
of the Berlin Wall.  Therefore, for this variable, 1980-1989 is given a score of one to
signify the presence of the Cold War and 1990-1993 is coded as a zero to indicate the
absence of Cold War.
c. Economic Freedom
In defining economic freedom, it is perhaps easier to begin with an identification
of losses in freedom.  Jones and Stockman (1992) point out that constraints imposed by a
third party on voluntary transactions will result in a loss of economic freedom, which is
the sum of the losses in consumer and producer surplus in those constrained transactions.
From a positive framework, I can say that individuals possess economic freedom when a)
property they acquire without the use of force, fraud, or theft is protected from physical
invasions by others and b) they are free to use, exchange, or give their property to others
as long as these actions do not violate the identical rights of others (Gwartney, et al.
55 For a comparable measurement of international financial openness, see Quinn (1997).  While Quinn
provides a more complex measure of financial openness, his sample of only 56 countries is somewhat
limiting for my application here.
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1996, 12).56  In choosing an appropriate measure of economic freedom, I am faced with
essentially three options - the Fraser Institute, Freedom House, and the Heritage
Foundation.  Fraser Institute provides the most complex index incorporating 17
components that cover four areas of economic freedom.  These areas include 1) money
and inflation, government operations and regulations, 3) takings and discriminatory
taxation, and 4) international exchange.  A zero to ten rating scale is used for each
component.  Details of the Fraser index are shown in Appendix B.
Building on their success of the widely-used measures of political rights and civil
liberties, Freedom House offers a composite measure incorporating six indicators: 1)
Freedom to hold property; 2) Freedom to earn a living; 3) Freedom to operate a business;
4) Freedom to invest one's earnings; 5) Freedom to trade internationally; and 6) Freedom
to participate in the market economy.57 As noted in its World Survey of Economic
Freedom, Freedom House acknowledges that there is a striking degree of similarity
between its ratings and those of the Fraser Institute and Heritage Foundation.  Having
said that, I choose to use the overall superior Fraser measure for my analysis.  First, it is
more comprehensive both in its combined indicators and its historical nature covering the
period from 1975-1995.  Further, the Fraser Institute better addresses a number of very
complex methodological issues that arise in creating an index such as this.58
d. Inequality
56 It is important to note the distinction between economic freedom and political and civil liberties.
Nations may indeed exhibit high levels of political rights and civil liberties while at the same time
achieve a relatively low level of economic freedom.  Examples include Sweden, India and Israel.
57 Assigned values for this composite range from 0 to 3 for the first four indicators and 0 to 2 for the last
two indicators.
58  This work is a culmination of six symposia from 1984 through 1993 where some of the most respected
economists cooperated to forge an acceptable measure of economic freedom.  See Walker (1988)
Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare; Easton and Walker (1992) Rating Global Economic
Freedom; Block (1991), Economic Freedom: Toward a Theory of Measurement; and Gwartney, et al.
(1996), Economic Freedom of the World: 1975-1995.
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While the issue of income inequality is a potentially potent factor in international
political economy and basic human rights, obtaining an acceptable data source has for
years been a vexing problem.  Previous data sets used in the existing literature on
inequality have included Paukert (1973), Jain (1975), and Fields (1989).59  These early
attempts, while important, fall short in providing sufficient numbers of high-quality
observations, widespread coverage of countries, and adequate data over time to allow for
any time series analysis.  Paukert (1973) supplies 55  (18 high quality) observations, Jain
(1975) provides 405 (61 high quality), and Fields (1989) presents 105 (73 high quality)
observations.  In terms of country coverage, they range from a high of 36 (Fields 1989)
to a low of 18 (Paukert 1973).  A more recent effort from the World Bank goes a long
way in correcting many of these deficiencies.  Deininger and Squire (1996) build on the
wide array of existing data and apply a stringent set of quality standards to improve the
overall product.60 Persuaded by their arguments, I employ their latest data set that covers
108 countries from 1947 to 1993.61
Starting where Fields (1989) left off, they apply a more stringent criterion for
inclusion of observations.  At the core of their representation of income inequality is the
GINI index, based on the Lorenz curve that plots the share of population against the
share of income received.  For inclusion in the data set, Deininger and Squire (1996)
require that observations be based 1) on household surveys, 2) on comprehensive
coverage of the population, and 3) on comprehensive coverage of income sources.  They
argue that estimates of inequality should be based on individual units in household
surveys rather than information from national accounts.  Using national accounts
59 The data set for Paukert (1973) forms the basis for subsequent work by Lecaillon et al.  (1984).
60 Ultimately, the data set proposed by Deininger and Squire (1996) includes 2621 observations (682 high
quality) for 108 countries from 1947 to 1993.
61  While these data covers 108 countries from 1947 to 1993, not all countries are represented for every
year.
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involves assuming a general functional form according to which different types of
income are distributed.  If these assumptions concerning patterns of inequality across
countries over time are included in the database, they cannot be tested.
If a non-representative subset of the population is utilized, it could obviously
result in biased estimates.  Because of this, data must be based on a representative sample
covering the entirety of the population even if taken from household surveys.  In order to
prevent errors in inference from a flawed sample, Deininger and Squire (1996) drop
numerous observations from Latin America where many of the household surveys are
limited to urban areas.62 Their third criterion, that measurement of income (or
expenditure) must be comprehensive (covering both different income sources as well as
population groups), demands that long time series on inequality for a number of
countries be excluded. 63
e. Democracy
The researcher is also faced with many choices when facing measurement of
political rights.  For our purposes here, I focus my measurement on the concept of
"democracy." Well-known scholars such as Lipset (1963, 27), Dahl (1956, 67-90),
Downs (1957, 23-24) and Lenski (1966, 319) have proposed definitions that emphasize
elections and political liberties which should expand political efficacy, but here I adopt
the definition of Bollen (1980, 1993) who draws from the above authors.  He defines
political democracy as "the extent to which the political power of the elite is minimized
and that of the nonelite is maximized" (1980, 372).
62 Other countries that experience reduced observations according to this criterion are Japan, Israel,
Malawi and Madagascar)
63 This includes Greece, Morocco, New Zealand, Sweden, and Nigeria.
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The measure that most closely meets my definitional and practical means is
Jaggers and Gurr's Polity III democracy measure, which covers 161 nations from 1946
through 1994.  Jaggers and Gurr (1995) argue that there are three essential,
interdependent components of democracy in the context of Western liberal philosophy.
First, institutions and procedures must be present where individuals can voice their
preferences about alternative political policies and leaders.  Second, it is vital that there
be adequate constraints on the power of the executive.  Finally, the state must guarantee
civil liberties (e.g., freedom from slavery/servitude, torture, arbitrary arrest and
imprisonment, inhuman punishment).  Operationally, their indicator of democracy is
drawn from codings of the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, the
competitiveness of political participation, and the level constraints of the chief executive.
The eleven-point scale and the associated weights of categories are presented in
Appendix C.
Jaggers and Gurr (1995) provide an excellent comparison of Polity III with some
of the most utilized constructs of democracy.  These include Arat (1991), Bollen (1980,
1991), Coppedge and Reinicke (1990), Freedom House (annual 1978-1994),
Gassiorowski (1993) and Vanhanen (1990).  In assessing the validity of the Polity III
indicators (utilizing the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient),  Jaggers and
Gurr (1995) find a high correlation (ranging from a low of .85 with Arat and
Gasiorowski to a high of .92 with Freedom House indicator of political rights) with these
alternative measures, in spite of the methodological and conceptual diversity in the
various indicators.64
4.6 Methodology
64 For the reader's convenience, a summary of the operationalization of all variables and data sources can
be found in Appendix D.
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In previous chapters I address the more theoretical and philosophical questions by
employing basic qualitative analysis of the literature and history concerning international
political economy and basic human rights.  This includes the question of whether there
are indeed "basic human rights," which rights should be included, and what bases these
have in international law.  Further, the issue of cultural relativism and universality of
human rights has been dealt with in a similar fashion.
Turning to the important issue of potential trade-offs between the various rights, I
utilize a number of statistical approaches.  First, I conduct a series of trend analyses in
which I plot the mean individual rights scores (subsistence rights, security rights,
democracy, and economic freedom) over time to ascertain what empirically has occurred
since the early 1980s.  Additionally, I plot the standard deviation scores for individual
rights in order to determine whether they are converging or diverging.  The overall
sample is further divided between OECD and non-OECD countries to examine the
differences between the two.  In investigating the potential linkages between these rights,
I first conduct simple bivariate correlations.  Drawing upon the substantial theoretical
literature in Chapter Two, I also estimate bivariate regression equations of the linkages.
This includes regressing subsistence rights on security rights (linkage one), democracy on
security rights (linkage two), democracy on subsistence rights (linkage three), and
economic freedom on democracy (linkage four).
In moving beyond these preliminary steps to formulate an overall multivariate
model of international political economy and basic human rights, I draw upon the review
in Chapter Two, which reveals that much of the existing literature is somewhat lacking in
its scope and methodological approach.  One criterion for judging empirical research is to
what extent a particular study is generalizable to the greater population (in this case,
almost 200 countries of the world).  But for a few exceptions (Poe and Tate 1994,
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Heinish 1994, Henderson 1993, Park 1987), the vast majority of work in the field utilizes
a less than comprehensive sample of countries.  This obviously restricts the
generalizability of any results.  In addition, the study of integrity of the person violations
has typically involved cross-national, cross-sectional samples that do not allow for any
change that might occur in within countries.  Finally, only a few scholars (Poe and Tate
1994, Heinish 1994, Webster 1994, Henderson 1991, 1993) move beyond simple
bivariate studies and utilize multivariate analysis.
Therefore, in order to test my multivariate model of human rights variation, I
choose to employ pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) analysis or time-series cross-
section (TSCS) as it is sometimes called.  TSCS research designs involve regression in
both space and time.  Traditionally, political scientists have dealt with space in the much-
used cross-sectional designs.  Also, we have dealt with time considerations in time-series
regressions and through techniques developed by Box and Jenkins.  While we appear to
be comfortable conducting comparative analyses across space and dynamic analyses over
time, as a discipline we have (until very recently) been reluctant to combine the two in a
dynamic comparison (Stimson 1985).65
TSCS analysis is conducted with the use of longitudinal data for two or more
"units." The units in my database are individual countries.  Therefore, each country -
with values for all years and variables - is stacked on the next country.  By employing
TSCS for my analysis, I am inheriting all of the formidable strengths of its design
properties and the special statistical problems that go along with such designs (Stimson
1985, 914).  As illustrated in the previous paragraph, TSCS eases any potential problem
of limited sample size by multiplying the number of cases available over time (T) by the
65 In the econometric literature, these pooled models are sometimes referred to as "panel models." This is
not to be confused with panel analysis in political science that refers to surveys, which are conducted
with the same subjects (respondents) over time.
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number of units (N), thereby yielding N x T cases for the analysis.  Also, from a
theoretical standpoint, TSCS highlights the extent to which variation in the dependent
variable is attributable to regressor variables (covariates) common to all units or to
unspecified properties of the units themselves (Clarke 1994).  As pointed out by
Przeworski and Teune (1970), these should be familiar concerns for students of cross-
national comparative inquiry.
Turning to the potential difficulties or statistical challenges to TSCS, Stimson
(1985, 919-920) argues that there are basically two problems that arise form utilizing
data that varies both over time and across unit.  First, the all-too-familiar problem of
autocorrelated errors in a time series highlights the over time difficulty.  Secondly, the
across-unit problem comes from potential heterogeneity in the expected value of the
dependent variable by the pooling of data from different units.  This heteroskedasticity
problem might be especially troublesome with such a large sample such as this where the
worldwide diversity among nations (units) is a given.
In actually conducting analysis on pooled data, the researcher is faced with a
number of choices.  Perhaps the most utilized model for pooled data is ordinary least
squares (OLS).  While acceptable for simple pooled data sets, its assumptions (i.e.,
Gauss-Markov) illustrate the difficulties in combining data across space and time.  If all
of the assumptions  hold, the OLS estimator is said to be "blue." This means that it is
unbiased (mean of estimate equals population value), consistent (as sample size
increases, value of estimate approaches population parameter), and efficient (estimator
has minimum sampling variance).  OLS regression essentially ignores that the data are
actually "pooled." Each case is considered independent of the other cases rather than part
of a set of related observations.  As a result, OLS assumes constant variance and
uncorrelated errors.  As discussed in the above paragraph, however, it is quite likely that
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autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity will accompany data that is stacked and pooled.
Because of this potential, Stimson (1985) argues that OLS regression may not be the first
choice for researchers utilizing TSCS data.
Another possible method available to the those working with TSCS is least
squares with dummy variables (LSDV).  This covariance model introduces dummy
variables to control for the significant between-unit differences.  In this case, the
dummies would be variables for countries (units).  While this approach is quite effective
in addressing the heterogeneity problem, it does nothing for the autocorrelation (time
serial) problems.  In addition, if there are many units (as in this instance of over 150
countries) and few time points (here, 14 years - or 13 years with a lagged endogenous
variable), the process will not be very efficient because of the large loss in degrees of
freedom.
The next option available is the error components model.  While the transition
from OLS to LSDV is rather simple and orthodox, the generalized least squares (error
components) model is neither orthodox nor simple (Stimson 1985, 922).  This approach
can be seen as a search for an efficient estimator.  Rather than conceptualizing the unit
effects as fixed,  the GLSE model views them as random.  In addition, it gains some
efficiency by assuming the absence of time-serial correlation.  Here, the autocorrelation
is assumed to come from unit effects (Clarke 1994, 5).  This procedure is accomplished
by capturing the unit effects with an estimate of r.  This estimate (r) is assumed constant
across all lags in a unit.  This procedure is similar to that of Cochran-Orchutt (albeit for
heteroskedasticity).  While the GLSE method does gain efficiency by dropping the unit
dummies, the assumption of no true time-related autocorrelation is often incorrect,
especially if the number of time-points for each unit is substantial.
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A fourth possible method is the GLS-ARMA.  This approach, which is suitable
for data with a small number of units and numerous time points, addresses both the
problems of unit heteroskedasticity and true time-series correlation.  This iterative
approach begins by selecting unit dummy variables.  Residuals from properly modeled
unit dummies should exhibit the following traits: 1) the summed unit means will be
approximately zero, 2) the unit residual variances will be approximately equal, and 3) the
pattern of autocorrelation within each unit will be stationary" (Stimson 1985, 928).
Though similar in appearance to GLSE, the critical difference is its specification of
within unit over-time partitions as ARMA processes rather than the "fixed specifications
of GLSE." The choice between the two approaches, therefore, revolves around whether
the problem of the pooled design is unspecified unit effects.  While the GLS-ARMA
approach is rather powerful, the fact that it is designed for time-serial dominance (i.e., t >
N) leads the researcher to lean towards the GLSE (if compared to GLS-ARMA) for a
cross-sectionally dominant data set.  If there is indeed timewise autocorrelation present
and if there is cross-sectional dominance (as indeed may be the case here), Stimson
(1985) concedes there is no estimator developed specifically for this situation.
In their exploration of time-series cross-section data analysis, Beck and Katz
(1995) argue that the frequent use of generalized least squares on TSCS data is
potentially troublesome.  A review of the literature indicates that most time-series cross-
section GLS analysis is performed using an application first described by Parks (1967) in
which an estimate of the error process is generated and used to evade or overlook the
assumption underlying GLS - that the error process is known.66  This procedure is what
Beck and Katz call "feasible generalized least squares."  Through Monte Carlo trials on
66 This procedure was illustrated at length in Kmenta’s (1986) text, Elements of Econometrics.  It is
occasionally called Parks-Kmenta, or simply Kmenta.
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existing studies, Beck and Katz indicate that violating this assumption may not be
advisable because of FGLS's underestimation of standard errors, often between 50 and
300 percent (1995, 634).  Consequently, this method may lead to overly optimistic
estimates of statistical significance.67
Ultimately, Beck and Katz (1995) argue in favor of using OLS regression with
certain improvements.  As noted previously, one problem with OLS is that even though
estimates of beta (ß) are found to be consistent, the reported standard errors of that
estimate may not provide accurate estimates of variability (i.e., in the case of cross-
national panel data like in this human rights data set).  In order to test whether these
standard errors are consistent, Beck and Katz (1995) suggest utilizing a simple variant of
White's (1980) procedure.  The calculation generalizes White's heteroskedastic consistent
covariance matrix estimates to the panel situation.  In differentiating from White’s
heteroskedasticity consist standard errors, Beck and Katz (1995, 638) refer to these
estimators of variability as "panel-corrected standard errors" (PCSEs).68 Persuaded by
their arguments, I utilize the Beck and Katz procedure for the model estimation in
Chapter Five.
Typically in preliminary tests, one would analyze the various models using
Durbin-Watson to determine potential problems from serial correlation.  However, with
this large, unbalanced data set (i.e., not all countries have data for all variables for all
years), the Durbin-Watson statistic is not applicable.  Since there is still the suspicion of
autocorrelation (and its detrimental effects concerning OLS regression), I have chosen to
67 Beck and Katz (1995, 644) go as far to say that it is “… impossible to use the Parks method if the
length of the time frame, T, is smaller than the number of units, N.” Indeed, this is precisely the case here
with my comprehensive data set.
68  For a critique of the Beck and Katz approach, see Maddala (1997).
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incorporate a lagged endogenous variable into the general models.  Not only are there
methodological justifications for this procedure but theoretical ones as well.69
In an effort to balance the sometimes conflicting goals of being as comprehensive
and as parsimonious as possible, I begin with the following general models for estimating
the variance of subsistence rights and security rights, respectively.
General Subsistence Rights Model
Subsistence Rightstj = a + B1 Subsistence Rights(t-1) + B2 Bretton Woods
Membershiptj + B3 Trade Opennesstj + B4 Financial Opennesstj + B5 Cold Wartj +
B6 Economic Freedomtj + B7 Income Inequalitytj + B8 Democracytj + B9 Economic
Developmenttj + B10 Economic Growthtj  + B11 International Wartj + B12 Civil
Wartj + B13 Population Leveltj  + B14 Population Growthtj
General Security Rights Model
Security Rightstj = a + B1 Security Rights(t-1) + B2 Bretton Woods Membershiptj +
B3 Trade Opennesstj + B4 Financial Opennesstj + B5 Cold Wartj + B6 Economic
Freedomtj + B7 Income Inequalitytj + B8 Democracytj + B9 Economic
Developmenttj + B10 Economic Growthtj  + B11 International Wartj + B12 Civil
Wartj + B13 Population Leveltj  + B14 Population Growthtj
69 Beck and Katz (1996) argue in favor of utilizing lagged endogenous variables to address difficulties
associated with autocorrelation.  From a theoretical standpoint, it is expected that a country’s basic
human rights policies (at time t) will be influenced by the preceding human rights practices of that
particular regime (at time t-1).
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Following the path taken in Chapter Three, I continue by limiting the general
models from the entire sample (world) to the subsamples of the industrialized countries
(OECD) and the developing countries (non-OECD).  This method is chosen to determine
whether various factors affect basic human rights differently in the developed and
developing world.
Next, the general international political economy models are reduced into their
economic and political components.  Here, I am searching for ways to determine the
manner in which political and economic variables in a global system are driving basic
human rights practices.  The limited economic and political models are as follows:
Economic Model for Subsistence Rights
Subsistence Rightstj = a + B1 Subsistence Rights(t-1) + B2 Bretton Woods
Membershiptj + B3 Trade Opennesstj + B4 Financial Opennesstj + B5 Economic
Freedomtj + B6 Income Inequalitytj + B7 Economic Developmenttj + B8 Economic
Growthtj
Political Model for Subsistence Rights
Subsistence Rightstj = a + B1 Subsistence Rights(t-1) + B2 Cold Wartj +
B3 Democracytj + B4 International Wartj + B5 Civil War
Economic Model for Security Rights
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Security Rightstj = a + B1 Security Rights(t-1) + B2 Bretton Woods Membershiptj
+ B3 Trade Opennesstj + B4 Financial Opennesstj + B5 Economic Freedomtj + B6
Income Inequalitytj + B7 Economic Developmenttj + B8 Economic Growthtj
Political Model for Security Rights
Security Rightstj = a + B1 Security Rights(t-1) + B2 Cold Wartj +
B3 Democracytj + B4 International Wartj + B5 Civil War
Finally in the last section of Chapter Five, I compare the models for both
subsistence rights and security rights.  By analyzing these two aspects of basic human
rights across separate models (general models, OECD and non-OECD models, economic
and political models), we can hopefully obtain a more complete picture of the true
dynamics that are driving basic human rights practices around the world.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
5.1 Describing the Sample
As alluded to in Chapters Two and Three, the data set utilized for this analysis is
one of the largest compiled for evaluating variations in both subsistence rights and
security rights.  If our goal is to make empirical research generalizable to the greater
population (almost 200 countries of the world), we must strive to incorporate the most
extensive data available.  I have attempted to do just that with this project (A list of all
the countries included in this study can be found in Appendix E). A review of the
literature shows that with few exceptions, the work in both of these subfields (subsistence
rights and security rights) have presented a limited and usually biased sample of
countries or time periods, or both.
In dealing with security rights, most research has until very recently been limited
to cross-sections (e.g., Heinish 1994, Henderson 1993, Park 1987).  Poe and Tate (1994)
have gone a great distance in remedying this shortcoming with their comprehensive data
set of 153 countries from 1980-1987.  In dealing with subsistence rights, those utilizing
the Physical Quality of Life Index have not outperformed those writing on security
rights.  This includes Dixon’s (1984) study of 72 developing countries for 1960 and
1980, Spalding’s (1986) coverage of 97 nations during the 1970s and Moon’s (1991)
seminal work that examines myriad of variables for 120 countries during the early 1970s.
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 Finally, Morris’(1996) update of his 1979 study analyzes 127 countries, but only
for four years – 1960, 1981, 1985, and 1990.  Building on the work of scholars before
me, I have compiled what may be the most comprehensive study yet concerning
subsistence rights and security rights.  The pooled cross-sectional time-series (PCT) or
time-series cross-section (TSCS) employed here covers over 150 countries for 14 years
from 1980 through 1993.  This ranges from 156 countries for subsistence rights and 152
countries for security rights in 1980 to 168  countries for subsistence rights and 176
countries for security rights in 1993.  This extensive data set is important in that it now
allows us to compare over time the variation in basic human rights for the largest number
of countries in both the developed and developing world.
Before discussing the actual modeling of basic human rights practices, I think it
instructive to examine the overall performance of government’s respect for subsistence
and security rights.  Tables 5.1 through 5.4 list all available nations in rank order
according to subsistence rights and security rights performance at the beginning and
ending time periods (1980 and 1993, respectively).70  A cursory look at Tables 5.1 and
5.2 illustrate much of the conventional wisdom concerning subsistence rights.  As one
might expect, there is a wide variation in Physical Quality of Life throughout the world.
This ranges in 1980 from a high of 92 (Japan) to a low of 14 (Dijibouti).  In 1993, Japan
still remains the leader with an index of 94.7 while Sierra Leone takes over the
unenviable last position with an index of 24.2.   In both periods, many of the
industrialized countries can be found at the top of the list.  Perhaps not surprisingly, the
70 The security rights ranking within groups (i.e., 1-5) is simply arranged according to alphabetical order.
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United States is found toward the end of this group (number 13 and 16, respectively).71
Just below the industrialized world, the reader finds a number of Eastern and Central
European countries.  On the surface, this might appear counterintuitive.  However, taking
into account the sweeping social programs in the former Soviet bloc, the situation does
seem logical.  With a more extensive social safety net, it could be argued that greater
provision of subsistence rights is expected.  Further, the 1993 table indicates a slight
decline (in relative rank) of some of these countries during the period (e.g., USSR,
Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic).  This reflects the hardships incurred in the
transition to a market economy and democratization.  A striking example of former
Soviet support is Cuba which ranks seventh in 1980 and falls to twenty-eighth thirteen
years later.  Just below the grouping of Eastern Europe, one can find a number of Latin
American nations.  Consistency in this respect can be found across both tables for the
beginning and end of the period (1980 and 1993).  While typically congregating towards
the middle, the wide diversity of Asian countries is exhibited with rankings at the top
(Japan), middle (Vietnam), and bottom (Nepal).  Clustered at the bottom of the rankings,
the continent of Africa is disproportionately represented.
Turning to security rights in Tables 5.3 and 5.4, we find a number of similarities
and differences as compared to the subsistence rights data.  As discussed in Chapter
Three with our comparison of various rights, security rights overall have improved since
1980.  However, our earlier analysis also revealed that security rights had a precipitous
drop immediately after the fall of Eastern Europe.  This is in keeping with Fein’s (1995)
“more murder in the middle” thesis as countries begin the difficult process of
democratization.  From 1980 we can see the distribution of the Political Terror Scale
71 Higher than expected infant mortality and literacy rates (compared to other OECD countries) and
accompanying high levels of  inequality might produce this result.
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ratings “flatten out” with the middle rating (Level 3) being squeezed into the highest and
lowest ends of the scale.  For example in 1980, the most egregious human rights
violations (Level 1 and 2) were exhibited by fifteen percent of the countries, while in
1993 that number had risen to twenty percent.  The middle category (Level 3) fell from
thirty-four percent of the reported countries to only nineteen percent in the last year of
the study.  Finally, the upper echelon (Level 4 and 5) move from fifty-two percent in
1980 to sixty-percent in 1998.  These findings support the preliminary analysis in
Chapter Three which indicate that although security rights are better in 1993 than they
have been since 1989, there is more variation in global human rights practices in 1992-
1993 than at any other period. This is probably in response to the collapse of the Berlin
Wall and the end of the Cold War.  A graphical illustration of this dispersion of security
rights at the beginning and end of the period can be found in Figure 5.1.










































Table 5.1 Country Rankings for Subsistence Rights in 1980


















































S.  Korea 79.9
Portugal 79.2













































































































Table 5.2 Country Rankings for Subsistence Rights in 1993












































































































































































Table 5.3 Country Rankings for Security Rights in 1980






























St.  Lucia 5





























































































































Table 5.4 Country Rankings for Security Rights in 1993
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In continuing our examination of the overall nature of the data, I now focus on
the summary statistics for not only the dependent variables of subsistence rights and
security rights but also the substantive independent variables and control variables.  In
order to further delineate the study, I consider the complete sample as well as
differentiating the developed and developing world.  The results can be found in Tables
5.5 through 5.7.
Table 5.5 Summary Statistics for the World
Variable N Mean Median St.  Dev Min Max
Subsistence Rights 2217 67.66 73.2 20.56 14 99
Security Rights 2208 3.56 4 1.15 1 5
Bretton Woods 2099 2.46 3 .80 0 3
Trade Openness 1704 72.21 61.45 47.49 6.32 423.41
Financial Openness 1662 3.05 3 1.63 0 6
Inequality 357 35.71 33.29 9.14 19.49 62.30
Cold War 2492 .71 1 .45 0 1
Economic Freedom 420 4.57 4.4 1.48 0.6 9.3
Democracy 1900 3.86 1 4.36 0 10
Economic Development 2185 3908 1190 6086.60 53 36670
Economic Growth 2160 3.16 3.01 12.89 -95.5 128.57
International War 2240 .08 0 .27 0 1
Civil War 2221 .10 0 .30 0 1
Population Level 2444 15.52 15.65 1.84 11.05 20.89
Population Growth 2440 2.19 2.19 4.35 -48.45 126.01
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Table 5.6 Summary Statistics for OECD Countries
Variable N Mean Median St.  Dev Min Max
Subsistence Rights 294 91.61 91.8 1.31 86.60 94.70
Security Rights 294 4.72 5 .46 3 5
Bretton Woods 273 2.92 3 .36 1 3
Trade Openness 273 69.72 60.81 39.93 17.62 211.94
Financial Openness 252 4.42 5 1.60 0 6
Cold War 294 .71 1 .45 0 1
Economic Freedom 80 5.47 5.65 1.22 2.90 8
Inequality 114 31.99 32.21 3.95 24.42 41.72
Democracy 294 9.87 10 .42 8 10
Economic Development 294 15243.67 14020 6388.83 4370 36410
Economic Growth 294 6.84 6.53 9.38 -13.96 33.94
International War 294 .08 0 .27 0 1
Civil War 294 0 0 0 0 0
Population Level 294 16.30 16.10 1.70 12.34 19.36
Population Growth 294 .55 .44 .51 -1.25 3.45
Table 5.7 Summary Statistics for Non-OECD Countries
Variable N Mean Median St.  Dev Min Max
Subsistence Rights 1923 64.00 67.40 19.65 14 99
Security Rights 1912 3.38 3 1.12 1 5
Bretton Woods 1826 2.39 2.5 .83 0 3
Trade Openness 1431 72.69 61.69 48.80 6.32 423.41
Financial Openness 1410 2.80 3 1.51 0 6
Coldwar 2198 .71 1 .45 0 1
Economic Freedom 340 4.36 4.2 1.46 .6 9.3
Inequality 243 37.45 36 10.29 19.49 62.30
Democracy 1603 2.76 0 3.83 0 10
Economic Development 1887 2148.08 910 3662.09 53 36670
Economic Growth 1863 2.61 2.67 13.25 -95.50 128.57
International War 1943 .08 0 .27 0 1
Civil War 1924 .12 0 .32 0 1
Population Level 2136 15.41 15.55 1.84 11.05 20.89
Population Growth 2132 2.42 2.43 4.61 -48.45 126.01
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From the above table we can see a number of similarities and differences between
the industrialized world and the developing countries.  On average, OECD countries
perform better on both dependent variables (subsistence and security rights) as well as on
many of the independent variables (financial openness, democracy, economic
development, economic growth, and population growth).  For other variables, the
difference is less pronounced.  For instance, the mean economic freedom measure for the
developed world is 5.47 while for the developing world it is 4.36 (on a 1 to 10 scale).  It
is also equally likely to find developed and developing countries involved in an
international conflict.  Another surprising finding is the relatively consistent presence of
inequality among the entire sample.  Here, the OECD exhibits a GINI index of
approximately 32 while the non-OECD exhibits slightly more inequality at just over 37
(on the GINI index).72 Counter to some critics, who claim that unfettered capitalism
results in huge disparities in income, the findings here are quite interesting and warrant
further investigation.
Also, for two measures of globalization (membership in Bretton Woods
institutions and trade openness) there is little difference between the two groups.  This is
in stark contrast to the variation in financial openness where the OECD is much less
likely to impose capital controls.  For the contemporary environment of financial crises
in key regions of the world (Asia, Latin America, Russia), the issue of capital restrictions
is even more pertinent.  While some of the largest industrialized nations are loath to
impose financial restrictions, this is obviously a tempting tool for some policy makers, at
least in less developed areas.
72 The GINI scale which plots the share of population against the share of income ranges from a low of
1(perfect equality) to a high of 100 (total inequality).
116
The next step in evaluating the empirical evidence concerning basic human rights
involves employing simple bivariate correlations.  Here, I utilize a simple Pearson’s
correlation matrix to examine the relationships, if any, between the independent variables
and subsistence rights and security rights.73 The findings are summarized in Table 5.8.
While at this stage we cannot assume any causal linkage between the variables, there is
striking evidence of correlation between many of our substantive factors and the two
aspects of human rights.  A quick glance at Table 5.8 reveals similar influences on
subsistence rights and security rights.  Except for Bretton Woods, all of the primary
variables in question indicate statistically significant correlation with physical quality of
life.  Trade openness, financial openness, economic freedom, and democracy are seen to
be positively related to subsistence rights while inequality and the Cold War are
negatively related.  Likewise, security rights are positively correlated with Bretton
Woods, trade openness, financial openness, economic freedom, and democracy.
Inequality is negatively associated with security rights but the Cold War presents little
influence.  Both lagged endogenous variables (subsistence rights t-1 and security rights t-1)
also indicate a high positive correlation with their respective basic human right.  The
control variables have a mixed showing with economic development and economic
growth correlating positively with subsistence rights.  Civil war has a negative influence
on both subsistence and security rights.  In addition, all of the other control variables
[economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war (-), population
level (-) and population growth (-)] exhibit a correlation with security rights.
73 The correlation coefficients reported here are a measure of the linear association between each basic
human right (subsistence rights and security rights) and the other variables of interest.  A value of 1.00
indicates a perfect positive correlation while –1.00 indicates a perfect negative correlation.  A zero value
represents no relationship.
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Table 5.8 Bivariate Correlations




Subsistence Rights t-1 .98* (2003)
Bretton Woods .001 (2014)
Trade Openness .17* (1671)
Financial Openness .19* (1605)
Cold War -.10* (2217)
Economic Freedom .36* (417)
Inequality (Gini Index) -.33* (347)
Democracy .58* (1838)
Economic Development .52* (2077)
Economic Growth .10* (2071)
International War .01 (2149)
Civil War -.21* (2132)
Population Level -.03 (2160)




Security Rights t-1 .84* (2177)
Bretton Woods .11* (2029)
Trade Openness .35* (1665)
Financial Openness .35* (1602)
Cold War .004 (2202)
Economic Freedom .26* (412)
Inequality (Gini Index) -.24* (353)
Democracy .43* (1867)
Economic Development .41* (2133)
Economic Growth .13* (2124)
International War -.17* (2205)
Civil War -.46* (2195)
Population Level -.42* (2187)
Population Growth -.04* (2183)
In conducting correlation analysis, the researcher must also look for associations
among the independent variables to guard against the vexing problem of
multicollinearity.  This problem occurs if there is a linear or near linear relationship
among independent variables.  Indeed, this is a common occurrence with times series and
cross sectional data.  If two variables are highly correlated with one another, it can pose
serious difficulties with inferences drawn from our regression estimations.  The problem
results in inflated standard errors which causes the t statistic to be smaller, thereby
resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis (Type II error).74 Initially, it was
74 In order to check for the presence of multicollinearity, I employed two procedures - an ocular test that
examines the Pearson’s r correlation matrix and the Klein test that regresses each independent variable on
all the other independent variables.  For the ocular test, I take a relatively conservative stance and look
for any correlations exceeding .60.  For the Klein test, I look for any R2 which approaches 1.00.
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suspected that the measures for globalization, while theoretically separate aspects of
integration, might exhibit collinear relationships.  Luckily, there is no sign of
multicollinearity among these globalization indicators.75 Having said that, there are
indications that incorporating population level and the lagged value for subsistence rights
could be problematic.  Physical Quality of Life at t-1 is collinear with economic
development and democracy.76 Also, population level appears closely related to trade
openness.77 Since population level is simply a control variable, I decided to drop it from
my analysis and retain the more substantively important trade openness.  I also decided to
refrain from drawing inferences from models utilizing the subsistence rights at t-1 although
I do report the results for comparative purposes.
From these descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, we can move now to
the multivariate analyses for both subsistence rights and security rights.  The following
sections consider general human rights models, restricted sample models of developed
and developing countries, and narrow models that concentrate on economic and political
factors separately.  Finally, in section 5.5, I summarize these findings in an overall
comparison of subsistence rights and security rights.  All of the models in sections 5.2
and 5.3 are estimated assuming a first order autoregressive process.  Previous models
were estimated assuming no autoregressive process and analysis of the standard errors
indicated that the AR1 approach was more appropriate.  As noted in Chapter Four,
another concern with TSCS data is the problem of heteroscedasticity.  According to the
Cook and Weisberg (1983) test, our data indeed are heteroscedastic (variance of error
terms is not constant).  The statistical software utilized here (Stata 5) allows specifying
75 The correlations were as follows: Bretton Woods and financial openness = .11, Bretton Woods and
trade openness = -.03, financial openness and trade openness = .2132.
76 The correlation between Physical Quality of Life at t-1 and economic development was .53.  The
correlation between Physical Quality of Life at t-1 and democracy was .59.
77 The correlation between population level and trade openness was -.58.
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such an error structure.  Also, estimations do not include the economic freedom and
inequality variables in the same models because of the extremely low number of cases
that result from this intersection.  As discussed in Chapter Four, all of the coefficients are
unstandardized OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) being reported as
suggested by Beck and Katz (1995).  All regression estimation procedures were
conducted with Stata 5 (StataCorp, 1997).
5.2 Subsistence Rights Models
a.  General Models
As discussed in the previous section, a number of multicollinearity problems must
be addressed in order for our analysis to be accurate.  In looking at subsistence rights,
physical quality of life at t-1 is collinear with economic development and democracy.
Because of the importance of these variables in my study, I choose to concentrate on
models that do not incorporate the lagged endogenous variable for subsistence rights.
For comparison purposes, however, I also report the various models with the lagged
endogenous variable in Appendix F.
 In presenting the various models, I proceed in the following manner.  In each
section, I first address the general model without the economic freedom and inequality
variables.  I begin here because this approach provides the largest number of
observations.  From Chapter Four we know that the economic freedom data is only
available for 109 countries for 4 years (1980, 1985, 1990, 1993).  In addition, the
inequality data provided by the World Bank (Deininger and Squire, 1996) only covers
357 cases during our 14 year time period.78 Next, I systematically consider the general
model by separately adding economic freedom and inequality.
78 Ultimately, the data set proposed by Deininger and Squire (1996) includes 2621 observations (682 high
quality) for 108 countries from 1947 to 1993.
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To review the proposed hypotheses, it is expected that global integration,
economic freedom, democracy and Cold War will have a positive effect on basic human
rights.  Inequality is believed to have a negative impact on these rights.  Of the control
variables (economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and
population growth), all are expected to have a negative influence except economic
development, which should have a positive influence.
In my first general model (shown in Table 5.9), I find that global integration as
measured by trade openness has a positive effect on subsistence rights.  The other two
measures of global integration (Bretton Woods and financial openness) are not
statistically significant.  Actually, financial openness is even exhibiting a negative
influence on our dependent variable.   As expected, democracy and economic
development are highly significant and in a positive direction.79 The other control factors
(economic growth, international and civil war, and population growth) have virtually no
impact on a country’s respect for subsistence rights.  In terms of overall goodness of fit,
the χ2 indicates that the overall model is significant.  The adjusted R2 is also reported
from the basic OLS regression and shows that the model can explain some 56 percent of
the variance in subsistence rights.80 Finally, the high F statistic attests to an overall
statistical significance of the regression.  The F test measures the statistical significance
of the entire range of independent variables.  It tests the joint hypothesis that all
coefficients except the intercept are zero.  High values of the F statistic force us to reject
the null hypothesis that the constraints are true (Kennedy 1994, 57).  The probability > F
reported in each table tells us the probability of a greater F statistic if we draw samples
79  The significance for all variables is shown at the 95%, 99%, and 99.9% confidence level.
80 The adjusted R2 is simply the coefficient of determination adjusted for the number of independent
variables incorporated into the model.  Essentially, this represents a penalty for not maintaining
parsimonious models.  The formula is R2 = 1-(1- R2) (N-1/N-k)where k is the number of independent
variables plus the constant.  As the number of independent variables becomes large, the difference
between R2 and adjusted R2 grows.
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randomly from a population in which the null hypothesis is true (Hamilton 1998, 132).
If we include the lagged dependent variable of subsistence rights t-1 (see Table 5.36 in
Appendix F) which is highly significant, all other influences are eradicated.  As alluded
to previously, this finding is questionable noting the multicollinearity problem.
If  economic freedom is added to this general model (Table 5.10), the results are
slightly altered.  First, economic freedom is found to be highly significant.  Also, our
Cold War variable becomes significant and in a positive direction.  This makes
theoretical sense in that the end of the Cold War ushered in liberalized economic policies
for numerous countries and provided a broader basis for subsistence rights.  While trade
openness is influential above, none of the measures of global integration appear
significant.  However, democracy and economic development retain their largesse.  The
χ2, F statistic, and R2 again indicate a good fit.  With the inclusion of economic freedom
or inequality, the reader must be mindful that the sample is greatly reduced (here, only
71 countries for 3 years).81
Next, inequality is incorporated into the general model for subsistence rights
(Table 5.11).  While this intersection restricts the model to 48 countries over 12 years,
the result is quite similar to the original model.  Cold War is no longer significant while
trade openness, democracy, and economic development are again highly influential.
Surprisingly, inequality itself is anemic in its power over the dependent variable (and
indeed is incorrectly signed).  As before, the χ2 and F statistic indicate a good fit and the
R2 shows the model explaining 77 percent of the variance.
81 Adding the highly significant subsistence rights t-1  variable (see Table 5.37 in Appendix F), economic
growth and international war exhibit large negative influence.
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Table 5.9 General Subsistence Rights Model
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
Z
Constant 54.97*** 2.46 22.26
Bretton Woods .34 .77 .45
Trade Openness .02** .009 2.96
Financial Openness -.81 .09 -.86
Cold War -.59 .49 -1.19
Democracy 1.04*** .11 9.16
Economic Development .001*** .00009 11.43
Economic Growth -.01 .01 -1.14
International War -.39 .68 -.56
Civil War .40 .86 .04
Population Growth -.03 .02 -1.51
Number of Cases 1082 Adjusted R2 .56
χ2 397.07*** F 139.35***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.10 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 55.27*** 5.69 9.70
Bretton Woods -.45 1.71 -.26
Trade Openness .04 .01 .13
Financial Openness .04 .36 -.84
Cold War -.83** .98 2.53
Economic Freedom 1.50*** .59 5.01
Democracy 1.14*** .22 4.02
Economic Development .0005** .0001 -2.33
Economic Growth -.07 .03 -.14
International War -.21 1.50 -.85
Civil War -2.87 3.34 -.52
Population Growth -.04 .09
Number of Cases 192 Adjusted R2 .61
χ2 122.15*** F 29.19***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.11 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 71.50*** 5.56 12.84
Bretton Woods .47 1.14 .41
Trade Openness .03** .01 3.08
Financial Openness .10 .12 .81
Cold War .31 .76 .41
Inequality .01 .09 .16
Democracy .49* .22 2.21
Economic Development .0005*** .00009 5.81
Economic Growth -.002 .02 -.08
International War -.25 1.08 -.23
Civil War .16 1.61 .10
Population Growth -2.78** .92 -3.00
Number of Cases 196 Adjusted R2 .77
χ2 138.94*** F 67.56***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
b.  OECD Sample for Subsistence Rights
In order to glean more knowledge about the nature of international political
economy and its effects on basic human rights, I divide the sample into the developed
and developing world.  The general models estimated here and in Section C mirror those
in the previous section.  For obvious reasons, the number of cases in all of these
scenarios is necessarily reduced.  Table 5.12 reveals the OECD general subsistence rights
model without economic freedom or inequality.  Similar to the estimation for the entire
sample, economic development is still highly significant and positive.  Economic growth
is influential and in a negative direction as hypothesized.  Population growth, unlike for
the entire sample, exhibits a significantly positive effect that is unexpected.  This means
that population growth for industrialized nations is not the negative influence as with
developing nations (see Tables 5.15 and 5.16) but rather can provide economic
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opportunities that might better provide basic human rights.   Another interesting finding
is that the consistent effect of democratic institutions evaporates with the OECD
countries.  Though this might appear troublesome at first, we must remember that there is
very little variation in this measure for the industrialized world.  Similarly, none of the
global integration variables appear statistically significant for the same reason.  One
should also note that civil war was automatically dropped from the estimation because of
the absence of civil war in developed countries.  While the χ2 and F statistic continue to
indicate a substantial model overall, the OECD model not surprisingly is only able to
explain 39 percent of the variance as revealed by the R2.82
Incorporating economic freedom into this equation (Table 5.13), we see an
opposite effect from the general sample.  Here, economic freedom is significant but in a
negative direction.  Though puzzling, there could be an explanation for this phenomenon.
Perhaps at higher levels of economic development and integration, any further
liberalization might actually harm a country’s ability to provide increased subsistence
rights.  Further, economic development and economic growth are seen to be significant
in the hypothesized directions.  The coefficient for economic development, however,
appears quite small.  Again, the χ2, F statistic, and R2 continue to show strength.83
Next, I add inequality to the general OECD model.  Similar to the two other OECD
models and distinct from the world sample inequality model, no measure of global integration
has any effect on subsistence rights.  Democracy and economic development, however, remain
highly significant and positive.  Like the economic freedom model immediately above,
economic growth exhibits a significantly negative impact as expected.  Further, the χ2 and F
82 Adding subsistence rights t-1 to this model (Table 5.38 in Appendix F) results in a significant lagged
variable and economic development in the hypothesized direction.  However, democracy is seen as
negatively significant.
83 Table 5.39 in Appendix F shows that adding subsistence rights t-1 results in a significant lagged variable
in the correct direction and democracy again being negatively significant.
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statistic continue to indicate a statistically significant model overall, but the R2 signifies only 35
percent of the variance is explained.84
Table 5.12 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 87.38*** 3.31 26.37
Bretton Woods -.24 .30 -.78
Trade Openness -.002 .004 -.56
Financial Openness .0002 .02 .009
Cold War .02 .20 .12
Democracy .33 .32 1.03
Economic Development .0001*** .00002 5.08
Economic Growth -.01** .006 -2.67
International War -.11 .20 -.54
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .36* .21 1.71
Number of Cases 211 Adjusted R2 .39
χ2 60.10*** F 16.35***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
84 Incorporating subsistence rights t-1 (Table 5.40 in Appendix F) ameliorates all variable significance
except for the lagged variable itself.
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Table 5.13 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)




Bretton Woods 29.49*** 1.21 24.22
Trade Openness -.001 .005 -.35
Financial Openness -.005 .09 -.05
Cold War -.23 .46 -.50
Economic Freedom -.26** .10 -2.62
Democracy .32 .37 .86
Economic Development .0001*** .00004 3.73
Economic Growth -.10*** .01 -8.12
International War .14 .37 .39
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .04 .33 .13
Number of Cases 46 Adjusted R2 .65
χ2 617973.44*** F 9.65***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.14 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 70.38*** 6.45 10.91
Bretton Woods (dropped)
Trade Openness -.002 .005 -.05
Financial Openness .06 .03 1.54
Cold War .33 .28 1.15
Inequality -.05 .05 -.96
Democracy 2.10*** .68 3.074
Economic Development .0001*** .00002 4.15
Economic Growth -.01* .01 -1.64
International War .13 .28 .46
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth -.15 .28 -.54
Number of Cases 103 Adjusted R2 .35
χ2 42.03*** F 6.69***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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c.  Non-OECD Sample for Subsistence Rights
Turning our attention to the developing world, I estimate the same three models
as before but only for the non-industrialized countries.  Table 5.15 exhibits many
similarities with the model comprised of the world sample.  Indeed, trade openness,
democracy and economic development exhibit strong positive significance as they did for
the entire sample.  Additionally, Cold War and population growth both have a large
negative impact on subsistence rights.  The latter two have no significant effect on the
global sample; and population growth actually has the opposite effect on the OECD
sample.
This is an interesting finding because it indicates that different processes are
driving subsistence rights in the developed, as compared to the less developed world.
We can intuitively see that the Cold War (and its subsequent end) and population growth
would affect subsistence rights in the developing world in ways that it would not the
industrial countries.  While deleterious pressures were placed on many non-OECD
countries by the superpowers during the Cold War, the tensions, it could be argued, had
less effect on the industrialized nations.  This negative Cold War effect is contrary to my
expectation and would support the conventional wisdom that argues that the Cold War
fostered greater repression as the developing countries struggled as pawns of the
superpowers.  Considering the issue of population growth, more people in an
industrialized country can typically mean a larger pool from which to draw workers.
This can have a positive effect on economic development and therefore physical quality
of life.  Also, negative population growth in a developed society could mean importing
non-citizen Gastarbeiter or guest workers, which could lead to problems for subsistence
rights.  For the developing world, population pressures can mean increasing stress on a
system that already cannot provide the basic subsistence for many of its citizens.  Finally,
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the χ2 and F statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the model, but the
R2 signifies it can only account for 39 percent of the variance.85
In terms of the non-OECD model with the addition of economic freedom, Table
5.16 reveals a number of similarities and differences from the entire sample as well as the
OECD sample.  First, the issue of global integration does again achieve statistical
significance as it did for the OECD countries but in a different manner.  Only one
measure of globalization (Bretton Woods) is statistically significant and it is in the
negative and opposite direction as the OECD model.  This phenomenon is difficult to
explain.  Economic freedom mirrors the significant and positive influence (as
hypothesized) that was present with the world sample.  This is counter to the negative
effect economic freedom has for the OECD counties.  As stated in the last subsection,
perhaps at higher levels of economic development and integration, any further
liberalization might actually harm a country’s ability to provide increased subsistence
rights.  The positive effects of democracy and economic development in the non-OECD
sample are consistent with the global sample.   In looking at population growth, we find
that its negative influence for the non-OECD countries does not carry over for either the
members of the OECD or the world as a whole.  This could be due to the suspicion that
the developing world is more sensitive to overpopulation issues, especially in relation to
providing subsistence rights.  In terms of the overall performance of the model, the χ2
and F statistic are again statistically significant while the R2 indicates it explains 49
percent of the variance.86
85 Table 5.41 in Appendix F indicates that if by adding subsistence rights t-1, the only significant variables
are the lagged variable itself (+), Bretton Woods (-), and economic development (+).
86 Table 5.42 in Appendix F shows that adding subsistence rights t-1 results in significant positive
influence by the lagged endogenous variable, trade openness, Cold War, and population growth.
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By substituting economic inequality into the above model, we see a number of
interesting findings as illustrated in Table 5.17.  Like the OECD model, none of the
globalization measures have an impact on subsistence rights.  Also, the new variable in
question (inequality) has no significant effect.  Perhaps most intriguing is that the
stalwarts in the global and OECD sample (democracy and economic development) also
have no discernible influence.  Further, the Cold War exhibits a negative statistical
significance contrary to our prediction, while it did not for either the OECD or entire
sample.  Finally, civil war is reported to have a positive effect that is neither expected nor
statistically significant for the other models.  The author is unable at this time to
adequately explain this phenomenon.  I initially suspected that with such few cases (70),
exacerbated problems of multicollinearity among the variables could be emerging.
However, careful examination of the matrix of correlations between the estimated
regression coefficients reveals no such evidence.87 Finally, the goodness of fit indicators
are also rather confusing.  While the F statistic points to an overall significant model, the
χ2 is not found to be statistically significant.  The amount of variance explained is 63
percent.  From the above description, it is obvious that this model presents some difficult
interpretation problems.88
87 The suspected culprit was the correlation between coefficients on civil war and economic inequality.
However, this correlation was only .07.  The highest correlation present was between the constant and the
coefficient on economic inequality (-.57).
88 Incorporating the lagged endogenous variable results in subsistence rights t-1 and civil war having a
positive effect while economic growth and international war exhibit negative effects.
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Table 5.15 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 54.99*** 2.58 21.28
Bretton Woods .15 .80 .19
Trade Openness .02** .01 2.55
Financial Openness -.13 .12 -1.11
Cold War -1.66** .59 -2.80
Democracy .82*** .11 6.92
Economic Development .001*** .0003 4.19
Economic Growth -.01 .01 -1.07
International War -.25 .89 -.28
Civil War .67 .85 .78
Population Growth -.04* .02 -1.70
Number of Cases 871 Adjusted R2 .39
χ2 113.13*** F 57.37***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.16 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 67.34*** 6.37 10.56
Bretton Woods -6.14*** 1.89 -3.24
Trade Openness .01 .02 .48
Financial Openness -.73 .63 -1.15
Cold War -2.72 1.73 -1.57
Economic Freedom 1.69* .87 1.94
Democracy 1.71*** .28 6.06
Economic Development .002*** .0005 4.26
Economic Growth -.07 .05 -1.23
International War 4.14 2.88 1.43
Civil War 2.14 3.91 .05
Population Growth -.21* .10 -2.00
Number of Cases 146 Adjusted R2 .49
χ2 146.21*** F 14.31***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 5.17 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)
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Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 55.78*** 6.99 7.97
Bretton Woods -.27 .70 -.39
Trade Openness -.009 .03 -.26
Financial Openness .37 .24 1.55
Cold War -1.45* .78 -1.86
Inequality -.09 .07 -1.24
Democracy -.11 .12 -.91
Economic Development -.0005 .0007 -.69
Economic Growth .002 .02 .08
International War 1.36 1.02 1.33
Civil War 1.77* 1.10 1.60
Population Growth -.54 .56 -.96
Number of Cases 70 Adjusted R2 .63
χ2 15.63 F 20.34***
Probability > χ2 0.15 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
d.  Separating Economic and Political Explanations of Subsistence Rights
As laid out in the research design in Chapter Four, I now consider a reduced
version of the general subsistence rights model, concentrating on the separate economic
and political explanations.  The overall economic model is as follows:
Subsistence Rightstj = a + B1 Bretton Woods Membershiptj + B2 Trade Opennesstj
+ B3 Financial Opennesstj + B4 Economic Freedomtj + B5 Income Inequalitytj + B6
Economic Developmenttj + B7 Economic Growthtj
As in the previous three subsections, I begin with the most general model and then
systematically add the variables of economic freedom and inequality.
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Table 5.18 displays the results from the general economic model.  Indeed, with
this first iteration there are not many surprises.  In terms of global integration, our
measure of trade openness is statistically significant and in the predicted direction
(positive).  This supports the findings from our general model for the world sample
(Table 5.9) and for the non-OECD countries (Table 5.15).  Likewise, the other measures
for globalization (Bretton Woods membership and financial openness) have no
discernible effect.  Also in lockstep with our general model for the world and for
developed countries, this model indicates that economic development is a significant
factor.  In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ2  indicates that the overall model is
significant.  Also, the high F statistic also attests to an overall significance of the
regression.  Having said that, the adjusted R2 shows the limits of the economic variables
in that collectively they only explain 38 percent of the variance in subsistence rights.
Adding economic freedom to our analysis provides yet more information (Table
5.19).  As before, the reader is cautioned as to the reduction of cases that occur because
of this addition (i.e., the model declines from 127 countries over 12 years for the general
economic model to 72 countries over 3 years for the economic freedom model.)
Economic freedom appears to have a significantly positive effect on subsistence rights as
predicted and seen in the overall model for the world (Table 5.10) and developing
countries (Table 5.16), respectively.  Economic development also exhibits influence as
seen in all of the general models (world sample, OECD, and non-OECD).  In terms of
global integration, trade openness is also seen as having a significant and positive impact.
Finally, the χ2 and F statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the model,
but the R2 still remains relatively low for the economic model at 0.40.
Substituting our inequality variable for economic freedom (in the economic
model with subsistence rights as the dependent variable), we encounter some interesting
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results (Table 5.20).  First, economic inequality itself is still unable to exhibit any
influence on subsistence rights as was the case for all of the previous general models
which utilized inequality (world, OECD, and non-OECD sample).  Secondly, economic
development remains the consistent performer with a significant and positive effect.
Turning to the question of global integration, this model presents some confounding
information.  The trade openness measure shows positive influence as it did in the
previous economic models above (Tables 5.18 and 5.19).  However, the Bretton Woods
indicator exhibits a negative effect on subsistence rights.  It is unclear why the Bretton
Woods measure would behave differently from its counterpart, trade openness.  Finally,
the F statistic and χ2 again indicate that the model as a whole is significant, while the R2
represents 49 percent of the variance explained.
Restricting the general model to include only political variables provides little
utility in explaining the dynamics of subsistence rights.  From Chapter Four, recall that
the restricted political model consists of the Cold War, democracy, international war and
civil war.  Table 5.21 reveals that two factors, democracy and Cold War, are indeed
significant and in the hypothesized direction.  Interestingly, neither the presence of civil
war nor international war has any significant effect on subsistence rights.  While the χ2
and F statistic indicate a good fit overall, the model is only able to explain 37 percent of
the variance.
Table 5.18 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights
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Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 59.09*** 2.05 28.80
Bretton Woods .88 .55 1.58
Trade Openness .02* .01 2.05
Financial Openness -.10 .07 -1.39
Economic Development .0009*** .0001 8.50
Economic Growth -.006 .01 -.60
Number of Cases 1127 Adjusted R2 .38
χ2 80.03*** F 140.47***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.19 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights (with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 62.01*** 5.16 12.01
Bretton Woods -2.16 1.59 -1.36
Trade Openness .06** .02 2.81
Financial Openness -.56 .49 -1.14
Economic Freedom 1.40* .71 1.97
Economic Development .001*** .0001 7.47
Economic Growth -.06 .04 -1.47
Number of Cases 198 Adjusted R2 .40
χ2 90.82*** F 24.55***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 5.20 Economic Model for Subsistence Rights (with Inequality)
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Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 74.48*** 5.00 14.88
Bretton Woods -2.32* 1.15 -2.13
Trade Openness .54** .02 2.48
Financial Openness .31 .26 1.17
Inequality -.02 .09 -.27
Economic Development .001*** .0001 9.15
Economic Growth .06 .04 1.45
Number of Cases 197 Adjusted R2 .49
χ2 155.69*** F 36.79***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.21 Political Model for Subsistence Rights
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 65.23*** .81 79.61
Cold War -1.12*** .33 -3.34
Democracy .56*** .07 7.50
International War -.58 .56 -1.02
Civil War -.26 .67 -.38
Number of Cases 1808 Adjusted R2 .37
χ2 76.56*** F 271.51***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
5.3 Security Rights Models
a.  General Models
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In this section, I apply the subsistence rights models developed in the last section
to our second dependent variable of security rights, or integrity of the person rights as
they are sometimes called.  In presenting the various models, I proceed in the following
manner.  First, I consider the general model without the economic freedom and
inequality variables.  Next, I add economic freedom to the general model and then
substitute our inequality measure.  Similar to the subsistence portion of this dissertation, I
further delineate the sample and evaluate the models separately for the developed and
developing world.  Finally, I disaggregate the general model and consider economic and
political variables in separate models.  Because of the theoretical and methodological
reasons presented previously, I estimate all of the subsequent models with the lagged
endogenous variable for security rights (Security Rights t-1).  However, I also estimate the
general models without the lagged endogenous variable for the sake of more direct
comparison with the analyses of subsistence rights.  These can be found in Appendix F as
Tables 5.44, 5.45, and 5.46.
In our first general model (Table 5.22), we find that 9 out of our 11 independent
variables exhibit statistical significant effects on security rights.  Not surprisingly,
previous security rights practices in a country have a tremendous impact on current
policies.  Concerning our issue of global integration, trade openness and financial
openness positively influence these rights.  Our third measure of globalization (Bretton
Woods membership) has no discernible effects.  The presence of Cold War has a
significantly positive effect as hypothesized.  This is contrary to conventional wisdom
which states that during the Cold War, Moscow and Washington allowed and even
encouraged domestic governments to repress in order to maintain their superpower
advantage.  With the sudden end to the Cold War, one might expect the protection of
international human rights would substantially improve.  However, I argue that the Cold
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War was actually a stabilizing factor that suppressed potential domestic aggression.  As
expected, and as we have seen before, democracy and economic development are quite
influential in explaining levels of human rights abuse.  Looking at domestic and
international war, these exhibit negative effects that would support the findings of Stohl
(1975, 1976), Rasler (1986), and Poe and Tate (1994).  Population also has a negative
effect in support of my hypothesis.  In terms of overall goodness of fit, the χ2 indicates
that the overall model is significant.  The adjusted R2 is also reported from the basic OLS
regression and shows that the model can explain over 70 percent of the variance in
subsistence rights.  Finally, the high F statistic attests to an overall significance of the
regression.
While adding economic freedom does nothing for the overall explanatory ability
of the above model (Table 5.23), it provides us with one the most interesting findings
thus far.89 Rather than having a positive effect as it consistently did with subsistence
rights, economic freedom is found to have an unexpected negative impact on security
rights.  As I observed in Chapter Four, it appears that there is a linkage between
economic freedom, economic development and subsistence rights.  If the argument holds
that increased levels of GNP result in higher physical quality of life, then economic
freedom should (at least indirectly) have an effect on basic human needs.  It is assumed
that this would have the same effect on security rights.  This finding is consistent across
the non-OECD sample (Table 5.29) and the economic model described later (Table
5.31).  From this analysis, it appears that while improving subsistence rights, higher
levels of economic freedom can actually lessen security rights.  A second important point
is that the consistent strength of democracy fails to show significance as does financial
89 As in the above model, the χ2 and F statistic indicate an overall significant model and the amount of
variance explained is an identical 72 percent.  Once must also keep in mind that the number of cases is
reduced from 1087 to 192.
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openness.  Security rights t-1, trade openness, and Cold War once again provide positive
effects on security rights.  Finally, international and civil war as well as population
growth exhibit the same negative influences.
Next, I substitute economic inequality for economic freedom (Table 5.24).  As
with the general model, security rights t-1, trade openness, financial openness, democracy,
Cold War and economic development all reveal positive effects on our dependent
variable.  Civil War continues to have a negative impact but is not followed by
international war.  Ultimately, the model exhibits similar overall significance and
explanatory power as above.
Table 5.22 General Security Rights Model
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .53*** .12 4.30
Security Rights t-1 .67*** .02 29.12
Bretton Woods .05 .03 1.58
Trade Openness .001*** .0004 3.65
Financial Openness .026** .01 2.25
Cold War .22*** .04 5.081
Democracy .01*** .005 3.51
Economic Development .00001*** .000003 5.89
Economic Growth -.001 .001 -.09
International War -.19** .06 -2.93
Civil War -.44*** .07 -6.16
Population Growth -.02*** .005 -3.39
Number of Cases 1087 Adjusted R2 .72
χ2 4137.34*** F 291.32***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
Table 5.23 General Security Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)




Constant 1.25*** .39 3.20
Security Rights t-1 .47*** .06 7.55
Bretton Woods .84 .10 .82
Trade Openness .003** .001 2.79
Financial Openness .01 .03 .36
Cold War .29*** .09 3.14
Economic Freedom -.08* .04 -1.89
Democracy .04** .01 2.87
Economic Development .00004*** .000009 4.63
Economic Growth -.002 .003 -0.77
International War -.29* .16 -1.79
Civil War -.64** .24 -2.66
Population Growth -.02*** .006 -3.27
Number of Cases 192 Adjusted R2 .72
χ2 457.49*** F 45.22***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.24 General Security Rights Model (with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 1.92*** .51 3.74
Security Rights t-1 .30*** .07 3.89
Bretton Woods -.002 .09 -.02
Trade Openness .003** .001 2.40
Financial Openness .04* .01 2.26
Cold War .20* .10 1.95
Inequality -.01 .01 -.99
Democracy .06** .02 2.45
Economic Development .00003*** .00001 3.29
Economic Growth -.003 .002 -1.35
International War -.09 .17 -.51
Civil War -.79** .29 -2.74
Population Growth -.01 .07 -.26
Number of Cases 198 Adjusted R2 .79
χ2 225.72*** F 69.42***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
b.  OECD Sample for Security Rights
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As with the subsistence rights models, I estimate the security rights models
separately for the developed and developing world (Table 5.25).   The general model
using the OECD sample exhibits many of the same traits as the entire world sample.
First, security rights t-1, Bretton Woods, trade openness, and democracy have a positive
influence.  Second, economic growth has a negative effect as expected.  Population
growth, however, has a positive impact that is counter to our hypothesis.  This is the same
finding as for the OECD with subsistence rights as well.  Perhaps this could mean that
population growth for industrialized nations is not the negative influence as it is with
developing nations but rather can provide economic opportunities that might better
provide basic human rights.  The overall model is significant and can explain over 50
percent of the variance.
Table 5.25 General Security Rights Model (OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant -55 .88 -.063
Security Rights t-1 .35*** .07 4.46
Bretton Woods .32** .13 2.36
Trade Openness .002** .0009 3.03
Financial Openness -.006 .01 -.43
Cold War .05 .07 .72
Democracy .23** .08 2.69
Economic Development .00001 .000006 1.50
Economic Growth -.006* .002 -2.18
International War -.05 .11 -.49
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .15** .05 2.75
Number of Cases 211 Adjusted R2 .54
χ2 126.81*** F 26.53***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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With the addition of economic freedom to our model (Table 5.26) we see different
results as well as a much reduced sample (i.e., only 16 countries over 3 years).  As before,
previous security rights policies and democracy exhibit a positive effect.  The global
integration variables, however, either fade away or have a negative influence (i.e., Bretton
Woods).  There doesn’t appear to be any theoretical basis for this transformation.  The
only other statistically significant variable is international war, which once again provides
decreased security rights.  Unlike with the general security rights model with economic
freedom, the OECD sample does not result in economic freedom exhibiting a surprisingly
negative impact.  Indeed, it is not statistically significant in either direction.
Table 5.26 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)




Security Rights t-1 .50*** .14 3.41
Bretton Woods -1.80*** .46 -3.83
Trade Openness .001 .003 .34
Financial Openness .02 .02 .95
Cold War -.19 .15 -1.23
Economic Freedom .02 .03 .63
Democracy .79*** .13 5.79
Economic Development -.00001 .00001 -.96
Economic Growth -.001 .002 -.48
International War -.19* .11 -1.65
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .04 .11 .36
Number of Cases 46 Adjusted R2 .64
χ2 1314.93*** F 8.65***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Finally, the substitution of inequality for economic freedom in our OECD model
results in security rights t-1, democracy, and population growth influencing security rights
in a positive manner.  While this is still a reduced sample, it does provide more cases
(N=103) than the economic freedom example.  Explanatory acumen and overall
significance of the model are relatively unchanged.
Table 5.27 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant -2.86** 1.13 -2.52
Security Rights t-1 .38*** .11 3.47
Bretton Woods (dropped)
Trade Openness .002 .001 1.50
Financial Openness -.01 .01 -.68
Cold War .10 .12 .81
Inequality -.007 .01 -.52
Democracy .55*** .16 3.44
Economic Development .00001 .000009 1.53
Economic Growth -.002 .003 -.58
International War -.16 .20 -.81
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .21** .07 2.88
Number of Cases 103 Adjusted R2 .60
χ2 225.80*** F 15.59***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
c.  Non-OECD Sample for Security Rights
The general model utilizing the developing world sample reveals that the non-
OECD countries are indeed driving the complete sample.  Indeed, the security rights
model as illustrated in Table 5.28 provides virtually identical results as the general model
143
for the entire world (Table 5.22).  Security rights t-1, trade openness, financial openness,
Cold War, Democracy and economic development have positive effects on developed
countries’ security rights performance.  The control variables of international war, civil
war and population growth all affect the dependent variable in a negative fashion as
predicted.  Also, the overall significance of this non-OECD model and explanatory
ability is only slightly less than the world sample model.
With the addition of the economic freedom variable, we also see a very similar
outcome as compared to the complete global sample (Table 5.23).  Rather than having a
positive effect as it consistently did with subsistence rights, economic freedom is found
to have an unexpected negative impact on security rights (see the section on general
models above for a discussion of this perplexing phenomenon).  The only altered variable
is that of democracy which regains positive statistical significance for the non-OECD
countries.  Security rights t-1, trade openness, and Cold War also increase the level of
security rights in the developing world.
Finally, if we substitute the inequality variable for economic freedom, we see
much of the significance of the economic freedom model evaporate (Table 5.30).  The
only positive influences retained are the lagged endogenous variable (security rights t-1)
and democracy.  The presence of civil war is the only statistically negative effect on
security rights.  Compared with the OECD sample for economic freedom (Table 5.26),
we find no significance (positive or negative) for international war or Bretton Woods
membership.  The model taken as a whole is still significant and can account for almost
60 percent of the variance.
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Table 5.28 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .54*** .13 4.08
Security Rights t-1 .67*** .02 27.89
Bretton Woods .04 .03 1.10
Trade Openness .001*** .0005 3.22
Financial Openness .03* .01 2.00
Cold War .25*** .05 4.78
Democracy .01*** .005 3.11
Economic Development .00001* .000006 2.19
Economic Growth -.0008 .001 -.53
International War -.22** .07 -2.83
Civil War -.43*** .07 -6.09
Population Growth -.01*** .006 -3.16
Number of Cases 876 Adjusted R2 .65
χ2 1940.43*** F 155.33***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.29 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .98** .39 2.45
Security Rights t-1 .60*** .06 9.40
Bretton Woods .05 .09 .59
Trade Openness .004*** .001 3.49
Financial Openness .01 .03 .48
Cold War .35** .11 2.99
Economic Freedom -.11** .04 -2.44
Democracy .03** .01 2.68
Economic Development .000006 .00002 -.23
Economic Growth .001 .003 .28
International War -.38* .22 -1.72
Civil War -.44* .21 -2.01
Population Growth -.01** .005 -3.21
Number of Cases 146 Adjusted R2 .62
χ2 391.96*** F 21.77***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.30 General Security Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)
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Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 1.24** .44 2.80
Security Rights t-1 .57*** .08 6.85
Bretton Woods -.11 .08 -1.37
Trade Openness .001 .001 .82
Financial Openness .073 .05 1.43
Cold War .05 .14 .37
Inequality -.01 .009 -1.34
Democracy .06** .02 2.98
Economic Development .00005 .00005 1.04
Economic Growth -.005 .004 -1.19
International War -.32 .24 -1.34
Civil War -.52** .25 -2.03
Population Growth .10 .07 1.48
Number of Cases 104 Adjusted R2 .59
χ2 193.85*** F 16.27***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
d.  Separating Economic and Political Explanations of Security Rights
As in the subsistence rights section, I also consider a reduced version of the
general security rights model, highlighting the separate economic and political
influences.  Again, the overall economic model is:
Security Rightstj = a + B1 Bretton Woods Membershiptj + B2 Trade Opennesstj +
B3 Financial Opennesstj + B4 Economic Freedomtj + B5 Income Inequalitytj + B6
Economic Developmenttj + B7 Economic Growthtj
Like in the previous subsections, I begin with the most general model and then
systematically add the variables of economic freedom and inequality.
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Figure 5.31 displays the results from the general economic model.  Indeed, with
this first iteration there are not many surprises.  All of the variable coefficients are
virtually identical to those in the general model (Table 5.22).  In terms of global
integration, our measures of trade openness and financial openness are statistically
significant and in the predicted direction (positive).  This supports the findings from our
general model for the world sample (Table 5.22) and for the non-OECD countries (Table
5.28).  Also in lockstep with our general model for the world and for developed
countries, this model indicates that economic development is a statistically significant
factor (although the coefficient is again rather weak).  In terms of overall goodness of fit,
the χ2  indicates that the overall model is significant.  Also, the high F statistic also attests
to an overall significance of the regression.  Indicating further strength of this limited
economic model, we find the adjusted R2 shows only slightly less explanatory value (.72)
than the complete general model (.74).
Adding economic freedom to our analysis provides yet more information (Table
5.32).  As before, the reader is cautioned as to the reduction of cases that occur because
of this addition (i.e., the model declines from 1136 cases for the general economic model
to 197 cases for the economic freedom model.) Economic freedom appears to have a
similar significantly positive effect on security rights as predicted and seen in the overall
model for the world (Table 5.23) and developing countries (Table 5.29), respectively.
Economic development also exhibits influence as seen in the general models for the
world sample and non-OECD.90 In terms of global integration, trade openness is also
seen as having a statistically significant and positive impact.  Finally, the χ2 and F
90 It is not surprising that economic development does not exhibit influence for the OECD sample
because of such small variance in the measure.
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statistic continue to show an adequate goodness of fit for the economic model, while the
R2 drops only slightly to .69.
Table 5.31 Economic Model for Security Rights
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .37*** .11 3.33
Security Rights t-1 .76*** .02 36.58
Bretton Woods .04 .03 1.27
Trade Openness .001*** .0004 4.02
Financial Openness .03** .01 2.68
Economic Development .00002*** .000002 6.72
Economic Growth .001 .001 .92
Number of Cases 1136 Adjusted R2 .72
χ2 3747.52*** F 501.75***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.32 Economic Model for Security Rights (with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .75* .41 1.80
Security Rights t-1 .68*** .05 12.42
Bretton Woods .04 .10 .41
Trade Openness .003** .001 2.58
Financial Openness .03 .03 1.06
Economic Freedom -.07* .04 -1.66
Economic Development .00004*** .000009 4.37
Economic Growth .003 .004 .71
Number of Cases 197 Adjusted R2 .69
χ2 546.15*** F 65.95***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Substituting our inequality variable for economic freedom (in the economic
model with security rights as the dependent variable), we encounter some interesting
results (Table 5.33).  First, economic inequality itself is still unable to exhibit any
influence on security rights as was the case for all of the previous general models that
utilized inequality (world, OECD, and non-OECD sample).  Secondly, economic
development remains the consistent performer with a significant and positive effect
(albeit still with a relatively weak coefficient and substantive effect).  Turning to the
question of global integration, this model presents some confounding information.  The
trade openness measure shows positive influence as it did in the previous economic
models above (Tables 5.31 and 5.32).  However, the Bretton Woods indicator exhibits a
negative, but statistically insignificant effect on security rights.  It is unclear why the
Bretton Woods measure would behave differently from its counterpart, trade openness
with this sample.  Finally, the F statistic and χ2 again indicate that the model as a whole is
significant, while the R2 represents a respectable 76 percent of the variance explained.
Table 5.33 Economic Model for Security Rights (with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .98*** .38 2.57
Security Rights t-1 .70*** .05 12.16
Bretton Woods -.06 .07 -.85
Trade Openness .002* .001 1.88
Financial Openness .01 .02 .85
Inequality -.003 .006 -.55
Economic Development .00003*** .000008 4.24
Economic Growth -.002 .003 -.074
Number of Cases 199 Adjusted R2 .76
χ2 578.54*** F 104.22***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Restricting the general model to include only political variables provides similar
utility (as compared to the economic model) in explaining the dynamics of security
rights.  From Chapter Four and the above section on subsistence rights, recall that the
restricted political model consists of the Cold War, democracy, international war and
civil war.  Table 5.34 reveals that like before, all of the factors are indeed statistically
significant and in the hypothesized direction.  While the coefficients are slightly different
from the general security rights model, the substantive effects remain the same.  Finally,
the χ2 and F statistic again indicate a good overall fit as well as a slightly lower (but still
quite similar) R2 explaining some 71 percent of the variance.  Since the explanatory
power for the political model appear very close to the economic model, analysis
including encompassing tests might shed further light on this competition.91
Table 5.34 Political Model for Security Rights
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .77*** .06 12.35
Security Rights t-1 .74*** .01 44.38
Cold War .06* .03 2.18
Democracy .02*** .003 7.68
International War -.12** .04 -2.72
Civil War -.45*** .05 -8.56
Number of Cases 1882 Adjusted R2 .71
χ2 5623.64*** F 944.77***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
5.4 Model Selection and Diagnostics
91 As revealed in the next section on diagnostics, Ramsey RESET results indicate that there is the
potential for  model mispecification and omitted variables in both the restricted economic and political
models.  Therefore, encompassing tests were not performed at this time.
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In this chapter I estimate a vast array of models (i.e., some 26 separate models in
all) to explain variation in subsistence rights and security rights.  My approach has been
to start broadly and then subsequently to narrow the focus.  While this is illuminating, it
is important for us to evaluate which models represent the most useful account of human
rights practices around the world.
In terms of overall goodness-of-fit, most of the models performed well.  Virtually
all the models exhibit a statistically significant χ2 and F statistic.  As noted previously,
the χ2 and F statistic indicate that the overall model is significant.  The F statistic
measures the statistical significance of the entire range of independent variables.  It tests
the joint hypothesis that all coefficients except the intercept are zero.  High values of the
F statistic force us to reject the null hypothesis that the constraints are true (Kennedy
1994, 57).
Another commonly used indicator of goodness-of-fit is the coefficient of
determination, or R2.  In all of these models, I report the adjusted R2 to account for the
number of independent variables incorporated into the model.  The security rights models
for the world sample (both the general and restricted economic and political models)
appear to explain approximately 75 percent of the variance.  The OECD and non-OECD
versions reveal from 54 to 65 percent of the variance in security rights.  For the
subsistence rights models, the performance is less consistent.  The general models for the
world sample explain from 56 to 77 percent of the variance in subsistence rights.  The
performance for the OECD and non-OECD samples as well as for the restricted
economic and political models typically explain only 35 to 49 percent of the variance.
While this R2 information is instructive for each individual model, it unfortunately
provides us little assistance in choosing one model over another.  In order to compare
two or more R2 values, the number of observations must be the same and the dependent
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variable must be the same.  It is obvious from my study here that these conditions are not
met.
A more comparable statistic that we can consult is the root mean square error or
the standard deviation of the residuals for each model.  This is a measure that focuses on
the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and complexity (i.e., more complex models are
penalized by inclusion of a loss function).  Here, the smaller values indicate the “better”
models.  As was the case with the other goodness-of-fit measures (χ2 and F statistic) there
is little that differentiates the various models.  As a whole, however, the security rights
models perform better than the subsistence rights models.  All of the root MSEs for the
security rights models are less than .68.  Typically, the subsistence rights models
(general, non-OECD, and restricted economic and political models) exhibit root MSE
values in the 11 to 16 range.  The root MSE for the OECD sample, though, is only
around 1.0.  Again, while somewhat informative, the root MSE does not provide us with
a definitive choice in model selection.
Another diagnostic tool at our disposal is the Ramsey (1969) regression
specification error test (RESET) for omitted variables.  This test amounts to estimating y
= xb + zt + u and then testing t = 0 (joint F test).  If we reject the null hypothesis, then we
can expect that there is indeed specification error.  Conducting this test for all of the
general models (both for subsistence rights and security rights) resulted in finding no
evidence of omitted variables.  However, when the Ramsey RESET was applied to the
restricted economic and political models for subsistence and security rights, it is
determined that there are indeed potentially important variables omitted.  Therefore, we
can at least narrow our focus to the more general models.  The reader is reminded that
the general models for both dependent variables are of three types: 1) the general model
with all economic and political variables except economic freedom and income
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inequality, 2) the general model including economic freedom, and 3) the general model
including income inequality (but without economic freedom).92
In choosing among the general models, I am forced to resort to a combination of
objective and subjective criteria.  From an objective standpoint, we could base our
decision on choosing models with statistically significant variables.  Most of the general
models, however, exhibit relatively similar performance in this regard.  Since income
inequality consistently shows no sign of statistical significance, we can put aside those
models that include that variable.  That leaves us with choosing between the general
model with the variable of economic freedom and the one without economic freedom.
Although economic freedom does exhibit statistical significance, the case selection and
number of observations for this model is unacceptably low (as compared to the model
excluding the variable).  In the subsistence rights model without economic freedom, we
have 1082 observations representing 121 countries over 12 years.  This is reduced to 192
cases representing only 71 countries over 3 years.  A similar situation exists for the
security rights models.  In the judgment of this researcher, it is prudent to choose the
model that covers four times the number of time periods and 75 percent more countries
in order to get a more accurate assessment of the dynamics of basic human rights
performance.93  The results of these models can be found in Table 5.9 (subsistence
rights) and Table 5.22 (security rights).
Now that I have settled on the primary model for both subsistence rights and
security rights, it is important to conduct a number of regression diagnostics to guard
against any potential threats to our inferences.  First, a number of checks were already
performed during the model development stage.  As detailed in Section 5.1, the potential
92 See the beginning of this chapter for the rationale behind this approach.
93 However, for discussion purposes, I consider the economic freedom results in my comparison between
subsistence rights and security rights.
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problems of multicollinearity, autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity have been
sufficiently addressed.  Also, as illustrated previously in this section, Ramsey RESET
procedures indicate that our models are well specified and that no variables have been
omitted.  Another concern, especially when we consider the substantive significance of
variables, is that of exogeneity.  The variables xi are said to be weakly exogenous if y
does not explain xi (i.e., there is no “feedback” from y to xi) (Kennedy, 1992, 89).  The
procedure utilized for this assessment is the Hausman (1978) specification test.  This tests
for contemporaneous correlation between the regressors and the error.  It shows that our
variables are weakly exogenous.
Next, I turn to the consideration of outliers and their effect (if any) on the model
estimations.  Regression outliers are observations whose dependent variable value is
unusual given the value of the independent variable.  A case is influential if deleting that
case from the sample substantially changes the regression results.  In observing separate
plots of the residuals versus the predicted values for the subsistence rights and security
rights models, we find only two instances of outliers – Rwanda in the case of subsistence
rights and Chad in the case of security rights.
Continuing this evaluation of potentially influential outliers, I generated a new
variable equal to Welsch and Kuh’s (1977) influence statistic DFITS.  This measures the
influence of the ith observation on the model as a whole.  The idea here is to measure the
difference between predicted values for the ith case when the regression is estimated with
and without the ith observation.  In estimating the DFITS for the security rights model, I
detected 22 potentially influential cases out of 1089 observations.  For the subsistence
rights model, the number was 19 cases out of 1084 observations.94 To look more closely
94 Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980, 28) suggest that DFITS values greater than 2 √k/n deserve further
investigation.  I have therefore used this cutoff to identify potential offenders.
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at these outliers, I employ DFBETAs, which are a direct measure of influence (i.e.,
measure how much each case affects each coefficient).  Assessing the outliers for each
variable (for both subsistence rights and security rights) highlighted a number of
potentially influential countries (typically two or three for each variable).  In order to
assure myself of no confounding influence from these outliers, I reestimate the models
excluding these cases.  Though there is an expectedly slight difference in the overall
performance of the model, all of the variables continue to exhibit roughly the same
magnitude and direction of influence (i.e., positive or negative) over the dependent
variables.  Further, there is no theoretical justification for excluding these.  Therefore, I
retain all of the cases for the model estimations.
5.5 Comparing Subsistence Rights and Security Rights Models
Most of the interpretation of the models and independent variables up to this
point has concentrated primarily on objective measures such as statistical significance.  It
is important, however, to move on to substantive significance and draw the distinction
between the two.  A statistically significant coefficient essentially means that the
sampling problem has been solved; that is the sample size is large enough to guarantee
that another sampling would produce similar results (McCloskey 1986, 5).  However, a
“permanent” coefficient is not necessarily a meaningful one.  Determining whether a
variable is substantively important is far more difficult than simply selecting statistically
significant coefficients.  As McCloskey (1986) argues, a variable is substantively
significant if its 1) coefficient is large, 2) variance high and 3) character exogenous.  I
have reported (with the Hausman test) that the variables in question are weakly
exogenous.  Also, one can see from summary statistics in Table 5.5 that notwithstanding
the dichotomous measures (Cold War, international war and civil war), all of the
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independent variables except for Bretton Woods exhibit a relatively high variance.95 The
question of substantive significance for our variables, therefore, rests on the magnitude of
the coefficients.  A summary of the variable significance on basic human rights is
illustrated in Table 5.35.96
To review the proposed hypotheses, it is expected that global integration,
economic freedom, democracy and Cold War will have a positive effect on basic human
rights.  Income inequality is believed to have a negative impact on these rights.  Of the
control variables (economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war,
and population growth), all are expected to have a negative influence except economic
development, which should have a positive influence.  I address each one separately and
make comparisons between the effects on subsistence rights and security rights.
While there are methodological reasons for including the lagged endogenous
variable, there are also substantive aspects that can be gleaned from the strength of the
coefficients.  Supporting the findings of Poe and Tate (1994), security rights t-1 exhibits a
consistently strong effect on contemporary security rights.  These large, statistically
significant coefficients indicate that the Political Terror Scale ratings on individual
countries are rather entrenched aspects of a system that is difficult to manipulate.  In the
subsistence rights arena as indicated by Table 5.36 in Appendix F, the lagged
endogenous variable (subsistence rights t-1) has an overwhelming effect on contemporary
subsistence rights.  However, as noted in Section 5.2, subsistence rights t-1 is collinear with
economic development and democracy.  Indeed, a quick glance illustrates the
confounding effects of including this variable.  While the overall model supposedly
95 Though the variance is not specifically reported in Table 5.5, it can be revealed by simply squaring the
reported standard deviations.
96 Results are based on the general models (Tables 5.9 and 5.22, respectively). Although they were
ultimately excluded from the general models, economic freedom and income inequality are also
examined (from Tables 5.10 and 5.11 on subsistence rights and Tables 5.23 and 5.24 on security rights).
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explains virtually all of the variance (R2 = .98), the highly statistically significant lagged
Physical Quality of Life drowns out all other influences.97
Table 5.35 Summary of Variable Significance on Basic Human Rights
Independent Variable Subsistence Rights Security Rights
Security Rights t-1 --------------- Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Subsistence Rights t-1 Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
---------------
Bretton Woods (+) (+)
Trade Openness Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant




Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Cold War (-) Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Economic Freedom Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Stat.  Significant (-)
Inequality (+) (-)
Democracy Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Economic Development Stat.  Significant (+)
Subst.  Significant
Stat.  Significant (+)
Economic Growth (-) (-)
International War (-) Stat.  Significant (-)
Subst.  Significant
Civil War (-) Stat.  Significant (-)
Subst.  Significant
Population Growth (-) Stat.  Significant (-)
Subst.  Significant
97 Therefore, these results are only reported in Appendix F.
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Turning to the important question of global integration, my first measure of
globalization (Bretton Woods institutional membership) is typically lacking in its
statistical and substantive significance for both arenas of basic human rights.  As stated
above, its variance is rather low (with an index ranging from 0 to 3) and it does not
exhibit either large or statistically significant coefficients.  These findings are similar to
those of Webster (1994) who utilizes an identical measure.  The only situation in which
this does not hold is for security rights in the separate OECD sample (Table 5.25).  This
is somewhat surprising because one would expect most if not all OECD countries to be
fully integrated into the Bretton Woods system.  A possible contributing factor to this
could be that a couple of countries (especially Switzerland) consistently register an
extremely low value in this category.  With such a reduced sample size in the OECD, this
could alter the results.
The second aspect of global integration (trade openness) is found to be
statistically and substantively significant for both dependent variables.  For subsistence
rights, a 100-point increase in trade openness would result in a 2-point increase in a
country’s Physical Quality of Life Index.  While it might seem unlikely that a country
could shift its trade openness (measured as exports + imports/GNP) by such a margin, a
number of countries did approach this level (e.g., Guyana from 1989 to1990).  The
impact appears to be uniform for both developed and developing countries alike.  The
effect of trade openness on security rights, while not as substantial, still has a positive
influence.  For all of the variables in the security rights model, it is important for us to
acknowledge the dynamic effect mediated by the lagged endogenous variable.  As
illustrated in Figure 5.2, the impact of a sizable change in trade openness increases
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substantially over time.98 We can see that the small initial change of .1 in the Political
Terror Scale would approach a threefold increase within 8 years.
Figure 5.2 Increase in Security Rights Due to Increase in Trade Openness
The third leg of globalization is financial openness as measured by a composite
index of various capital controls.  While not statistically significant, it could be argued
that the impact of financial openness on subsistence rights does have some substantive
importance.  As indicated in Table 5.9, the addition of two capital controls (out of a
possible six) would result in a 1.62 decline in PQLI.  Movements from a completely open
system to the most restrictive situation results in a 5-point drop in PQLI.  While not
typical, this complete reversal in openness has occasionally occurred (e.g., Dominica
98 To calculate the effect of any of these variables at timet+1, I multiply the effect at timet by the
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable and add the direct effect of the independent variable at








































from 1989 to 1990).  This is counter to our hypothesis of financial openness having a
positive impact on subsistence rights.  Having said that, we must not make too much of
this since there is no evidence of statistical significance.
In its influence on security rights, financial openness exhibits a statistically and
substantively positive effect.  Continuing our assumption of a move from the most
restricted to the most open (e.g., Dominica 1985 to 1986), an initial impact of .15 on the
Political Terror Scale translates into almost a .5 increase in security rights (Figure 5.3).
While this also holds for the non-OECD sample, it does not for the OECD countries.
Not only is the impact insignificant from a statistical standpoint, but its weak coefficient
is in the opposite direction.  This could mean that at higher levels of economic
development, further moves towards globalization (financial) is immaterial at best.











































Turning to the analysis of the Cold War’s effect on basic human rights, we see
negligible effects on subsistence rights but statistically and substantively significant
impact on security rights.  This supports the assumption that in a post-Cold War world,
renewed nationalism and conflict among various groups that was restrained by the
respective superpowers is now free to emerge.  While the immediate impact of the Cold
War is not great (a .22 improvement in security rights as compared to the post-Cold War
era), it quickly moves over a .5 point gain within three years when factoring in the lagged
security rights effect.  Real world examples of this effect are witnessed with the
continuing struggles and human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia.  While this
finding is keeping with our theory, it is surprising that the Cold War effects would not be
even more substantial for the subsistence rights.  One could expect that the recent
difficulties in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe concerning the movement
towards a market economy would prove problematic in providing basic human needs.  It
is possible that our timeline is too short and this scenario may eventually play out in the
coming years.  We will have to wait and see.
While not included in my most general models, the findings for economic
freedom warrant further discussion.99 For subsistence rights, economic freedom exhibits
statistical and substantive significance.  A potential three-point rise in economic freedom
(over three years) will result in a 4.5-point gain in Physical Quality of Life.100 Though
not common, a number of countries have approached this level of change in economic
freedom (e.g., Costa Rica, Haiti, and Canada from 1990-1993).  This expected outcome
follows my original hypothesis that greater economic freedom should foster economic
99 Again, this is primarily because of the large reduction in observations since economic freedom is only
available for four years during our time period.
100 Keep in mind that the economic freedom data (for our period) is only available for 1980, 1985, 1990,
and 1993.
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development, thereby enhancing the provision of basic human needs.  However, the
situation changes dramatically when we turn our attention to security rights.  As
illustrated in Table 5.23, the impact of economic freedom on security rights provides us
with an interesting finding.  Rather than having a positive effect as it consistently does
with subsistence rights, economic freedom is found to have an unexpected negative
influence on security rights.  This finding is consistent across the non-OECD sample
(Table 5.29) and the economic model (Table 5.32).  Figure 5.4 indicates the change over
time when combined with the lagged dependent variable.  While security rights exhibits
statistical significance, it is less clear that substantive significance has been obtained.
The initial decline of .08 on the Political Terror Scale as a result of a 1 point annual
increase (3-points over 3 years) in economic freedom only approaches a .25 drop by the
end of a decade.  Though interesting, this effect is surely not monumental.







































The important factor of democracy achieves continued support in this study with
statistical and substantive significance for both dependent variables.  In terms of
subsistence rights, a 1-level drop in democracy (on the 0 to 10 Polity III scale) will result
in a greater than 1-point drop in the Physical Quality of Life Index.  At the other end of
the spectrum, if a country were to achieve the highest democratic score in one year and
then abandon democracy (e.g., obtaining the lowest democratic score) in the next period,
we would witness a more than a 10-point decline in subsistence rights.   This large
degradation in physical quality of life would have dramatic impact on a country’s basic
human needs.  These findings strongly support the previous work in this area (Moon and
Dixon 1985, Rosh 1986, Spalding 1986, and Moon 1991).  This is especially true since I
utilize a different measure of democracy than the previous authors (i.e., Polity III).
Spalding (1986) and Rosh (1986) offer the definition provided by Arat (1984, 1991)
while Moon and Dixon (1985) and Moon (1991) use that of Bollen (1980, 1991).
Some may question the feasibility of this assumption of complete abandonment of
democracy.  While unlikely, there have been precedents for this.  One such occurrence is
the overthrow of Chilean democracy under Salvador Allende by the authoritarian
Augusto Pinochet in the early 1970s.  Indeed, Chile obtained the maximum democracy
score in 1973 and then dropped immediately to the lowest possible score.  Another
potential example could be the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the ascension of
national socialism in Germany (Poe and Tate 1994, 861).
While statistically significant, democracy’s substantive impact on security rights
is less pronounced.  Once again assuming our complete abandonment of democracy from
one period to another, a country would experience an initial decline of .1 in the Political
Terror Scale.  With the utilization of the lagged endogenous variable, however, there is a
combined effect as illustrated in Figure 5.5.  If the cessation of democracy were to
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continue in our sample country, it appears that the human rights index would only
decline by .3.  With the security rights scale range from 1-5, this small change would be
difficult to assess in terms of political prisoners held or increased torture or execution.
This finding, while supporting the established literature, does not exhibit the same
magnitude as previous studies (e.g., Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Tate and
Poe 1996).  This could once again call into question (as does Fein 1994) the truly linear
nature of democracy and its effects on security rights.101
Figure 5.5 Decrease in Security Rights due to Decrease in Democracy
101 Having said that, democracy’s effect on security rights does exhibit greater influence in some of the
other models with much smaller time frames or samples. This is especially true if we concentrate on the
OECD sample.  Here, the initial decline in the Political Terror Scale is .23 if a country abandons








































In the existing literature of both subsistence and security rights, much has been
said concerning economic development and economic growth.  In the present study,
economic development is statistically significant for both dependent variables.
Substantively, it appears that the variable is only significant for subsistence rights.  In the
unlikely event that a country obtained a ten thousand dollar increase in per capita GNP,
we could see a remarkable ten-point improvement in the Physical Quality of Life Index.
With a more reasonable increase of one thousand dollars (albeit very difficult for the
poorest countries), we could expect a one-point increase in basic human needs provision.
The weak coefficient for security rights, however, prevents economic developments from
moving beyond statistical significance.  In our optimistic example of a ten-thousand
dollar increase in per capita GNP, the security rights index would initially only be
increased by .1.  Within five years, the cumulative effect would still only be a .27
increase in the Political Terror Scale.  With a one-thousand dollar improvement in per
capita GNP, the immediate effect would be .01 while the compound influence over 5
years would only be .24.  Within a decade, the change in security rights would reach a
relatively meager .29.  Looking at economic growth (i.e., the percentage change in per
capita GNP), I find no support (either statistical or substantive) to confirm my hypothesis
that greater levels of economic growth will have adverse effects on subsistence and
security rights.102
The dummy variables controlling for the presence of international and civil wars
achieve substantively important and statistically significant coefficients for security
rights but exhibit no such influence over subsistence rights.  This is somewhat surprising
since it was expected that internal and external conflict would be deleterious to basic
102 It can be noted that for both subsistence and security rights, the impact of economic growth (although
not statistically significant) is in the hypothesized direction (i.e., negative).
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needs of persons as well to their personal security.  Figures 5.6 and 5.7 illustrate the
decreases in security rights due to civil and international war, respectively (assuming the
continued involvement in each type of conflict).  Perhaps not surprisingly, civil war has a
much greater impact than does an international conflict.  During an international foray,
some of the political and economic infrastructure needed to maintain acceptable human
rights practices might remain intact.  On the other hand, when the conflict is internal,
strains appear to permeate the society.  The immediate drop of .44 on the Political Terror
Scale as a result of a civil war would continue to decrease over one point before the third
year and stabilize at 1.3 by the end of a decade (Figure 5.6).  This would mean that if a
country with the highest security rights rating (5) become engaged in civil war, we would
at least expect that there would be some political prisoners being held, and that torture
and political murder might become more common (other factors remaining equal).  As
depicted in Figure 5.7, if a country were involved in an international conflict, the initial
decline of .19 in security rights would stabilize at .57 within ten years.  Though
substantial, the actual impact over this period is much less than with the civil war
example.
Figure 5.6 Decrease in Security Rights Due to Civil War








































Finally, my examination of population growth pressures on human rights
indicates, once again, differing influences on subsistence rights and security rights
(Figure 5.8).  While population growth exhibits statistically and substantively
important impact on security rights, it appears to have virtually no effect on
subsistence rights.  Depending on the degree of growth that is present in a
particular country, we can see modest to dramatic decreases in the guarantees of
security rights.  If a country experiences a blistering fifty percent increase in its
overall population, we see an immediate one point decrease in the Political Terror
Scale.  Though not common, there were a number of countries in this fourteen-
year sample that had extreme fluctuations in population due primarily to conflict
and/or famine (e.g., Slovenia, Rwanda, Guinea, UAE, North Yemen).  If this
continued for the better part of a decade (very unlikely), we would expect a three-









































highest security rights rating (5), the situation after a number of years would
involve widespread occurrence of murders and disappearances.  Obviously, more
common high growth rates of five and ten percent would yield less dramatic
impact.  An initial decrease of .1 (five percent rate) and .2 (ten percent growth
rate) would achieve a cumulative .3 and .6 change in security rights, respectively
by the end of a decade.
 Figure 5.8 Decrease in Security Rights Due to Increase in Population Growth
Therefore, from the above comparison between subsistence rights and security
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rights.  Typically, those variables that have a positive (negative) effect on subsistence
rights also have a positive (negative) influence on security rights.  The only possible
exception is with economic freedom, which has a significantly positive impact (both
statistically and substantively) on subsistence rights but has a negative effect (statistically
significant) on security rights.  Another interesting result to note is that a number of
variables (Cold War, international war, civil war, and population growth) affect security
rights while having virtually no effect on subsistence rights. This could indicate that
altering the level of basic human needs may be a more complex and difficult process than




This dissertation has attempted to answer a number of important questions in the
human rights community.  After an extensive review of the existing literature in Chapter
Two, Chapter Three examined the content and nature of human rights.  The first
theoretical question posed was whether there are indeed "basic human rights" and if so,
which rights fit into this category.  This research takes a broader view than much of the
recent literature that has simply concentrated on a single aspect of human rights (e.g.,
integrity of the person rights).  From a theoretical standpoint, I draw upon Shue (1980)
who argues that there are at last three basic rights: security, subsistence, and liberty.  In
examining the components of basic human rights, I explore the origins of these rights in
international law. The issue here is whether there is indeed an international human rights
“regime” and to what extent this regime controls or alters national sovereignty.  Though
the latter is more difficult to answer, it is apparent that an international human rights
regime backed by international law is now firmly entrenched.  Examples of this legal
basis include the original Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.103 There is indeed substantial evidence indicating the existence
of basic human rights (including security rights and subsistence rights) that are
guaranteed by (though not always enforced by) international law.  While enforcement
surrounding human rights norms and sovereign nations will perhaps always be
103 In addition to these global agreements, a number of regional (and potentially more powerful)
agreements include the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
European Social Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American
Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.
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problematic, a number of legal decisions suggest that enforcement is indeed possible.
Examples include Filartiga v. Pena, Letelier v. Republic of Chile, Ireland v. United
Kingdom, and the case of Dusko Tadic that has just gone before the recently instituted
War Crimes Tribunal (as a result of the Balkans conflict). Another contemporary and
complicated case involves the detainment of Augusto Pinochet by the United Kingdom
and the attempt by Spain to have him extradited and tried for crimes against humanity
(i.e., for atrocities committed against Spanish nationals in Chile in the 1970s during the
reign of Pinochet).
 A second parallel controversy that is also addressed is the issue of cultural
relativism versus universality.  Are human rights truly universal in the sense that they are
the rights of every person simply because they are a human being?  Or, as many in the
non-western world argue, is the validity of a moral right or rule relative to the indigenous
culture?  While not definitively answering this question, it is clear that this project
suggests a compromise strategy (not unlike Howard, 1984) similar to the weak cultural
relativist tradition.  Universalism is assumed but the extremes are checked by the
relativity of communities and rights. The compromise suggested by Howard (1984)
would strive for domestic legislation that would allow citizens to “opt out” of traditional
practices (e.g., childhood betrothal and widow inheritance) that may not correspond to
international norms.  In an indication of greater movement towards more universally
accepted human rights practices, the most recent resolutions adopted at the Vienna
Conference (June 1993) appear to give supporters encouragement (Perry 1997, 481). The
Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by 172 countries states categorically and
171
repeatedly that “the universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question”
and that “they are universal, indivisible and mutually reinforcing.”104
Third, I empirically evaluate this assertion that rights are interdependent and
indivisible.  Here, the question is whether there are trade-offs, for example between the
provision of security rights and basic human needs, as suggested by Donnelly (1989,
188) and as often argued by certain regimes.  Or, on the other hand, are two or more of
these rights intimately linked and therefore tend to be realized together, as suggested by
Vienna Conference and Vance (1977), Howard (1983), Kyi (1995)?
In considering differences between the developed and developing world,
preliminary analyses indicate that OECD countries overall enjoy greater subsistence and
personal integrity rights, more democratic institutions and more economic freedom.  In
addition, OECD countries are apparently a more homogeneous group than non-OECD
countries.105  From this, we may conclude that there is a considerable divide between
developed and less developed countries, and that not only are human rights more realized
in developed countries, but that they are more stable as well.
Though not all of my questions regarding the relationship between these four
groups of  “basic” internationally recognized human rights were answered in Chapter
Three, there are some important findings in our search for understanding the various
linkages between basic human needs, security rights, political rights, and economic
freedom.  In what might be considered good news for citizens, as well as policy-makers
and scholars who argue that these rights are generally complementary, bivariate
correlation analyses provide no direct evidence of trade-offs.  In these initial, simple
104 It should be noted that substantial cultural differences remained at Vienna. In order to achieve
unanimity, the Declaration omits any reference to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights per se.
105 Further analysis of the univariate distributions of these variables does not reveal any significant
outliers; I do not believe that any individual nation or cluster of nations is driving these summary
statistics.
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analyses, I find a tendency for these human rights to be achieved together, both in
analyses of the full sample and in a subset of countries consisting of non-OECD
countries.  However, when only OECD member countries are included in the analysis,
many of the relationships dissipated.  This finding is probably due to the lack of variance
in OECD countries and their relative homogeneity.   Most of the significant findings
throughout Chapter Three were driven by the non-OECD portion of the sample.
Therefore, it would appear that Kyi (1995) is essentially correct when he suggests that
the trade-offs argument concerning development and other freedoms is merely a pretext
used by regimes to counter the ever-increasing call for governments to live up to
international political and security rights standards.
The results of my analyses of trends in human rights achievement and the
variance in human rights performance also provides some very interesting findings.
Each of the variables analyzed in Chapter Three (subsistence rights, security rights,
political rights, and economic freedom) showed a trend toward greater realization of
rights since the beginning of the data series that I examine.  Thus, it would seem that it is
possible, in the aggregate, to have each of the human rights I survey to become
progressively more realized over time.
Having said that, there are also some findings that hint that the four categories of
human rights investigated do not always move together.  In spite of increases in levels of
subsistence rights, economic rights, and democracy after 1989 and the end of the Cold
War, the Amnesty measure (security rights) shows that respect for personal integrity
abuse actually decreased after 1989, until an improvement in 1993.  This would suggest
that, on a systemic level, moves toward democracy might actually be accompanied at
first by greater repression.  This would lend credence to Fein's (1995) argument of "more
murder in the middle."  In addition, the correlations between the categories of rights were
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not so strong as to preclude the possibilities of trade-offs in certain cases.  Future work
could concentrate on certain case studies to shed further light on these findings.
Analysis of the variance in the scores yields further potentially important
information.  Though measures of the variation in economic rights and democracy
indicat the world was converging concerning respect for security rights and to a lesser
extent with PQLI, there was evidence of a trend toward divergence.  At least in the latter
case, this could be a result of the increasing problems of inequality as alluded to in
Chapter Four.
In Chapter Four, I developed a research design aimed at determining why some
regimes promote human rights while others do not.  This is an especially important
objective since we can only provide intelligent prescriptions to insure human rights
conditions if we as scholars can adequately explain human rights variations.  Further, if
we can eventually identify situations that indicate a government's propensity to violate
human rights, we might assist in actually preventing the spread of abuse.  To this end, I
build upon the existing theoretical and empirical research to develop multivariate models
that attempt to explain variation in the broadly conceived notion of basic human rights.
Drawing upon the widely accepted framework of “basic rights” as offered by
Shue (1980), I select subsistence rights and security rights for my dependent variables.
This is an important distinction in the literature since almost all studies focus only on a
single aspect of human rights.  By examining both areas in a comparative fashion, I
believe we gain even more knowledge of the dynamics of human rights practices.  The
important question here is whether certain factors affect various aspects of human rights
(i.e., subsistence and security rights) in different ways.
In a further break from the traditional human rights literature, I employ an
international political economy model that centers on globalization and its effects on
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basic human rights.  The general model includes both economic and political variables
that can be further categorized into international and domestic factors. Building on the
work of scholars before me, I have compiled what I believe to be the most
comprehensive study yet concerning subsistence rights and security rights.  The pooled
cross-sectional time-series (PCT) or time-series cross-section (TSCS) employed here
covers over 150 countries for 14 years from 1980 through 1993.106 This extensive data
set is important in that it now allows us to compare over time the variation in basic
human rights for the largest number of countries in both the developed and developing
world.
Before estimating the various globalization models, I consulted summary
statistics that provided useful information. On average, OECD countries perform better
on both dependent variables (subsistence rights and security rights) as well as on many of
the independent variables (financial openness, democracy, economic development,
economic growth, and population growth). For other variables, the difference is less
pronounced. For instance, the mean economic freedom measure for the developed world
is 5.47 while for the developing world it is 4.36 (on a 1 to 10 scale). It is also equally
likely for OECD or non-OECD countries to find themselves embroiled in an
international conflict. Another interesting finding is the relatively consistent presence of
income inequality throughout the entire world. Here, the OECD exhibits a GINI index of
approximately 32 while the non-OECD exhibits slightly less equality at just over 37 on
the GINI index, which ranges from 1 (perfect equality) to 100 (total inequality).
In terms of globalization, two of our indicators (membership in Bretton Woods
institutions and trade openness) reveal little difference between the developed and
106 This ranges from 156 countries for subsistence rights and 152 countries for security rights in 1980 to
168 countries for subsistence rights and 176 countries for security rights in 1993.
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developing countries. For the third measure, financial openness, there is stark variation in
that the OECD is much less likely to impose capital controls. In the context of recent
financial instability in Asia, Latin America, and Russia, the issue of capital restrictions is
even more pertinent. While many of the largest industrialized nations are loath to impose
financial controls, this is still a very tempting policy tool for some leaders, especially in
less developed areas.
In Chapter Five, I estimate a comprehensive array of models (i.e., some 26
separate models) to explain variation in subsistence rights and security rights. Further
analyses were conducted to separate the differences in OECD and non-OECD countries.
After exhaustive diagnostic tests, a single model for each dependent variable was
chosen.107  The subsistence rights model estimated the effects of global integration
(Bretton Woods membership, trade openness, and financial openness), Cold War,
democracy, economic development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and
population growth on a country’s Physical Quality of Life index. The security rights
model estimated the impact of security rights t-1, global integration (Bretton Woods
membership, trade openness, and financial openness), Cold War, democracy, economic
development, economic growth, international war, civil war, and population growth on a
country’s Political Terror Scale rating.
To review the proposed hypotheses, it was expected that global integration,
economic freedom, democracy and Cold War would have a positive effect on basic
human rights.108  Income inequality was thought to have a negative impact on these
rights. Of the control variables (economic development, economic growth, international
107 As discussed at length in Chapter Five, a multicollinearity problem with the lagged dependent
variable for physical quality of life prevents us from incorporating it into our general subsistence rights
model.
108 While economic freedom is not retained in the final models because of data availability and a
subsequent high reduction in the number of cases, I discuss its impact from the other models.
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war, civil war, and population growth), all were expected to have a negative influence
except economic development, which was thought to have a positive effect.
As to the actual impact of globalization on basic human rights, this study
indicates mixed results (see Table 5.35).  Typically, the first indicator of global
integration (Bretton Woods institutional membership) lacks statistical and substantive
significance for both subsistence and security rights.  This supports the work of Webster
(1994) who uses an identical measure.  Moving on to trade openness as a measure of
global integration, I find that a country’s liberal trade policies are statistically and
substantively significant for both dependent variables. As illustrated in Chapter Five, all
of the influences on security rights are enhanced by the lagged endogenous variable
(security rights t-1).  The impact on basic human rights appears to be uniform for both
developed and developing countries alike. This appears to support the liberal position in
the liberalism versus realism debate (at least in terms of human rights).  As argued by
Holsti (1985) it is logical to believe that increased interdependence of nations will result
in a global society or community.  This also supports the initial work of Harrelson-
Stephens and Callaway (1998) in which they find that levels of trade affect the security
rights practices of a state. From a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, this could have serious
implications for trade relations with countries exhibiting “unacceptable” human rights
practices. On the surface, this might suggest that the U.S. is prudent in its relationship
with China (e.g., continuing MFN status) and is counter-productive in its isolation of
Cuba.109
Considering the third leg of our globalization measures, financial openness is
found to be statistically and substantively significant in terms of security rights.
109 It should be stated that in individual circumstances such as with South Africa, multilateral sanctions
and the subsequent reduction in trade and interdependence could be argued to be effective.
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However, it does not reach statistical significance for physical quality of life. If we
examine the differences between the developed and developing world, we find some very
interesting results for security rights. While the above holds for the non-OECD sample, it
does not for the OECD countries. Not only is its impact insignificant from a statistical
standpoint, but its meager coefficient is in the opposite direction. Though we should not
make too much of this, it could mean that at higher levels of economic development,
further moves towards global integration (at least financially) are ineffectual at best.
Similar findings result when I consider the impact of the Cold War on basic
human rights.  Again, there are negligible effects on subsistence rights but significant
impacts on security rights.   This supports my break with conventional wisdom that
suggests that the Cold War should have a negative influence on human rights. Rather, in
a post-Cold War world, it seems that renewed nationalism and conflict among various
groups is now reemerging. Having said this, it is still surprising that the post-Cold War
effects would not be even more substantial for subsistence rights. One might expect that
the recent difficulties concerning the movement toward a market economy would prove
problematic in providing basic human needs. As time passes and we have a longer post-
Cold War period with which to compare, these findings might change somewhat.
Though not included in the final models because of data availability, the findings
for economic freedom warrant inclusion in the summary.110  In support of my hypothesis,
increased economic freedom is tied to increases in levels of Physical Quality of Life.  A
three-point rise in economic freedom results in an impressive 4.5-point gain in
subsistence rights. Therefore, it appears that liberalizing economic restraints should
110 The only reason that economic freedom is not included in the final models is because of the large
reduction in observations due to availability of the data  (i.e., only available for 4 years during our time
period).
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foster economic development, thereby enhancing the provision of basic human needs.
The findings for economic freedom in relation to security rights are not significant.
In support of the extensive literature on democracy, this study finds that
democratic regimes have a substantial impact on subsistence rights and to a lesser extent
on security rights. Considering subsistence rights, we see a one-to-one relationship
between level of democracy (as measured by Polity III) and the dependent variable.
These findings echo the results of the previous work in this area (Moon and Dixon 1985,
Rosh 1986, Spalding 1986, and Moon 1991). The outcome is even more impressive since
I use a different measure of democracy than previous authors do.  Though still
statistically significant, the influence of democracy on security rights is less pronounced.
This is true even when considering the cumulative effect of the lagged endogenous
variable. While it does not conflict with previous security rights literature (e.g.,
Henderson 1991, 1993; Poe and Tate 1994; Tate and Poe 1996), it does once again beg
the question as to whether democracy is truly linear in its effect on political terror (Fein
1995).
Turning finally to my inclusion of a number of control variables, we once again
find inconsistent results when comparing subsistence rights and security rights.  In many
areas of human rights research, much has been written on economic development and
economic growth. In this dissertation, economic development is found to have a
relatively substantial effect on Physical Quality of Life while having a minuscule impact
on security rights.  In terms of economic growth, I find no support of the notion that
economic growth will have adverse effects on basic human rights.
The remaining control variables (international war, civil war, and population
growth) can be seen as heavily influential on security rights but have virtually no effect
on subsistence rights. As expected, the presence of international or civil conflict results in
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a degradation of integrity of the person. In support of Poe and Tate (1994), I find that
while both are quite deleterious, a strictly domestic conflict is more damaging than if the
conflict is truly international. This makes intuitive sense in that during an international
war, a portion of the political and economic infrastructure needed to maintain acceptable
human rights practices might remain intact. Similarly, a relatively high population
growth rate can be detrimental to guaranteeing these rights. This tends to support the
findings of Henderson (1993) and refute those of Poe and Tate (1994).
As the reader is now well aware, there appear to be both similarities and striking
differences in the manner in which the international political and economic processes
drive various human rights practices.  While acceptable subsistence rights and security
rights can be achieved together (as indicated in Chapter Three), the multivariate section
indicates that certain aspects of the international political economy affect the two in
different ways.  In terms of similarities, it is obvious that global integration (i.e., trade
openness) and democracy have similarly positive influences on basic human rights.
However, there are even more variables that affect subsistence rights and security rights
in a dissimilar manner.  From a policy-making standpoint, however, it should be noted
that none of the variables substantively affect the two aspects of human rights in opposite
directions. Therefore, governments, international organizations and non-governmental
organizations should not worry that one set of policies might substantially improve some
human rights while harming others. It is apparent though, that some factors can have an
important influence on one area of human rights while having little if any effect on
another.
While this dissertation attempts to answer many important theoretical and
practical questions, a number of issues still remain. Indeed, this project provides fertile
ground for numerous directions of future research. One area that continues to need
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further exploration is in measurement of human rights. In terms of subsistence rights, it
would be instructive to compare the most recent measure of basic human needs (the UN
Human Development Index) to the measures listed in this work (primarily PQLI). This
would require a rather time-consuming process since the HDI only covers countries since
1992. In looking at security rights, insight could be drawn in incorporating Cingranelli
and Richards’ (1999) latest personal integrity measure and comparing it to the Political
Terror Scale in a time series cross section study such as this. Again the difficulty here is
in that the measure is only provided every three years.
Looking to more substantive matters, the important issue of democratization
warrants further review. Though I find statistical and substantive support for much of the
previous literature arguing that democracy has a strong positive effect on human rights,
the findings for some of the various models here still questions the strictly linear
relationship between democracy and basic human rights. Another unresolved issue is that
of population pressures and their effect on basic human rights. As indicated above, this
study supports the findings of Henderson (1993) and calls into question those of Poe and
Tate (1994). This is somewhat surprising since this dissertation is methodologically
closer in nature to the Poe and Tate (1994) study. Also, the time period is more similar to
that of Poe and Tate (1994).
In terms of the trend analyses in Chapter Three, this broad survey focuses on
aggregate data for a pooled cross-sectional time series data set.  While this is typically an
advantageous strategy, it could at times obscure individual processes at work.  Looking
below the surface and investigating time series data for particular countries would allow
us to provide interesting tests of the relationships suggested by our aggregate analyses.
Therefore, it might be illuminating to investigate a few case studies in order to highlight
the potential trade-offs among various rights. While I find that these rights can indeed be
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realized together, that does not preclude the individual instance of trade-offs in particular
countries. Examples might  include countries such as China, Singapore, South Korea,
India, and Russia.
In addition, further research might investigate the linkages between these kinds of
rights while making a potentially important distinction between levels and actual changes
in human rights performance.  This distinction may be particularly important in our
attempt to better understand the linkage between democratization and the abuse of
personal integrity, for though levels of democracy are related to less personal integrity
abuse, our results suggest that a systemic movement toward democracy may have
affected increased repression, at least in the short-term.  Another tack could involve
comparing the effort expended by governments and the actual performance in providing
various human rights.  While we are ultimately concerned with the realization of human
rights, the reality of political and economic forces within a country may alter a regime's





The security rights scale utilized here follows that employed by Poe, Tate, Keith and
Lanier (1996); Poe and Tate (1994); Poe and Sirirangsi (1993, 1994); Stohl and Carleton
1985).  However, in order to be consistent with the scales of the other variables, the five-
point Political Terror Scale scale is recoded so that countries with more severe human
rights violations exhibit a lower rating while nations with fewer violations are assigned a
higher rating.
1. The terrors of [level 2] have been expanded to the whole population....  The leaders
of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they
pursue personal or ideological goals.
2. The practices of [level 3] are expanded to larger numbers.  Murders, disappearances
are a common part of life....  In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects
primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
3. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment.
Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common.  Unlimited
detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted.
4. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity.
However, few person are affected, torture and beating are exceptional....  Political
murder is rare.
5. Countries [are] under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view,
and torture is rare or exceptional....  Political murders are extremely rare.
For further details on coding and content analysis, see Gibney and Dalton (1996).
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I.  Money and Inflation
(Protection of money as a store of value and medium of exchange)
A. Average annual growth rate of the money supply during the last five years minus
the potential growth rate of real GDP
B. Standard deviation of the annual inflation rate during the last five years
C. Freedom of citizens to own a foreign currency bank account domestically
D. Freedom of citizens to maintain a bank account abroad
II. Government Operations and Regulations (Freedom to decide what is produced and
consumed)
A. Government general consumption expenditures as a percent of GDP
B. The role and presence of government-operated enterprises
C. Price controls - the extent that businesses are free to set their own prices
D. Freedom of private businesses and cooperatives to compete in markets
E. Equality of citizens under the law and access of citizens to a nondiscriminatory
judiciary (This variable is included only in the 1995 index)
F. Freedom from government regulations and policies that cause negative real
interest rates
III. Takings and Discriminatory Taxation (Freedom to keep what you earn)
A. Transfers and subsidies as a percentage of GDP
B. Top marginal tax rate (and income threshold at which it applies)
C. The use of conscripts to obtain military personnel
IV. Restraints on International Exchange (Freedom of exchange with foreigners)
A. Taxes on international trade as a percent of exports plus imports
B. Differences between the official exchange rate and the black market rate
C. Actual size of trade sector compared to the expected size
D. Restrictions on the freedom of citizens to engage in capital transactions with
foreigners
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=============================================================
Authority Coding Democracy Score
=============================================================










Openness of Executive Recruitment
(a) Election 1
(b) Dual: Hereditary/Election 1
(c) Dual: Hereditary/Designation 0
(d) Closed 0
Constraints on Chief Executive
(a) Executive Parity or  Subordination 4
(b) Intermediate Category 1 3
(c) Substantial Limitations 2
(d) Intermediate Category 2 1
(e) Slight to Moderate Limitations 0
(f) Intermediate Category 3 0




DATA COLLECTION AND SOURCES
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Variable Indicator Sources
Subsistence Rights Physical Quality of Life Index
- Infant mortality rates
- Life expectancy at age one
- Literacy rate
Original Index - Morris (1979)
Raw data for intervening years -
World Bank World Tables
UNESCO Statistical Yearbook
Security Rights 5 Point Political Terror Scale Gibney and Dalton (1996)
Poe and Tate (1994)
Global Integration New Globalization Index
- Mem. in IMF, World Bank , GATT
- Trade openness
   (exports+imports/GNP)
- Financial Openness
Political Handbook of the World
World Bank World Tables
IMF Exchange Rate Arrangements &
Financial Restrictions: Annual Report
Cold War Dummy Variable
("1" for years prior to 1990,
"0" for 1990 and beyond)
N/A
Economic Freedom 17 Point Economic Freedom Index Gwartney, et al. (1996), Fraser Inst.
Inequality GINI Index Deininger & Squire (1996)
Democracy Polity III - 11 point scale Jaggers and Gurr (1995)
Polity III Dataset (U of Maryland)
Control Variable     ----------------------------------------   -----------------------------------------
Economic Develop. GNP/Per Capita World Bank World Tables
Penn World Tables
Economic Growth % growth in GNP/Per Capita World Bank World Tables
Penn World Tables
International War >1000 total battle deaths
>100 deaths in 1 country
>1000 military personnel involved
Small & Singer (1982)
Poe and Tate (1994)
Sivard (1991)  Brogan (1990)
Civil War Government directly involved
Effective resistance
Small & Singer (1982)
Poe and Tate (1994)
Population Natural log of total national population World Bank World Tables
Population Growth Ave. % increase in national population World Bank World Tables
Poe and Tate (1994)
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SUBSISTENCE MODELS ESTIMATED WITH SUBSISTENCE RIGHTS t-1
AND
SECURITY MODELS ESTIMATED WITHOUT SECURITY RIGHTS t-1
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Table 5.36 General Subsistence Rights Model
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 3.26*** .66 4.90
Subsistence Rights t-1 .97*** .007 135.81
Bretton Woods -.39 .20 -1.89
Trade Openness .002 .001 1.53
Financial Openness -.06 .05 -1.077
Coldwar .06 .16 .45
Democracy .01 .02 .45
Economic Development .00002 .00001 1.60
Economic Growth .006 .008 .76
International War -.27 .27 -.97
Civil War -.15 .24 -.65
Population Growth .01 .01 .97
Number of Cases 1002 Adjusted R2 .98
χ2 107965.91*** F 6506.95***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.37 General Subsistence Rights Model (with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 1.71* 1.02 1.67
Subsistence Rights t-1 .99*** .01 90.40
Bretton Woods -.09 .12 -.78
Trade Openness -.0008 .0007 -1.11
Financial Openness .03 .03 .87
Coldwar -.26 .17 -1.48
Inequality -.006 .01 -.60
Democracy -.02 .03 -.78
Economic Development -.000002 .00001 -.19
Economic Growth -.01* .006 -1.83
International War -.78*** .20 -3.74
Civil War .56* .33 1.67
Population Growth .14 .09 1.61
Number of Cases 176 Adjusted R2 .99
χ2 50539.47*** F 3524.37***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.38 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 20.39*** 3.58 5.69
Subsistence Rights t-1 .79*** .03 20.28
Bretton Woods .24 .18 1.27
Trade Openness .001 .001 .90
Financial Openness -.32 .02 -1.53
Coldwar .02 .10 .21
Democracy -.24** .10 -2.39
Economic Development .00002** .00001 2.71
Economic Growth .0004 .004 .11
International War -.17 .12 -1.36
Civil War (Dropped)
Population Growth .08 .10 .79
Number of Cases 196 Adjusted R2 .79
χ2 1202.73 *** F 78.88***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.39 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 37.90*** 7.11 5.32
Subsistence Rights t-1 .67*** .07 8.62
Bretton Woods (dropped)
Trade Openness .004 .003 1.31
Financial Openness .02 .04 .51
Coldwar (dropped)
Economic Freedom -.03 .07 -.44
Democracy -.84** .27 -3.03
Economic Development .00002 .00003 .72
Economic Growth .03 .02 1.10
International War -.56 .46 -1.22
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .05 .21 .25
Number of Cases 16 Adjusted R2 .87
χ2 3674.12*** F 22.54***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.40 General Subsistence Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 16.05** 5.8 2.76
Subsistence Rights t-1 .84*** .058 14.44
Bretton Woods (dropped)
Trade Openness -.00007 .002 -.02
Financial Openness -.005 .03 -.16
Coldwar .39 .24 .16
Inequality -.005 .02 -.02
Democracy -.23 .36 -.64
Economic Development .00002 .00001 1.60
Economic Growth -.005 .006 -.84
International War -.25 .27 -.93
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .01 .11 .17
Number of Cases 95 Adjusted R2 .73
χ2 411.31*** F 25.52***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.41 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 3.45*** .72 4.78
Subsistence Rights t-1 .97*** .007 130.48
Bretton Woods -.39* .20 -1.93
Trade Openness .0005 .001 .31
Financial Openness -.07 .07 -.90
Coldwar .06 .19 .34
Democracy .02 .03 .84
Economic Development .0001** .00004 2.47
Economic Growth .006 .009 .66
International War -.36 .35 -1.04
Civil War -.14 .23 -.63
Population Growth .008 .01 .55
Number of Cases 806 Adjusted R2 .97
χ2 46702.55*** F 3486.78***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.42 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Economic Freedom)




Subsistence Rights t-1 .90*** .03 26.175
Bretton Woods -.20 .67 -.31
Trade Openness .03* .01 2.07
Financial Openness -.94 .66 -1.42
Coldwar 4.08* 2.19 1.86
Economic Freedom .62 .51 1.22
Democracy .05 .10 .49
Economic Development -.00009 .0002 -.40
Economic Growth .03 .03 .88
International War -1.01 1.10 -.91
Civil War 1.31 1.74 .75
Population Growth .13*** .04 3.45
Number of Cases 47 Adjusted R2 .97
χ2 67269.93*** F 398.78***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.43 General Subsistence Rights Model (Non-OECD with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 1.34 1.38 .97
Subsistence Rights t-1 .99*** .01 72.82
Bretton Woods -.10 .14 -.73
Trade Openness .0005 .002 .29
Financial Openness .13 .12 1.07
Coldwar -.19 .29 -.65
Inequality -.004 .01 -.36
Democracy -.02 .03 -.67
Economic Development -.00008 .00008 -1.03
Economic Growth -.01* .01 -1.79
International War -1.42*** .43 -3.23
Civil War .70** .34 2.47
Population Growth .17 .12 1.34
Number of Cases 90 Adjusted R2 .99
χ2 26094.39*** F 1131.51
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.44 General Security Rights Model
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant .1.97*** .19 10.19
Bretton Woods .15** .06 2.50
Trade Openness .004*** .0009 5.22
Financial Openness .03* .01 2.26
Coldwar .33*** .06 5.25
Democracy .06*** .009 7.76
Economic Development .00005*** .000005 9.65
Economic Growth .0006 .001 .39
International War -.29** .10 -2.87
Civil War -.97*** .12 -8.12
Population Growth -.007 .005 -1.34
Number of Cases 1088 Adjusted R2 .51
χ2 715.02*** F 117.14
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.45 General Security Rights Model (with Economic Freedom)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 2.53*** .40 6.21
Bretton Woods .15 .12 1.24
Trade Openness .005*** .001 3.33
Financial Openness .01 .03 .32
Coldwar .33*** .10 3.20
Economic Freedom -.12** .05 -2.42
Democracy .76*** .01 4.44
Economic Development .00007*** .00001 6.74
Economic Growth -.002 .003 -.64
International War -.39* .19 -2.06
Civil War -1.16*** .31 -3.76
Population Growth -.01 .009 -1.21
Number of Cases 193 Adjusted R2 .52
χ2 248.12*** F 20.88
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.46 General Security Rights Model (with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant 2.71*** .42 6.35
Bretton Woods .01 .09 .19
Trade Openness .004** .001 2.75
Financial Openness .05* .02 2.26
Coldwar .35** .11 3.05
Inequality -.01* .01 -1.84
Democracy .10*** .02 4.11
Economic Development .00005*** .00001 4.93
Economic Growth -.006* .003 -1.79
International War .01 .15 .08
Civil War -1.46*** .27 -5.25
Population Growth .05 .07 .79
Number of Cases 198 Adjusted R2 .64
χ2 327.80*** F 37.67
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
Table 5.47 General Security Rights Model (OECD)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant -.33 1.14 -.29
Bretton Woods .26 .19 1.35
Trade Openness .004 .001 3.21
Financial Openness -.001 .01 -.10
Coldwar .01 .08 .19
Democracy .39 .10 3.88
Economic Development .000005 .00008 .78
Economic Growth -.006 .003 -2.27
International War .03 .13 .25
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .17 .06 2.48
Number of Cases 211 Adjusted R2 .35
χ2 51.91*** F 13.81***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
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Table 5.48 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Economic Freedom)




Bretton Woods -1.58*** .50 -3.13
Trade Openness .005 .006 .96
Financial Openness .01 .02 .71
Coldwar -.19 .25 -.75
Economic Freedom -.009 .03 -.25
Democracy .94*** .12 7.58
Economic Development -.00001 .00001 -.57
Economic Growth .007 .005 1.51
International War -.09 .12 -.76
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .12 .17 .72
Number of Cases 46 Adjusted R2 .45
χ2 465.11*** F 4.84****
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
  Table 5.49 General Security Rights Model (OECD with Inequality)
Independent Variable Coefficient Panel Corrected
Standard Errors
z
Constant -3.00 1.03 -2.89
Bretton Woods (dropped)
Trade Openness .004 .001 2.57
Financial Openness -.002 .01 -.12
Coldwar .006 .13 .04
Inequality .002 .01 .12
Democracy .72 .16 4.45
Economic Development .000009 .00001 .93
Economic Growth -.003 .003 -.93
International War -.09 .21 -.43
Civil War (dropped)
Population Growth .26 .07 3.34
Number of Cases 103 Adjusted R2 .44
χ2 196.54*** F 9.29***
Probability > χ2 0.00 Probability > F 0.00
* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001
200
REFERENCES
--------. 1968. “Montreal Statement of the Assembly for Human Rights, March 22-27,
1968.” Journal of the International Commission of Jurists  9, 94-95.
--------. 1973. Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments of the United
Nations. New York: United Nations.
--------. 1975. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
General Assembly Resolution 3452, GAOR Supplement 34, UN Document
A/100034.
--------. 1984. Torture in the Eighties. London: Amnesty International Publications.
--------. 1986. Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Paris: UNESCO.
Adleman, Irma and Cynthia Morris. 1973. Economic Growth and Social Equity in
Developing Countries. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Ahluwalia, Montek. 1974. "Income Inequality: Some Dimension of the Problem." In
Redistribution with Growth., ed. Hollis Chenery et al. London: Oxford University
Press.
Alesina, Alberto, Bittorio Gilli, and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti. 1994. "The Political
Economy of Capital Controls." In Capital Mobility: The Impact on Consumption,
Investment, and Growth, ed. Leonardo Leidermand and Assaf Razin. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Almond, Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1966. Comparative Politics: A
Developmental Approach. Boston: Little Brown.
Arat, Zehra. 1984. "The Viability of Political Democracy in Developing Countries." Ph.D.
Dissertation. Binghamton: State University of New York at Binghamton.
Arat, Zehra. 1988. "Can Democracy Survive Where There is a Gap Between Political and
Economic Rights?" In Human Rights: Theory and Measurement, ed. David Louis
Cingranelli . New York: St. Martin's Press.
Arat, Zehra. 1991. Democracy and Human Rights in Developing Countries. Boulder:
Lynne Rienner.
Åslund, Anders. 1991. Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
201
Axelrod, Robert and Robert Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy." In
Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth Oye. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. 1984. New York: Basic Books.
Barsh, Russell Lawrence. 1993. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology
and Purpose." Human Rights Quarterly 15: 87-121.
Bay, Christian. 1982. "Self-Respect as a Human Right: Thoughts on the Dialectics of
Wants and Needs in the Struggle for Human Community." Human Rights
Quarterly 4: 53-75.
Bayless, Mark and Susan Bayless. 1982. "Current Quality of Life Indicators: Some
Theoretical and Methodological Concerns." American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 41: 421-437.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan Katz. 1995. “What to Do (and not to do) With Time-Series
Cross-Section Data.” American Political Science Review  89: 634-647.
Beck, Nathaniel and Jonathan Katz. 1996. “Nuisance vs. Substance: Specifying and
Estimating Time-Series-Cross-Section Models.” Political Analysis  6, 1-36.
Beetham, David. 1995. "What Future for Economic and Social Rights?" In Politics and
Human Rights, ed. David Beetham. Oxford: Blackewell Publishers.
Belsey, D.A., E. Kuh and R.E. Welsch. 1980. Regression Diagnostics. New York: John
Wiley & Sons.
Berger, Peter L. 1986. The Capitalist Revolution: Fifty Propositions about Prosperity,
Equality, and Liberty. New York: Basic Books.
Berry, Albert. 1984. "Income Distribution Trends in Labor Surplus Economies." In
Comparative Development Perspectives., ed. Gustav Ranis et al. Boulder:
Westview.
Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 1994. “Impact of Human Rights on U.S. Foreign Assistance to
Latin America.” International Interactions 19: 339-358.
Blasi, Gerald J. and David Louis Cingranelli. 1996. "Do Constitutions and Institutions
Help Protect Human Rights?" In Human Rights and Developing Countries, ed.
David Cingranelli. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
Block, Walter, ed. 1991. Economic Freedom: Toward a Theory of Measurement.
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
202
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1979. "Political Democracy and the Timing of Development."
American Sociological Review 44: 572-587.
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1990. "Political Democracy: Conceptual and Measurement Traps."
Studies in Comparative International Development  25: 7-24.
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1992. "Political Rights and Political Liberties in Nations: An
Evaluation of Human Rights Measures: 1950-1984." In Human Rights and
Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, ed. Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P.
Claude. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bollen, Kenneth A. 1993. "Liberal Democracy: Validity and Method Factors in Cross-
National Measures." American Journal of Political Science 37: 1207-30.
Bollen, Kenneth A. and Robert W. Jackman. 1995. "Income Inequality and Democracy
Revisited: Comment on Muller." American Sociological Review  60: 983-989.
Bollen, Kenneth. 1980. "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy."
American Sociological Review  45: 370-390.
Bollen, Kenneth. 1980. "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy."
American Sociological Review  45: 370-390.
Brada, Josef C. 1993. " The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far?
How Fast?" Post-Soviet Affairs  9: 87-110.
Brenkert, George. 1992. "Can We Afford International Human Rights?" Journal of
Business Ethics  1: 515-521.
Brogan, Patrick. 1990. The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World
Conflict Since 1945. New York: Vintage Books.
Burkett, John P. 1985. "Systemic Influences on the Physical Quality of Life: A Bayesian
Analysis of Cross-Sectional Data." Journal of Comparative Economics  9: 145-
163.
Burkhart, Ross E. and Michael S. Lewis-Beck. 1994. "Comparative Democracy: The
Economic Development Thesis." American Political Science Review  88: 903-910.
Carleton, David and Michael Stohl. 1987. "The Role of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign
Assistance Policy." American Journal of Political Science 31: 1002-18.
Chenery, Hollis and Moises Syrquin. 1975. Patterns of Development, 1950-1970.
London: Oxford University Press.
203
Chenery, Hollis et al. 1974. Redistribution with Growth. London: Oxford University
Press.
Christopher, Warren. 1993. “Democracy and Human Rights: Where America Stands.” 4
U.S. Department of State Dispatch 441, 442.
Cingranelli, David L. and David L. Richards. 1999. “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and
Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights.” Forthcoming,
International Studies Quarterly.
Cingranelli, David L. and Thomas Pasquarello. 1985. "Human Rights Practices and the
U.S. Distribution of Foreign Aid to Latin American Countries." American Journal
of Political Science 29: 539-63.
Clark, Ian. 1997. Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the
Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Claude, Richard Pierre and Burns H. Weston. 1992. Human Rights in the World
Community. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
Claude, Richard Pierre. 1992. "The Case of Joelito Filártiga in the Courts." In Human
Rights in the World Community, ed. Richard Pierre Claude and Burns H. Weston.
Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
Coate, Robert and Jerel Rosati. 1988. "Human Needs in World Society." In The Power of
Human Needs in World Society, ed. Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
Colombatto, Enrico. 1991. "A Comment on Economic Growth and Social Development."
World Development  19: 1441-1444.
Cook, R. D. and S. Weisberg. 1983. “Diagnostics for Heteroscedasticity in Regression.”
Biometrika 70: 1-10.
Coppedge, Michael and Wolfgang Reinicke. 1990. "Measuring Polyarchy." Studies in
Comparative International Development  25: 51-72.
Cranston, Maurice. 1973. What are Human Rights? New York: Taplinger Publishing
Company.
Cutright, Phillips. 1963. "National Political Development: Its Measures and Analysis."
American Sociological Review  28: 253-264.
Dahl, Robert A. 1956. A Preface to Democratic Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
204
Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahl, Robert. A. 1985. A Preface to Economic Democracy. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Davenport, Christian.  1995a.  “Assessing the MilitaryÕs Influence on Political
Repression,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 23:119-144.
Davenport, Christian.  1995b.  "Multi-Dimensional Threat Perception and State
Repression: An Inquiry Into Why States Apply Negative Sanctions." American
Journal of Political Science 39: 683-713.
Davenport, Christian.  1996a.  “The Weight of the Past: Exploring Lagged Determinants
of Political Repression.” Political Research Quarterly 49:377-403.
Davenport, Christian.  1996b.  “Constitutional Promises and Repressive Reality: A Cross-
National Time Series Investigation of Why Political and Civil Liberties are
Suppressed.” Journal of Politics  58:627-654.
Davenport, Christian.  1997.  Regime Change and Political Repression: Direction,
Coherence and Persistence. unpublished manuscript.
Davis, Dennis and Michael Ward. 19990. "They Dance Alone: Deaths and the
Disappeared in Contemporary Chile." Journal of Conflict Resolution  34: 449-
475.
Deininger, Klaus and Lyn Squire. 1996. "Measuring Income Inequality: A New Database."
World Bank. Typescript.
Diamond, Larry. 1992. "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered." In
Reexamining Democracy, e. G. Marks and Larry Diamond. Newbury Park,
California: Sage.
Diemer, Alwin. 1986. "The 1948 Declaration: An Analysis of Meanings." In Philosophical
Foundations of Human Rights. Geneva: United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization.
Dinstein, Yoram. 1981. "The Right to Life, Physical Integrity, and Liberty." In The
International Bill of Rights., ed. Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Dixon, William. 1984. "Trade Concentration, Economic Growth, and the Provision of
Basic Human Needs." Social Science Quarterly 65: 761-764.
205
Dixon, William. 1994. "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict."
American Political Science Review  88: 15-32. Dixon. William J. and Bruce E.
Moon. 1987. "The Military Burden and Basic Human Needs." Journal of Conflict
Resolution  30: 660-684.
Donnelly, Jack and Rhoda Howard. 1988. "Assessing National Human Rights
Performance: A Theoretical Framework." Human Rights Quarterly  10: 214-248.
Donnelly, Jack. 1984. “Human Rights and Development: Complementary or Competing
Concerns?” World Politics  36:255-83.
Donnelly, Jack. 1986. "International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis." International
Organization 40: 599-642.
Donnelly, Jack. 1989. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press.
Donnelly, Jack. 1992. "Human Rights in the New World Order." World Policy Journal  9:
249-277.
Donnelly, Jack. 1994. "Post-Cold War Reflections on the Study of International Human
Rights,” Ethics and International Affairs  8: 97-113.
Douglas, W.A. 1972. Developing Democracy. Washington: Heldref Publications.
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and
Row Publishers.
Drenowski, Jan and Wolf Scott. 1966. "The Level of Living Index." United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development, Report No. 4.
Dromm, Keith Charles. 1998. “Cultural Relativism and Human Rights.” Presented at the
Hinman Symposium on Democratization and Human Rights, Binghamton
University, September 25-26, 1998.
Easton, Stephen. and Michael Walker. 1992. Rating Global Economic Freedom.
Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
Ebstein, Gerald A. and Juliet B. Schor. 1992. "Structural Determinants and Economic
Effects of Capital Controls." In Financial Openness and National Autonomy, ed.
T. Banuri and J. Schor. Oxford: Clarendon.
Economist, The. 1990. The Economist Book of Vital World Statistics. New York:
Random House.
206
Ellina, Maro and Will H. Moore.  1992 “Discrimination and Political Violence: A Cross-
National Study with Two Time Periods.” The Western Political Quarterly  43:
267-78.
Enke, Stephen. 1963. Economics for Development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Evans. Tony. 1996. U.S. Hegemony and the Project of Universal Human Rights. New
York: St. Martin's Press.
Fein, Helen. 1995. "More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy
in the World, 1987." Human Rights Quarterly  17: 170-191.
Fields, Gary. 1989. A Compendium of Data on Inequality and Poverty for the Developing
World. Cornell: Cornell University Press.
Forsythe, David P. 1989. Human Rights and Development. New York: St. Martin's Press.
Forsythe, David P. 1989. Human Rights and World Politics. Lincoln, Nebraska:
University of Nebraska Press.
Forsythe, David P. 1993. Human Rights and Peace: International and National
Dimensions. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press.
Fraser, Elvis. 1994 "Reconciling Conceptual and Measurement Problems in the
Comparative Study of Human Rights." International Journal of Comparative
Sociology  35: 1-18.
Friedlander, Robert A. 1986. "The Implausible Dream: International Law, State Violence,
and State Terrorism." In Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research, ed. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press.
Friedman, Milton and Rose Friedman. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Galtung, Johan and Anders Helge Wirak. 1976. “Human Needs, Human Rights and the
Theories of Development.” In Indicators of Social and Economic Change and
Their Applications, Reports and Papers in Social Science No. 37. Paris:
UNESCO.
Galtung, Johan and Anders Helge Wirak. 1977. “Human Needs and Human Rights: A
Theoretical Approach.” Bulletin of Peace Proposals 8, 251-258.
Galtung, John. 1988. "International Development in Human Perspective." In The Power of
Human Needs in World Society, ed. Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers.
207
Gartner, Scott Sigmund and Patrick M. Regan. 1996. "Threat and Repression: The Non-
Linear Relationship Between Government and Opposition Violence." Journal of
Peace Research  33: 273-287.
Gassiorowski, Mark. 1993, The Political Regime Change Dataset. Baton Rouge:
Louisiana Population Data Center, Louisiana State University.
Gastil, Raymond. 1990. "The Comparative Survey of Freedom: Experiences and
Suggestions." Studies in Comparative International  Development  25: 25-50.
Gewirth, Alan. 1982. Human Rights. Chicago: University of Chicago.
Gibney, Mark and Matthew Dalton. 1996. "The Political Terror Scale." In Human Rights
and Developing Countries, ed. David Cingranelli. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI
Press.
Gibney, Mark and Michael Stohl. 1988. "Human Rights and U.S. Refugee Policy," In
Open Borders? Closed Societies?: The Ethical and Political Issues, ed. Mark
Gibney. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Gibney, Mark, Vanessa Dalton and Marc Vockell. 1992. "U.S. Refugee Policy: A Human
Rights Analysis Update." Journal of Refugee Studies  5: 33-46.
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Gilpin, Robert. 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Goldstein, Joshua. 1985. "Basic Human Needs: The Plateau Curve." World Development
13: 595-609.
Goldstein, Robert J. 1992. "Limitations of Quantitative Data." In Human Rights and
Statistics: Getting  the Record Straight., ed. Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P.
Claude. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Granato, Jim. 1991. “ An Agenda for Econometric Model Building.” Political Analysis 3:
123-154.
Grenier, C. 1984. “An Empirical Reassessment of the Inequality-development
Relationship: An International Comparative Analysis.” International Journal of
Contemporary Sociology  21: 83-98.
Grieco, Joseph M. Cooperation Among Nations. 1990. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
208
Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers and Will Moore. 1990. “The Transformation of the
Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power Since
1800.” Studies in Comparative International Development 25(1):73-108.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1968. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using
New Indices." American Political Science Review 62: 1104-1124.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1974. “Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971.”
American Political Science Review 68(4):1482-1504.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1986. "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: A
Theoretical Analysis." In Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for
Research, ed. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood
Press.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. Minorities at Risk: A Global View of  Ethnopolitical Conflicts.
Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
Gurr, Ted Robert and Barbara Harff. 1992. "The Rights of Collectives: Principles in
Measuring the Human Rights Status of Communal and Political Groups." In
Human Rights and Statistics: Getting the Record Straight, ed. Thomas B. Jabine
and Richard P. Claude. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Gurtov, Mel. 1991. Global Politics in the Human Interest. Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers
Gwartney, James, Robert Lawson and Walter Block. 1997. Economic Freedom of the
World: 1975-1995. Vancouver: The Fraser Institute.
Hallerberg, Mark and William Roberts Clark. 1997. "How Should Political Scientists
Measure Capital Mobility? A Review." Presented at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.
Halliday, Fred. 1995. "Relativism and Universalism in Human Rights." In Politics and
Human Rights, ed. David Beetham. Oxford: Blackewell Publishers.
Hamelink, Cees J. 1994. The Politics of World Communication: A Human Rights
Perspective. London: Sage Publications.
Hamilton, Lawrence C. 1998. Statistics With Stata 5. Pacific Grove, CA: Duxbury Press.
Harrelson-Stephens and Rhonda Callaway. 1998. “Are Human Rights for Sale?
Untangling the Relationship Between Human Rights and Trade.” Presented at the
Hinman Symposium on Democratization and Human Rights, September 26, 1998.
209
Hausman, J. A. 1978. “Specification Tests in Econometrics.” Econometrica  46: 1251-
1271.
Heinisch, Reinhard. 1994. "The Status of Basic Human Rights in the World: Political and
Economic Explanations of Cross-national Differences in Government Basic Human
Rights Performance and Effort." Ph.D. Diss. Michigan State University.
Henderson, Conway. 1979. "Multinational Corporations and Human Rights in Developing
States." World Affairs  14, 2: 17-30.
Henderson, Conway. 1991. "Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression."
Journal of Conflict Resolution 35: 120-142.
Henderson, Conway. 1993. "Population Pressures and Political Repression." Social
Science Quarterly 74: 322-333.
Hendry, David F. 1979. “Predictive Failure and Econometric Modeling in
Macroeconomics: the Transactions Demand for Money.” In Modelling the
Economy, ed. P. Ormerod. London: Heinemann.
Hendry, David F. 1983. “Econometric Modelling: the Consumption Function in
Retrospect.” Scottish Journal of Political Economy  30: 193-220.
Hendry, David F. 1985. “Econometric Methodology.” Presented to the Econometric
Society Frith World Congress, MIT, Boston, MA.
Henkin, Louis, ed. 1981. The International Bill of Rights. New York: Columbia
University Press.
Herzog, Roman.  1997. Deutschland Magazine on Politics, Culture, Business and
Science no. 3, June 1997:40-45.
Heston, Alan, and Robert Summers.  1991.  “The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An
Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 106(2):  327-368.
Heston, Alan, and Robert Summers.  1994.  The Penn World Table (Mark 5.6).
Hicks, Norman and Paul Streeten. 1979. "Indicators of Development: The Search for a
Basic Needs Yardstick." World Development  7: 567-580.
Hicks, Norman. 1980. "Is There a Trade-off Between Growth and Basic Needs?" Finance
and Development  17: 17-20.
210
Hofferbert, Richard J. and David Louis Cingranelli. 1996. "Democratic Institutions and
Respect for Human Rights." In Human Rights and Developing Countries, ed.
David Cingranelli. Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
Hofrenning, Daniel. 1991. “Human Rights and Foreign Aid: A Comparison of the Reagan
and Carter Administrations.” American Politics Quarterly 18:514-26.
Hogan, Michael J., ed. 1992. The End of the Cold War: Its Meaning and Implications.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Holsti, K.J. The Dividing Discipline. Boston: Allen and Unwin.
Howard, Rhoda. 1983. “The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority
over Civil and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa.” Human
Rights Quarterly 5, 467-490.
Howard, Rhoda. 1984. “Women’s Rights in English-Speaking Sub-Saharan Africa.” In
Human Rights and Development in Africa, ed. Claude E. Welch and Ronald I.
Meltzer.
Howard, Rhoda. 1995. "Human Rights and the Search for Community." Journal of Peace
Research  32: 1-8.
Hsaio, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Humphrey, John and Richard Tuck. 1986. "The International Bill of Rights." In
Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights. Geneva: United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
Humphrey, John. 1979. “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its History, Impact
and Juridical Character.” In Human Rights Thirty Years After the Universal
Declaration, ed. B.G. Rampcharan. The Hague: Nijhoff.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press.
Innes, Judith Eleanor. 1992.  "Human Rights Reporting as a Policy Tool: An Examination
of the State Department Country Reports."  In Human Rights and Statistics:
Getting the Record Straight, ed. Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude.
Philadelphia:  University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 235-257.
Isenman, Paul. 1980. "Basic Needs: The Case of Sri Lanka." World Development  18:
237-58.
Iwe, Nwachukwuike S.S. 1986. The History and Contents of Human Rights. New York:
Peter Lang Publishing.
211
Jaggers, Keith and Ted Robert Gurr. 1995. "Tracking Democracy's Third Wave with the
Polity III Data." Journal of Peace Research  32: 469-482.
Jain, Shail. 1975. "Size Distribution of Income: A Compilation of Data." Washington: The
World Bank.
Johnson, Bryan T. and Thomas P. Sheehy. 1996 Index of Economic Freedom.
Washington: Heritage Foundation.
Johnson, M. Glen. 1988. “Human Rights in Divergent Conceptual Settings.” In Human
Rights: Theory and Measurement, ed. David Cingranelli. New York. St. Martin’s
Press.
Jones, R.J. Barry. 1984. "The Definition and Identification of Interdependence." In
Interdependence on Trial, ed. R.J. Barry Jones and Peter Willetts. New York: St.
Martin's Press.
Jones, Ronald W. and Alan C. Stockman. 1992. "On the Concept of Economic Freedom."
In Rating Global Economic Freedom, ed. Stephen T. Easton and Michael A.
Walker. Vancouver: Fraser Institute.
Keith, Linda and Steven C. Poe. 1996. “The United States, the IMF and Human Rights: A
Policy Relevant Approach.” Paper presented at the Hendricks Symposium at
Lincoln, Nebraska, September, 1996.
Kennedy, Peter. 1994. A Guide to Econometrics. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Keohane, Robert and Helen Milner. 1996. Internationalization and Domestic Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keohane, Robert and Joseph Nye. 1989. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in
Transition. Boston: Little, Brown.
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy. 1984. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Keohane, Robert O. Neorealism and its Critics. 1986. New York: Columbia University
Press.
King, John.  1997. “Democracy, Opposition, Economic Development, and Political
Repression: Unobserved Statistical Interactions Across Forty Eight Countries and
Thirty Four Years.”  Presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political
Science Association, Chicago.
Kmenta, Jan. 1986. Elements of Econometrics. 2
nd
 Edition. New York: Macmillan.
212
Kohli, A. 1986. “Examining the ÔReexamination of Inequality in the Third World.”
Comparative Political Studies  19 (2): 269-74.
Köves, András. 1992. Central and East European Economies in Transition. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Krasner, Stephen, ed. 1983. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Kurian, George T. 1984, 1991, and 1997. The New Book of World Rankings. New York:
Facts on File.
Kuznets, S. 1955. "Economic Growth and Income Inequality." American Economic
Review  45: 1-28.
Kyi, Aung San Suu.  1995.  “Transcending the Clash of Cultures: Freedom, Development
and Human Worth,” Journal of Democracy  6: 11-19.
Lake, David. 1988. Power, Protection, and Free Trade. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Larson, David and Walton Wilford. 1979. "The Physical Quality of Life Index: A Useful
Social Indicator?" World Development  7: 581-584.
Leblang, David. 1996. "Property Rights, Democracy, and Economic Growth." Political
Research Quarterly  49: 5-25.
Lecaillon, Jacques, Felix Paukert, Christian Morisson and Dimitri Germidis. 1984. Income
Distribution and Economic Development: An Analytical Survey. Geneva:
International Labor Office.
Lenski, Gerhard. 1966. Power and Privilege. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lillich, Richard. "The Constitution and International Human Rights." American Journal of
International Law  83: 851-872.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review 53:
69-105.
Lipset, Seymour M. 1963. Political Man. Garden City: Anchor Books.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1994. "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited."
American Sociological Review  59: 1-22.
Locke, John. 1967. Two Treatises of Government  (Peter Laslett, ed.). Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
213
Lopez, George A. and Michael Stohl. 1992. "Problems of Concept and  Measurement in
the Study of Human Rights." In Human Rights and Statistics: Getting  the Record
Straight, ed. Thomas B. Jabine and Richard P. Claude. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Machan, Tibor. 1975. Human Rights and Human Liberties. Chicago: Nelson Hall.
Maddala, G.S. 1997. “Recent Developments in Dynamic Econometric Modeling: A
Personal Viewpoint.” Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political
Methodology Group, Columbus, Ohio.
Mason, David T. and Dale A. Krane. 1989. "The Political Economy of Death Squads:
Toward a Theory of the Impact of State-Sanctioned Terror." International Studies
Quarterly  33: 175-198.
Maxfield, Sylvia. 1997. "Understanding the Political Implications of Financial
Internationalization in Emerging Market Countries." Presented at the annual
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington.
Mazrui, Ali A. 1998. “Human Rights and Cross-Cultural Moral Judgements: The Case of
Islam and the West.” Presented at the Hinman Symposium on Democratization and
Human Rights, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY, September 25-26, 1998.
McCloskey, Donald N. 1986. “Why Economic Historians Should Stop Relying on
Statistical Tests of Significance, and Lead Economists and Historians Into the
Promised Land.” Newsletter of the Cliometrics Society 2: 5-7.
McCormick, James M. and Neil J. Mitchell. 1988. "Is U.S. Aid Really Linked to Human
Rights in Latin America?" American Journal of  Political Science 32: 231-239.
McCormick, James M. and Neil J. Mitchell. 1989. “Human Rights and Foreign Assistance:
An Update. Social Science Quarterly  70: 969-79.
McCormick, James M. and Neil J. Mitchell. 1997. “Human Rights Violations, Umbrella
Concepts, and Empirical Analysis.” World Politics  49: 510-25.
McGranahan, D.V., C. Richard-Proust, N.V. Sovani, and M. Subramanian. 1972.
Contents and Measurement of Socio-Economic Development. New York: Praeger.
McKinlay, R.D. and A.S. Cohen. 1975. "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and
Economic Performance of Military and Civilian Regimes." Comparative Politics
8:1-30.
McKinlay, R.D. and A.S. Cohen. 1976. "Performance and Instability in Military and
Nonmilitary Regimes." American Political Science  Review 70: 850-64.
214
McNitt, Andrew D. 1986. "Measuring Human Rights: Problems and Possibilities." Policy
Studies Journal  15: 71-83.
McNitt, Andrew D. 1988. “Democracy and Economic Rights in the Third World.” In
Human Rights Theory and Measurement, ed. David Louis Cingranelli. New York:
St. MartinÕs Press.
Mendus, Susan. 1995. "Human Rights in Political Theory." In Politics and Human Rights,
ed. David Beetham. Oxford: Blackewell Publishers.
Merrell, Peter. 1993. "What is Shock Therapy? What Did it do in Poland and Russia?"
Post-Soviet Affairs  9:  111-140.
Messick, Richard E. 1996. World Survey of Economic Freedom, 1995-1996. New York:
Freedom House.
Meyer, William H. 1996. "Human Rights and MNCs: Theory Versus Quantitative
Analysis." Human Rights Quarterly  18: 368-400.
Midgley, J. 1987. “Need and Deprivation in the Third World: A Profile.” In Comparative
Social Policy and the Third World, ed. S. MacPherson and J. Midgley. New York:
St. Martin’s Press.
Milner, Wesley T. 1995. "Human Rights Violations: An Examination of Abuse World-
Wide." Presented at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science
Association, Dallas.
Milner, Wesley T. 1996. "Open for Business? A World-Wide Investigation of Capital
Controls, Exchange Rate Regimes and Democracy." Presented at the annual
meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego.
Milner, Wesley T. 1997. "Economic Freedom, Democracy and Basic Human Rights."
Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto.
Milner, Wesley T., Steven C. Poe and David Leblang. 1997. "Security Rights, Subsistence
Rights and Liberties: A Theoretical Survey of the Empirical Landscape."
Forthcoming, Human Rights Quarterly.
Mitchell, Neil J. and James M. McCormick. 1988. "Economic and Political Explanations
of Human Rights Violations." World Politics  40: 476-98.
Mittelman, James H. 1996. "The Dynamics of Globalization." In Globalization: Critical
Reflections, ed. James H. Mittelman. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Mitttelman, James H.  and Donald Will. 1987. "The International Monetary Fund, State
Autonomy and Human Rights." Africa Today  34: 49--68.
215
Moon, Bruce and William Dixon. 1985. "Politics, the State, and Basic Human Needs: A
Cross-National Study." American Journal of Political Science 29: 661-694.
Moon, Bruce E. and William J. Dixon. 1992. "Basic Needs and Growth-Welfare Trade-
Offs." International Studies Quarterly 36: 191-212.
Moon, Bruce. 1991. The Political Economy of Basic Human Needs. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press.
Moore, Ronnie Lindstrom and Valerie OÕRegan.  1996. “Land Reform, Political Violence
and the Economic Inequality--Political Conflict Nexus: A Longitudinal Analysis,”
International Interactions  21:335-363.
Morgenthau, Hans. 1967. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.
New York: Knopf.
Morris, Morris David. 1979. Measuring the Condition of the World's Poor: The Physical
Quality of Life Index. New York: Pergamon.
Morris, Morris David. 1996. “Measuring the Condition of the World’s Poor: The Physical
Quality of Life Index, 1960-1990.” Providence, RI: Thomas J. Watson, Jr.
Institute for International Studies Working Paper (#23/24).
Muller, Edward N. 1985. "Income Inequality, Regime Responsiveness, and Political
Violence." American Sociological Review 50: 47-61.
Muller, Edward N. 1988. "Democracy, Economic Development, and Income Inequality."
American Sociological Review  53: 50-68.
Muller, Edward N. 1995. "Economic Determinants of Democracy." American
Sociological Review  60: 966-982.
Murhpy, Craig. 1988. "Global Institutions and the Pursuit of Human Needs." In The
Power of Human Needs in World Society, ed. Roger Coate and Jerel Rosati .
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Narveson, Jan. 1992. "Democracy and Economic Rights." In Economic Rights, ed. Ellen
Paul, Fred Miller, Jr., and Jeffrey Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Newman, Barbara A. and Randall J. Thomson. 1989. "Economic Growth and Social
Development: A Longitudinal Analysis of Causal Priority." World Development
19: 461-471.
Newman, Barbara A. and Randall J. Thomson. 1991. "A Reply." World Development  19:
1445-1449.
216
Nicholson, Michael. 1986. "Conceptual Problems of Studying State Terrorism." In
Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research, ed. Michael
Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Nickel, James. 1987. Making Sense of Human Rights. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Novak, Michael. 1996. "More Liberty, Better Life." Freedom Review  27: 5-7.
Ogwang, Tomson. 1995. "The Economic Development-Income Inequality Nexus: Further
Evidence on Kuznets' U-Curve Hypothesis." American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 54: 217-229.
Okun, Arthur. 1975. Equality and Efficiency: The Big Trade-off. Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution.
Olson, Mancur. 1963. "Rapid Growth as a Destabilizing Force." Journal of Economic
History  23: 529-52.
Oye, Kenneth. Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Park, Hans S. 1987. "Correlates of Human Rights: Global Tendencies." Human Rights
Quarterly   9: 405-13.
Parks, Richard. 1967. “Efficient Estimation of a System of Regression Equations When
Disturbances are Both Serially and Contemporaneously Correlated.” Journal of
the American Statistical Association 62: 500-509.
Perry, Michael J. 1997. "Are Human Rights Universal? The Relativist Challenge and
Related Matters." Human Rights Quarterly  19: 461-509.
Poe, Steven C. 1990. "Human Rights and Foreign Aid: A Review of Quantitative
Research and Prescriptions for Future Research." Human Rights Quarterly  12:
499-512.
Poe, Steven C. 1991. "Human Rights and the Allocation of U.S. Military Assistance."
Journal of Peace Research  28:205-16.
Poe, Steven C. 1992. "Human Rights and Economic Aid under Ronald Reagan and Jimmy
Carter." American Journal of Political Science  36: 147-67.
Poe, Steven C. and C. Neal Tate. 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal
Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis." American  Political Science Review
88: 853-872.
217
Poe, Steven C. and Jim Meernik. 1995. “U.S. Military Aid in the Eighties: A Global
Analysis.” Journal of Peace Research  32: 399-411.
Poe, Steven C. and Rangsima Sirirangsi. 1993. "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid to
Africa." International Interactions  18: 1-14
Poe, Steven C. and Rangsima Sirirangsi. 1994. "Human Rights and U.S. Economic Aid
During the Reagan Years." Social Science  Quarterly 75: 494-504.
Poe, Steven C., Suzanne Pilatovsky, Brian Miller, and Ayo Ogundele. 1994. “Human
Rights and U.S. Foreign Aid Revisited: The Latin American Region.” Human
Rights Quarterly  16: 539-558.
Pollis, Adamanita. 1996. "Cultural Relativism Revisited: Through a State Prism." Human
Rights Quarterly  18: 316-344.
Pollis, Adamantia and Peter Schwab. 1979. "Human Rights: A Western Construct with
Limited Applicability." In Adamantia and Peter Schwab (eds.), Human Rights:
Cultural and Ideological Perspectives. New York: Praeger Publishers.
Pourgerami, Abbas. 1991. Development and Democracy in the Third World. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Prestowitz, Clyde. 1988. Trading Places. New York: Basic Books.
Quinn, Dennis. 1997. "The Correlates of Change in International Financial Regulation."
American Political Science Review  91: 531-551.
Rabi, Mohamed. 1992. The New World Order: A Perspective on the Post-Cold War Era.
New York: Vantage Press.
Ram, Rati. 1988. "Economic Development and Income Inequality: Further Evidence on
the U-Curve Hypothesis." World Development 16: 1371-1376.
Ramsey, J.B. 1969. “Tests for Specification Errors in Classical Linear Least Squares
Regression Analysis.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 31: 350-371.
Rao, M. J. Manohar and Ajit Karnik. 1994. "Economic Systems, Political Structures and
Human Rights." Bulletin of Economic Research  46: 147-165.
Regan. Patrick. 1995. "U.S. Economic Aid and Political Repression: An Empirical
Evaluation of U.S. Foreign Policy." Political Research Quarterly  48: 613-628.
Reisman, Michael W. 1990. "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law." American Journal of International Law  84: 866-876.
218
Richards, David.  1996. “Settling the Score: Elections and Governmental Violations of
Physical Integrity,” unpublished manuscript.
Rock, Michael T. 1993. "'Twenty-five Years of Economic Development' Revisited."
World Development  21: 1787-1801.
Rosh, Robert. 1986. "The Impact of Third World Defense Burdens on Basic Human
Needs." Policy Studies Journal  15: 135-146.
Rostow, Walt W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Russett, Bruce. 1972. “Inequality and Instability: The Relationship of Land and Tenure to
Politics.” In Anger, Violence, and Politics: Theories and Research, ed. I.K.
Feierabend, R.L. Feierabend and Ted Robert Gurr. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Said, Abdul Aziz. 1979. "Precept and Practice of Human Rigths in Islam." Universal
Human Rights  1: 63-79.
Sartorius, Rolf H. and Vernon W. Ruttan. 1989. "The Sources of the Basic Human Needs
Mandate." Journal of Developing Areas  23: 331-362.
Schoultz, Lars. 1980. "U.S. Foreign Policy to Human Rights in Latin America: A
Comparative Analysis of Two Administrations." In Global Human Rights: Public
Policies, Comparative Measures, and NGO Strategies, ed. Ved P. Nanda, James
R. Scarritt, and George W. Shepherd. Boulder: Westview Press.
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1950. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper
and Row.
Scully, Gerald. 1988. "The Institutional Framework and Economic Growth." Journal of
Political Economy  96: 652-62.
Shapiro, Ian. 1986. The Evolution of Rights in Liberal Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Shue, Henry. 1980. Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sieghart, Paul. 1983. The International Law of Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1991. World Military and Social Expenditures, 1991. 14th ed.
Washington: World Priorities.
219
Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. Resort to Arms: International  and Civil Wars,
1816- 1980. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Smith, Arthur K. Jr. 1969. "Socioeconomic Development and Political Democracy: A
Causal Analysis." Midwest Journal of Political Science  13: 95-125.
Snidel, Duncan. 1985. "Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for
International Cooperation and Regimes." American Political Science Review  79:
923-42.
Snidel, Duncan. 19991. "Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation."
American Political Science Review  85: 701-26.
Spalding, Nancy L. 1985. "Providing for Economic Human Rights: The Case of the Third
World." Policy Studies Journal  15: 123-134.
Spalding, Nancy L. 1996. "Structural Adjustment Policies and Economic Human Rights in
Africa." In Human Rights and Developing Countries, ed. David Cingranelli.
Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press.
Sterling, R.W. 1974. Macropolitics: International Relations in a Global Society. New
York: Knopf.
Stimson, James A. 1985. "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." American
Journal of Political Science 29: 914-47.
Stohl, Michael, and David Carleton. 1985. "The Foreign Policy of Human Rights:
Rhetoric and Reality from Jimmy Carter to Ronald Reagan." Human Rights
Quarterly 7: 205-229.
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton and Steven E. Johnson. 1984. "Human Rights and U.S.
Foreign Assistance: From Nixon to Carter." Journal of Peace Research  21: 215-
26.
Stohl, Michael, David Carleton, George Lopez, and Stephen Samuels. 1986. "State
Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement." Human Rights
Quarterly  8: 592-606.
Stohl, Michael. 1975. “War and Domestic Violence: The Case of the United States, 1890-
1970.” Journal of Conflict Resolution  19: 379-416.
Stohl, Michael. 1976. War and Domestic Political Violence: The American Capacity for
Repression and Reaction. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Streeten, Paul. 1981. First Things First: Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing
Countries. New York: Oxford University Press.
220
Strouse, James C. and Richard P. Claude.  1976.  “Empirical Comparative Rights
Research: Some Preliminary Tests of Development Hypotheses,” In Comparative
Human Rights, ed. Richard P. Claude. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Suzuki, Motoshi. 1994. "Economic Interdependence, Relative Gains, and International
Cooperation." International Studies Quarterly  38: 475-498.
Teson, Fernando R. 1992. “International Human Rights and Cultural Relativism.” In
Human Rights in the World Community, ed. Richard P. Claude and Burns H.
Weston. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Tolley, Howard. 1987. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Boulder: Westview
Press.
Trubek, David. 1984. "Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Third World: Human
Rights Law and Human Needs Programs." In Human Rights in International Law,
ed. Theodore Meron. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Turner, Philip. 1991. Capital Flows in the 1980s. BIS Economic Papers, no. 30. Basel,
Switzerland: Bank for International Settlements.
UNESCO. UN Demographic Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
UNESCO. UN Statistical Yearbook. New York: United Nations.
United Nations Department of Public Information. 1993. Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, 2 June
1993, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 157/24 (Part 1). New York: United Nations.
United Nations Department of Public Information. Various Years. Human Development
Report. New York: United Nations.
Vance, Cyrus R. 1977. "Human Rights Policy." Washington: Office of Media Services,
Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, PR 194.
Vanhanen, Tatu. 1990. The Process of Democratization: A Comparative Study of 147
States, 1980-88. New York: Crane Russak.
Vicencio, Villa- Charles. 1992. A Theology of Reconstruction: Nation Building and
Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vincent, R. J. 1986. Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Walker, Michael, ed.  1988. Freedom, Democracy and Economic Welfare. Vancouver:
The Fraser Institute.
221
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Ward, M.D. 1978. The Political Economy of Distribution: Equality Versus Inequality.
Elsevier, NY: Elsevier North-Holland.
Webster, Craig. 1994. "Human Rights Practices and International Relations Theory."
Ph.D. Diss. State University of New York at Binghamton.
Weigel, Van. 1989. A Unified Theory of Global Development. New York: Praeger
Publishers.
Welsch, R.E. and E. Kuh. 1977. “Technical Report 923-77: Linear Regression
Diagnostics.” Cambridge: Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.
Weston, Burns H.. 1992. Human Rights. In Human Rights in the World Community, ed.
Richard P. Claude and Burns H. Weston. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Wolpin. Miles. 1986. "State Terrorism and Repression in the Third World: Parameters and
Prospects." In Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research,
ed. Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
World Bank. (Various Years). Social Indicators of Development. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press.
World Bank. (Various Years). World Development Report.
World Bank. (Various Years). World Tables. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Young, Oran. 1980. "International Regimes" Problems of Concept Formation" World
Politics 32: 331-56.
Young, Oran. 1986. "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions."
World Politics 39: 104-22.
Ziegenhagen, Eduard A.  1986. The Regulation of Political Conflict. New York:
Praeger.
